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Preface
Economic agents often face a lack of commitment power. Even when best intentions
to honor promises are present ex ante, agents might have incentives to renounce ex post. If
it is not feasible to pin down all contingencies in a formal contract, cooperation might not
be possible. However, long-term relationships can help to solve commitment problems.
If partners interact over and over again, they might be able sustain cooperation even if
this is costly for them in the short run. Cooperation today is then rewarded by future
collaboration, whereas reneging is followed by a termination of the present relationship.
Thus, a self-enforcing system of collaboration can be created, with the use of so-called
relational contracts. This explains why (costly) cooperation can even be sustained if
economic agents only pursue their own interest.
This dissertation presents three chapters, where two of them deal with commitment
problems and the impact of dierent kinds of laws on the ability to sustain cooperation,
whereas one chapter considers an information problem.
In the rst chapter, the behavior of couples within a household is considered. Agree-
ments there are to a large extent implicit, and partners must trust each other to honor
promises. Since punishment in a relationship might assume the form of a separation,
divorce laws can aect cooperation within a household. The second chapter further di-
vides the reputational aspects of an ongoing relationship. If a relationship is potentially
long-lasting and the current partner might be replaced, it is also important whether a
player is trusted by potential new partners. However, if it is not possible to build up an
external reputation  for example due to a lack of market transparency  cooperation
within a relationship can only be enforced if sucient turnover costs are present. This,
however, leads to eciency losses, which can be mitigated by a minimum wage. The third
chapter addresses information problem that a multinational enterprise faces if it wants
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to explore new investment opportunities. Before market entry, it is uncertain whether it
will be successful there, and learns about that after entry. Since conditions in dierent
market are correlated, the rm can also use information gathered in one market to learn
about the terms in other markets. This correlated learning can explain why rms pursue
a gradual expansion strategy over time rather than exploring all protable opportunities
simultaneously.
All three chapters capture dierent kinds of problems and can be read independently
of each other.
The rst chapter, Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and Di-
vorce (joint with Ray Rees) derives conditions for cooperation within a relationship
when both partners are solely driven by their self-interest and not able to make formally
binding commitments. Thus, all promises must be self enforcing, i.e., part of an equilib-
rium of the dynamic game. More precisely, we analyze the decision of a couple whether
to get married, how many children to have, and whether to remain together or break up.
Generally, children not only provide utility, but are also associated with costs. One part-
ner (denoted the secondary earner) will usually stay at home for some time to raise the
children. Thus, she faces opportunity costs in the form of current income losses as well
as future earning reductions  the latter induced by a reduced accumulation of human
capital. Therefore, the secondary earner will usually be less inclined to have children
than her partner. However, funds within the household can be reallocated in a way to
compensate the secondary earner for the associated opportunity costs. Since it is not
possible to write a formal contract, all related promises have to be self-enforcing and part
of equilibrium strategies. Cooperative behavior is only individually rational if reneging
is followed by sucient and credible punishment. Since the outside option in a relation-
ship is to a large extent captured by separation, spouses use the possibility to leave as a
punishment threat. Then, payos in equilibrium as well as o equilibrium determine the
feasible amount of cooperation. Furthermore, we explore the impact of several divorce
laws on the enforceability of transfers, and thus on fertility. Divorce costs, for exam-
ple, generally have a positive impact on fertility by increasing relationship stability and
decreasing players' reservation utilities. Thus, a marriage can serve as a commitment
device to enforce cooperation within a relationship. However, higher divorce costs do
not necessarily increase welfare. Making a divorce more dicult also induces couples to
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stay together when their match quality has become relatively bad and they would rather
prefer to break up (absent divorce costs). If the gains from an increased commitment
are lower than this welfare loss, a couple might abstain from getting married ex ante and
rather choose to cohabit.
The second chapter, MinimumWages and Relational Contracts, develops a tractable
model that shows that if agents must be motived to exert eort, various  empirically
observed  consequences of a minimum wage can be explained. Furthermore, if relational
contracts, i.e., contracts based on observable but non-veriable measures, are used and
agents can be replaced, an appropriate minimum wage increases the total surplus created
within an employment relationship. The driving factor behind these results is a rm's
optimal choice of incentives. If rms are forced to pay a higher wage than actually
intended, they will also require their employees to work harder. More precisely, a labor
market with many homogenous rms and employees exists, with more employees than
rms. The market is frictionless, and no (exogenous) turnover costs exist, why it is
always possible for a rm to costlessly replace an agent. Furthermore, the market is
not fully transparent in a sense that if turnover occurs, it is not possible to detect the
reason, i.e., if an agent is red or leaves voluntarily. Thus, a rm cannot build up an
external  or market  reputation for honoring its promises. This creates a commitment
problem: Instead of making promised payments as a reward for previous eort, rms
might have an incentive to renounce and replace employees. Therefore, the only way
to induce agents to work is the existence of endogenous turnover costs. However, rms
are also exposed to these turnover costs whenever their employees leave for exogenous
reasons. Although they have all bargaining power, rms are thus not able to capture the
whole surplus of an employment relationship. Then, they face a tradeo between giving
high incentives (induced by high wages) and reducing turnover costs (which also increase
with equilibrium wages). Even if maximum incentives are possible, employers voluntarily
decrease them and enforce an eort level which is ineciently low. Forcing rms to pay a
minimum wage will make it optimal for rms to let agents work harder, inducing a surplus
increase. To capture employment eects as well, the model is extended accordingly. In
one specication it is assumed that prots are positive. Furthermore, a rm can employ
many agents. Then, employment is chosen eciently for a given level of equilibrium eort.
However, since rms voluntarily decrease incentives to reduce endogenous turnover costs,
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eort and consequently also employment will be ineciently low. By increasing eort, a
minimum wage thus also induces a rm to employ more agents than before.
The third chapter, On the Genesis of Multinational Networks (joint with Peter Eg-
ger, Valeria Merlo, and Georg Wamser) deals with information problems. Specically,
this part explores how multinational enterprises (MNEs) develop their network of for-
eign aliates. It is commonly observed that MNEs tend to pursue a gradual expansion
strategy of their network of foreign aliates over time rather than exploring all protable
opportunities simultaneously. They typically establish themselves in their home coun-
tries and then enter new foreign markets step by step. We propose a model where MNEs
face uncertainty concerning their success in new markets and learn about that after en-
try. Conditions in dierent markets are not independent, and the information gathered
in one country can also be used to learn about conditions in other, in particular, sim-
ilar countries. This so-called correlated learning can explain why rms expand step by
step: market entry is associated with considerable costs, and sequential investments help
to economize on these costs by reducing uncertainty. The learning model developed in
this paper serves to derive a number of testable hypotheses regarding market entry in
general and simultaneous versus sequential market entry in specic. These hypotheses
are assessed in a data-set of the universe of German MNEs and their foreign aliates.
The results provide empirical evidence for correlated learning as a main driver behind
international expansion strategies.
Chapter 1
Household Relational Contracts for
Marriage, Fertility, and Divorce1
1.1 Introduction
Countries worldwide have observed a substantial decline in fertility rates over the
past 50 years.2 Besides various other aspects,3 the strong increase in female labour force
participation is very likely to be a driving factor of this development (Michael, 1985, Ahn
and Miro, 2002). While women still have to take major parts of the responsibilities of
raising children, female education has considerably improved over time and reached or
even exceeded male levels in many countries. This has substantially increased women's
opportunity costs for having children. Current income losses when staying at home have
become higher, as well as future earning reductions  the latter induced by a reduced
accumulation of human capital. In many discussions on how to deal with low fertility,
there is a large focus on how to reduce these costs by reconciling work and family life  for
example with the help of child-care facilities or part-time occupations. However, spouses
can also compensate each other for their income losses by means of an adequate allocation
of funds within the household. No ex ante commitment to any such allocation is possible,
1This chapter is joint work with Ray Rees.
2For example, total fertility rates (live births per woman) in Europe have gone down from 2.56 (1960-
1965) to 1.53 (2005-2010). During the same time period, the decrease in the US was from 3.31 to 2.07
and in Canada from 3.68 to 1.65. Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Aairs
(2011).
3For example the birth control pill, an easier access to abortion, or the decline in infant mortality
(see Doepke, 2005).
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though, and there is always the possibility that a partner breaks a given promise.
This paper derives conditions for cooperation within a relationship. Funds within the
household are reallocated in a way to compensate the partner responsible for raising the
couple's joint children for the associated opportunity costs. However, both partners are
solely driven by their self-interest and furthermore not able to make formally binding
commitments. Thus, the corresponding transfers must be self enforcing, i.e., part of an
equilibrium of the dynamic game. An important aspect of feasible cooperation are the
implications of a divorce. After a divorce, implicit agreements are replaced by formal
rules, and having separation as an option  as a possibility happening in equilibrium or
as a threat to punish a partner for not cooperating  is important for the enforceability of
a specic within-household allocation. Generally, more restrictive divorce laws increase
commitment and the scope for cooperation. Therefore, they consequently raise fertility
within a marriage. On the other hand, if the match quality has become low and part-
ners would prefer to break up, complications associated with a divorce decrease welfare.
Couples contemplating a marriage thus face a trade-o when a potential later separation
is more dicult. Increased commitment allows for more redistribution, whereas ending a
bad match becomes more dicult.
More precisely, this paper analyzes the interrelationships among decisions on whether
to marry or cohabit, how many children to have, and whether to stay in the relationship
or not. The underlying model consists of two risk-neutral players, the primary (he) and
the secondary earner (she), who form a  potentially  long-lasting relationship. First,
they decide whether to marry or cohabit and then how many children they want to have.
When children are present, the secondary earner abstains from work for some time. This
causes current income losses as well as a reduced accumulation of human capital, thus
inducing lower future wages. In later periods, the couple decides whether to remain
together or to separate. Such a decision will also be aected by factors that are usually
not part of an economic model, like love and caring for the present as well as a potential
new partner. To capture these aspects, we introduce a stochastic utility component that
is added to players' payos once the broke up. Realizations of these outside utilities are
drawn at the beginning of every period and revealed to the spouses. Then, remaining
together is ecient if the sum of players' payo levels within the relationship is higher
Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and
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than outside.4 However, reallocations of funds can also be needed to maintain an ecient
marriage. One partner might prefer a separation, while the other might want to stay
together. Then, the former has to be suciently compensated. Such a transfer might or
might not always be enforceable, depending on the underlying assumptions concerning
the timing of payments. We analyze both cases, namely that the couple only breaks up
if it is ecient, and the situation that also inecient separations can occur.
Since she bears the associated opportunity costs, the secondary earner will usually be
less inclined to have children than her partner. However, this decision has to be made
unanimously, why individual utility maximization will lead to an ineciently low fertility
level. Then, a Pareto improvement is possible. The secondary earner might agree to
having more children in exchange for a more preferable allocation of funds within the
households. More precisely, if utilities from staying together are higher than those from
breaking up, the resulting surplus can be redistributed and used to give incentives for
cooperation.
However, it is not possible to formally commit to a certain contingent allocation of
this surplus ex ante. Therefore, all related promises have to be self-enforcing and part of
equilibrium strategies.5 Cooperative behavior is only individually rational if reneging is
followed by sucient and credible punishment. Formally, the maximum feasible amount
of cooperation can be pinned down into one enforceability constraint which states that
the total future equilibrium surplus (net of reservation utilities, i.e., their payos ab-
sent any cooperation) must be higher than the reneging temptations today. Whether
the respective constraint binds (and then reduces feasible cooperation) depends on the
relationship stability in equilibrium, the steepness of the functions determining the sec-
ondary earner's opportunity costs of having children, and the severity of punishment.
Since the outside option in a relationship is to a large extent captured by separation,
spouses use the possibility to leave as a punishment threat. However, low separation
payos alone are not sucient to foster cooperation, primarily because separation must
actually be a punishment and the respective threat has to be credible. Concerning the
rst, as established earlier, the couple might also break up in equilibrium. If this is very
4The common assumption that the couple receives utility just by being together is captured by
making the values of these outside utilities net of any internal "relationship utilities".
5Although bargining models might implicitly assume a dynamic setting to support ecient decisions,
they do not make precise the conditions necessary for cooperation.
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likely to happen soon anyway, payo dierences between on- and o-equilibrium outcomes
are small. Thus, a separation only is a severe punishment if the relationship is relatively
stable in equilibrium.6 Furthermore, a separation must be credible in a sense that it has
be optimal for players to actually terminate the relationship absent any cooperation. If
a separation o equilibrium is very unattractive for both players, it will probably take
some time until suciently high values of the stochastic outside utilities are realized and
the punishment is actually carried out. Then, the scope for cooperation in equilibrium is
reduced. However, we take the possibility into account that the value of the relationship
will automatically go down after a spouse reneges on their promises. Consequently, if the
relationship is suciently unpleasant, a separation will always occur immediately after a
deviation, and low separation payos always help to sustain cooperation.
After identifying the Pareto-ecient equilibrium, we analyze the situation following a
divorce in more detail. While agreements during a relationship are to a large extent im-
plicit, this changes after a divorce. When all goodwill is lost, issues like nancial support
or access to children are mainly governed by law. Thus, we take an institutional perspec-
tive and analyze the impact of dierent policy changes on fertility, marriage stability, and
the propensity to get married (versus cohabiting). In doing so, we want to contribute
to the discussion concerning low birth rates in many countries. We argue that  besides
reasons that deal with the above mentioned increased opportunity costs  a change in
the enforceability of transfers induced by legal amendments can be an important factor
determing fertility levels.
A major part of this analysis deals with divorce costs. Our model predicts that divorce
costs generally have a positive impact on fertility by increasing relationship stability and
decreasing players' reservation utilities. Only if they make an o-equilibrium divorce
threat too uncredible, they might create adverse eects. Thus, a marriage can serve as a
commitment device to enforce cooperation within a relationship. This idea has already
been discussed by Becker (1991) and Rawthorn (1999), formally derived by Matouschek
and Rasul (2008), and empirically tested by various authors (see Rasul, 2003, Stevenson,
2007, Matouschek and Rasul, 2008, or Bellido and Marcen, 2011). The latter use the move
6The result that a high probability of getting divorced reduces cooperation within a relationship goes
back to Lommerud (1989), who assumes that cooperation is driven by voice enforcement rather then
players' self interest within a repeated setup. It is supported empirically by Lundberg and Rose (1999),
where a higher divorce risk is associated with lower levels of specialization.
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from mutual-consent to unilateral divorce regimes that occured in US and Europe in the
second half of the 20th century.7 Assuming that a separation is easier and thus less costly
(also taking non-monetary aspects into account) under unilateral divorce, they present
evidence that lower divorce costs imply lower fertility levels. However, higher divorce
costs do not necessarily increase welfare in our model. Making a divorce more dicult
also induces couples to stay together when their match quality has become relatively
bad and they would rather prefer to break up (absent divorce costs). If the gains from
an increased commitment are lower than this welfare loss, a couple might abstain from
getting married ex ante and rather choose to cohabit. Putting it dierently, higher divorce
costs will increase fertility given a couple is married. If, however, they induce the partners
to cohabit (where separation costs are substantially lower), higher divorce costs might
ultimately decrease fertility. The claim that total welfare might not necessarily increase
in divorce costs is in line with the empirical results presented by Alesina and Giuliano
(2007) who  dierent from Rasul (2003) or Matouschek and Rasul (2008)  nd that
unilateral divorce does not imply a decrease but rather an increase in the number of
marriages. Concerning fertility, Alesina and Guiliano (2007) also nd that in wedlock
fertility basically remains unaected by the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, while out
of wedlock fertility decreases signicantly and fertility rates for newly wedded couples go
up. This supports our view that the impact of divorce costs on marriage and total fertility
is not as obvious as it might seem and captures more aspects than just an increased degree
of commitment.
In addition to divorce costs, we analyze the impact of wealth division rules (more
precisely, we consider alimony payments that are solely based on income dierences  as
players are risk neutral, however, there is no accumulation of wealth in addition to human
capital). Although having no (direct) impact on relationship stability, they can help to
increase fertility. Since raising children is associated with a decrease in future income for
one spouse, alimony payments can serve as an insurance against this human capital loss.
Both eects together  no direct impact on relationship stability in equilibrium combined
with an increased slackness of the enforceability constraint  increase the relative benets
of being married compared to cohabiting for higher alimony payments.
7Whereas a mutual-consent divorce regime either requires both partners to agree on a divorce or
alternatively a proof of one partner's misbehaving, just one partner is sucient to induce a separation
under unilateral divorce.
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Finally, we allow for a reduction of the primary earner's access to his children following
a separation. By fostering marriage stability, reducing reservation utility and therefore
increasing the punishment following no cooperation, such restrictions can help to increase
fertility as well. However, their impact on a couple's propensity to marry should be
limited, since the primary earner's access to his children is usually not only reduced after
a divorce but also after breaking up a cohabitation.
Related Literature
This paper relates to the vast literature on (theoretical) household economics, where
a large part of this literature is underlied by the assumption that family members act
cooperatively and necessarily achieve Pareto ecient allocations.8 For example, the Nash
bargaining models of household behavior originating with Manser and Brown (1980) and
McElroy and Horney (1981) assume that household allocations are Pareto ecient and can
somehow be enforced as binding agreements even in a one-shot game. Also the collective
models of the houshold (for instance, see Browning and Chiappori, 1998) assume that
the household maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities. Using cooperative game
theory, all previous papers consider individual utilities but take cooperative behavior as
given. Early challenges to this assumption were made by Ulph (1988), Woolley (1988)
and, within the Nash bargaining framework, by Ott (1992), Konrad and Lommerud
(1995), and Lundberg and Pollak (2003), among others. Applying non-cooperative game
theory to household decision making in a static environment, they identify sources of
inecient behavior of household members.
Instead of assuming either cooperative or non-cooperative behavior, we derive con-
ditions for cooperation in a dynamic setup where players are solely driven by their self-
interest and not able to write exogenously enforceable agreements. Thus, the present
paper directly relates to the theory of relational contracts, which provides an appropriate
tool to gain new insights into decision-making within households. Relational contracts
are dynamic games based on actions or outcomes that are observable but not veriable,
i.e., the associated contracts are not legally enforceable. As agreements in household re-
lationships are to a large extent implicit and extend over quite long periods of time, they
8See Apps and Rees (2009), Chapter 3 for an extensive survey and list of references.
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present a good subject for an analysis with a relational contracts model. Starting with
Bull (1987), relational contract were initially developed to analyze labour markets and
agency situations. MacLeod/Malcomson (1989) provide a complete analysis for perfect
information, while Levin (2003) explores the case of imperfect public monitoring. Fur-
thermore, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) or Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) study
the interaction between relational and formal contracts. This is linked to our model since
after a divorce, implicit agreements between partners are basically replaced by formal
arrangements.
Most closely related to the present analysis is the aforementioned paper by Matouschek
and Rasul (2008). They develop a model where ongoing cooperation within the household
creates an exogenously given benet and has to be enforced by sucient punishment
threats. Divorce costs serve as a commitment device and thus increase cooperation.
Our paper diers by making precise a couple's fertility decision  which only happens in
relatively early stages of a relationship  and the consequences of having children, i.e.,
the associated opportunity costs.
1.2 The Model
Two individuals decide whether to form a household and, if so, whether to marry or
cohabit. In each case a household consists of a primary (he) and a secondary earner
(she)9, denoted i = 1, 2. The time horizone is innite, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., and players discount
the future with the factor δ ∈ (0, 1)10.
In the rst period of the game, i.e., in t = 0, the couple has n ≥ 0 children (how n
is determined is analyzed below). For convenience, we assume n is a real number. This
makes the secondary earner spend a share g(n) of her total time allocation (normalized
to 1) for raising children in t = 0, with g(0) = 0, g′ > 0, g′′ ≥ 0 and g(n) ≤ 1 for relevant
fertility levels. The remaining time she is working and earns (1− g(n))w20, where w20 is
her wage in period t = 0. In all future periods, the secondary earner supplies her total
time allocation to the labour market, earning w2t(n) ≥ 0. Because of work-related human
9The pronouns reect the fact that 70-90% of secondary earners in North America and Europe are
female. See Immervoll et al., 2009, Table 1, for country specic numbers.
10In addition to discounting, 1− δ can also represent an exogenous probability of separation.
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capital acquisition, the wage is an increasing concave function of her period 0 labor supply
and therefore a decreasing convex function of fertility, i.e., w′2t < 0 and w
′′
2t ≥ 0.11 It is
assumed that human capital accumulation only occurs in the rst period12, and the wage
w2t(n) ≡ w2(n) is constant for t ≥ 1.
The primary earner works full time in every period and earns w1t in period t. As his
human capital accumulation is of no interest to our analysis, w1t is constant over time
and equals w1. Furthermore, we assume that w1 > w2(n) ≥ w20.
Per period utility functions if the household is formed are uit = xit + ϕi(n), with
ϕi(0) = 0, ϕ
′
i > 0 and ϕ
′′
i < 0 for i = 1, 2, where x is a private consumption good. The
individual consumptions are dened by:
x1t = w1 − pt t = 0, 1, ... (1.1)
x20 = w20[1− g(n)] + p0 (1.2)
x2t = w2(n) + pt t = 1, 2, ... (1.3)
where pt T 0 is a payment made from one partner to the other. If pt > 0, the primary
earner makes the payment, whereas pt < 0 implies a transfer from the secondary to the
primary earner. The payment pt need not be explicit - its value is implied by any choice
of n and the xit, given w1, w20 and w2(n). For analytical purposes however it is useful to
treat this as if it were an explicit payment. On the other hand, no explicit contract on
the pt is feasible, it has to be part of an equilibrium supported by the household relational
contract (HRC), dened below.
In periods t = 1, 2, ..., the couple makes the decision whether to separate or remain
together. A separation has the following consequences
• Each receives an exogenously given outside net utility ṽi in every period which re-
ects possibilities outside the relationship, such as potential new partners, as well as
11Note that the reduced wage can also reect diculties of re-entering the labor market after abstain-
ing from it for some time.
12This assumption has no qualitative impact on our results.
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those within, like love or caring for the existing partner. The common assumption
that the couple receives utility just by being together is captured by making the
values of these outside utilities net of any internal "relationship utilities". Thus,
outside utilities also determine the match quality of the couple in a given period. ṽi
is a random variable, drawn in each period with distribution Fi(ṽi) and continuous
density fi(ṽi), strictly positive everywhere on the support [v
0
i , v
1
i ]. Furthermore, we
assume v0i ≤ 0 < v1i and denote the unconditional expectation E[ṽi] ≡ vi. For now,
we do not impose further restrictions on the distributions. We will implicitly do so
later to have second order conditions satised. Note that ṽ1 is independently dis-
tributed from ṽ2 (and vice versa) and that the ṽi are independently and identically
distributed over time. We also assume that both outside utility realizations, v1 and
v2, are observed by each partner.
13
After a player broke a promise (what this means will be made precise below),
the general quality of living together can be negatively aected. Thus, the reneging
partner's outside utility is increasing by the amount ∆vi in every subsequent period.
• The utility derived from children by the primary earner after a separation is θϕ1(n),
θ ∈ [0, 1]. Here, we want to allow for dierences in legislation determining the access
of the primary earner to his children, given the assumption that custody is granted
to the second earner.14
If the couple had chosen to marry, as opposed to cohabiting, a separation is a divorce
and has two further eects:
• The partners bear possibly unequal divorce costs ki > 0.
• The secondary earner receives a monetary transfer φ{w1t−w2t(n)} from 1. We will
refer to this transfer as a wealth division rule or alimony payments. Since we only
consider risk neutral actors and savings are irrelevant, both terms mean the same
in our setup (especially as the only wealth players accumulate is human capital).
13The assumption that spouses know their partners' outside option fairly well is supported by Peters
(1986)
14Note, we do not take account of any perceived disutility to the children arising from divorce. This
could be treated as a factor, say ρi ∈ (0, 1], applied to both utilities. Nothing in the following discussion
would change qualitatively as a result, as long as the value of ρ for the secondary earner was not so much
smaller than that for the primary earner as to outweigh the eects of θ as analyzed here.
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Although the transfer does not directly depend on the number of children, n enters
via its impact on 2's wages. The factor φ is assumed to be known ex ante and
is determined by divorce law. Note that we are assuming that this law takes into
account the eects of the second earner's withdrawal from the labour market on her
human capital, in assessing the value of the alimony payment. Then, φ measures
the weight given to this eect.
The values for ki, θ and φ remain constant over time. The separation decision is irre-
versible, and we assume that a divorced couple is never getting together again. After
a separation, no voluntary transfer is made anymore. We assume that then, all trust
between (former) spouses is lost, implying that transfers can not be self enforcing (i.e.,
part of an equilibrium  this concept is further specied below) anymore.
As a result of this, the separation utilities in periods t = 1, 2, .. of the partners are (as
all parameters or expectations are constant over time, the time subscript is omitted), if
married
Ũ1(v1) =
1
1− δ
(w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)])− k1 + v1 +
δ
1− δ
v1 (1.4)
and
Ũ2(v2) =
1
1− δ
(w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + φ[w1 − w2(n)])− k2 + v2 +
δ
1− δ
v2 (1.5)
Furthermore, we denote the expectation of separation utilities E[Ũi(ṽi)] = Ũ1(vi) ≡ Ũi.
If the partners are not married, we simply set ki = φ = 0. Thus we model cohabitation
as essentially the decision to avoid divorce costs and dispense with legal regulation of
alimony payments and child custody/access arrangements.15
To complete the model setup we specify the timing of events within one period. At
the beginning of t = 0, the couple decides whether to get married or live together in
cohabitation.16 Formally, each player announces a value mi ∈ {0, 1}. mi = 1 indicates
that player i wants to get married, whereas mi = 0 implies that the player prefers to
cohabit. The spouses marry if and only if both agree, i.e., if m ≡ m1m2 = 1. Otherwise,
the couple cohabits. Then, they unanimously decide on n, the number of children. If the
15As well as the costs or utility of the act of getting married in itself.
16The matching process, i.e., how the spouses meet, is beyond the scope of our analysis and taken as
exogenously given.
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individually desired levels dier, the lower of both is realized.
Afterwards, the primary earner works, while the secondary earner allocates her time
between work and raising children, as specied above. After players received their income,
a transfer p0 is made.
At the beginning of each subsequent period and if the couple is still together, both
observe the realizations of this period's outside utilities, v1,t and v2,t. Taking these into
account, the spouses then decide whether to remain together or not. Formally, players
announce dit ∈ {0, 1}, where dit = 1 indicates that player i wants to remain together
for period t. If at least one of them chooses dit = 0, they irrevocably break up.
17 The
variable dt ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the relationship is still active in period t. It is
dened recursively by dt = dt−1d1td2t, with d0 = 1. Once they separate, spouses receive
their previously specied separation utilities Ũi. Otherwise, both work and receive their
income, followed by the transfer pt. We do not impose any exogenous bound on the
transfer levels. This implicitly assumes that players can save or borrow, an issue not
modelled here due to the lack of additional insight when players are risk neutral.
Note that we abstract from monetary aspects of having children. If we included
such costs and assumed a given allocation among partners, our results would not be
aected qualitatively. The same would be true for laws supporting parents nancially.
Furthermore, our alimony payments or wealth division rules do not take the utility of
children into account and are only supposed to compensate the secondary earner for her
human capital loss. Thus, we do not consider child support laws. These are beyond the
scope of our analysis, especially as one problem associated with them is that fathers often
do not pay despite the existence of a legal title (see Allen and Brinig, 2010).
Our assumptions with regard to g(n), i.e., the time needed to raise children and the
fact that only the secondary earner participates, require some attention. If child-care
facilities were available, g(n) and the associated human capital loss could be reduced.
However, this would not aect our results, as long as a substantial amount of time still
has to be spent by parents. Since especially newborns can not be given away immediately
after birth, g(n) must be positive even in the presence of child-care facilities. Another
aspect not covered in our model is that parents actually derive utility from spending time
17If they are married, we thus assume a unilateral divorce regime.
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with their children (instead of just having them). Thus, parents might decide to stay at
home for a longer time than is actually necessary.
The assumption that only the secondary earner stays at home is quite restrictive and
causes ineciently low fertility levels, generating the need for redistribution within the
relationship. This will become clear below, just note that if the partners were able to
commit to an arbitrary allocation of g(n), they could choose it in a way to obtain ecient
fertility. Taking a certain allocation of g(n) among players as exogenously given (which is
the crucial aspect here; the assumption that only the secondary earner partially abstains
from the labour market is just made for convience) thus has to be justied by issues
outside our model. We argue that this restriction is sensible and that especially cultural
reasons often prevent fathers from assuming their share of responsibilities eciently.18
For example, many (especially Western) countries regard it as a problem that women
still are mainly responsible for raising children  especially since men are not better
educated anymore. The human capital loss induced by women's diculties to re-enter
the labor market after a pregnancy is seen as one the mean reasons for low fertility rates.
Many suggestions have been made how these responsibilities could be distributed more
equally. As an example, Sweden and Germany oer nancial assistance to men staying
at home for some time with their newborns (these programmes are not gender-specic 
yet, participation of men is either a prerequesite or extends their duration).
Furthermore, many jobs are designed in ways that doing them part-time is not pos-
sible. Then, the couple is just not able to share the time needed to take care of children
more equally and has to make a decision which of both partners completely stays at
home. Finally, ex-ante promises made by the primary earner to stay at home for some
time might not be credible. Taking this into account, the secondary earner will be more
reluctant to have children.
18One has to be careful using the term ecient here, as many aspect beyond a purely economic view
may enter.
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1.3 Household Relational Contracts
1.3.1 The game
Players have to decide on whether to form a household, and if they do so the legal form
of their relationship, the number of children they want to have, payments pt, and whether
they separate or stay together in later periods. We assume that - while together - they
formulate a Household Relational Contract (HRC) which is a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game and species all actions players will take conditional on all possible histories.
However, this can not be a legally binding contract contingent on actions or outcomes,
because of the non-veriability of the payments pt.
19
Let us briey give a formal characterization of actions, strategies and conditions for
a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., a Household Relational Contract. There, instead of
just referring to the net transfer pt, we split it into the individual contributions of players
1 and 2, with pt = p1,t + p2,t, where p1,t ≥ 0 and p2,t ≤ 0. Obviously, only the net
transfer pt is relevant and thus used in all other sections. However, splitting it into two
components simplies a characterization of strategies.
Furthermore, the number of children is realized as follows. Each player announces
their preferred preferred fertility level ni, i = 1, 2. Since this decision has to be made
unanimously, we assume for convenience that realized fertility n is the smaller of both
players' announcements, i.e., n = min{n1, n2}.
Then, the history ht species all events that occur at time t. For t = 0, we have
h0 = {m1,m2, n1, n2, d1,0, d2,0, p1,0, p2,0} (note that d1,0 = d2,0 = d0 = 1 by assump-
tion). For all t ≥ 1, the history is ht = {d1,t, d2,t, p1,t, p2,t}. Then, ht = {hτ}t−1τ=0 is the
history path at beginning of period t, with h0 = ∅. H t = {ht} characterizes the set of
history paths until time t, while H = ∪tH t is the set of histories.
A strategy σi for player i, i = 1, 2, is a sequence of functions Mi ∪Ni ∪ {Pi,t, Di,t}∞t=0,
where Mi : H
0 → {0, 1} species whether the couple gets married (if m = m1m2 = 1)
or cohabits (m = 0). Ni : H
0 ∪ {m1,m2} → [0,∞) describes the process determining
19This is supported by the argument that individual consumptions within a household cannot be
veriably measured. In reality of course there is a far richer set of reasons for the impossibility of
complete marital contracts than this.
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fertility at the beginning of period t = 0, and n = min{n1, n2} is the realized fertility
level. Di,t : H
t ∪ {v1,t, v2,t} → {0, 1}, t ≥ 1, characterizes players' decisions whether
they want to remain together (di,t = 1) or separate, with dt = dt−1d1,td2,t and d0 =
1. Finally, transfers are determined by P1,t : H
t ∪ {v1,t, v2,t, d1,t, d2,t} → [0,∞) and
P2,t : H
t ∪ {v1,t, v2,t, d1,t, d2,t} → (−∞, 0] for periods t ≥ 1, where the net transfer pt
equals p1,t + p2,t. In t = 0, the functions are P1,0 : H
0 ∪ {m1,m2, n1, n2} → [0,∞) and
P2,0 : H
0 ∪ {m1,m2, n1, n2} → (−∞, 0].
Denoting a player's payos following history ht Ui(σ1, σ2 | ht), a strategy prole
(σ1, σ2) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if following any history ht,
σ1 ∈ argmax
σ̃1
U1(σ̃1, σ2 | ht)
σ2 ∈ argmax
σ̃2
U1(σ1, σ̃2 | ht)
1.3.2 Fertility, Transfers, and Constraints
The spouses will use the payments pt as an incentive tool to either raise fertility or
maintain the relationship.20 This increases eciency as  absent any transfers  fertility
is too low and separation probabilities are too high. Note that we refer to eciency as
the outcome players would choose if they were able to fully commit.
Too low fertility is induced by the exogenously given distribution of the costs and
benets of having children, i.e., the fact that only the secondary earner (partially) refrains
from the labor market to raise them in period t = 0. Thus - and since the decision about
n has to be made unanimously - it is very likely that the individually optimal levels of
n dier between spouses. Then, gains from cooperation exist which the partners can try
to exploit. The partner bearing relatively higher costs (in relation to the benets) might
be willing to agree on having more children than individually optimal if compensation is
(credibly) promised.
Inecient separation has to be prevented if staying together is ecient, i.e, outside
utility realizations (v1, v2) in a period are low enough that the sum of utility streams when
remaining together is higher than
∑
i Ũ(vi), but if one player would nd it individually
20Transfers always can always contain a purely redistributive component as well.
Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and
Divorce 19
optimal to split. Then, a transfer exists that makes it optimal for both to remain together.
However, transfers to increase eciency by giving incentives to raise fertility and pre-
vent inecient divorce must be self-enforcing, i.e., part of a subgame perfect equilibrium
as specied above. For example, assume a transfer is supposed to be positive. Then, it
must be in the interest of the primary earner to actually make it ex post, i.e., after the
secondary earner has delivered, either by agreeing on a higher fertility level or abstaining
from inducing a separation. Thus, although he might be willing to make that transfer ex
ante, the limits of commitment - recall that no explicit contingent contracts are feasible
- might make him renounce this promise ex post. As this is anticipated by the secondary
earner, her ex-ante willingness to cooperate would be limited by his credibility.
More precisely, a payment will only be made if reneging triggers sucient punishment.
We use the standard dynamic games/relational contracts approach21 and assume that
after someone reneged, the relationship has become unpleasant, and any trust between
the partners is lost. Thus, the harshest possible punishment is used (Abreu, 1986),
implying that the equilibrium with the lowest payo for the player that reneged (pushing
that player down to their reservation utility) is played. As the only decision players can
make in periods t ≥ 1 determines whether they want to remain together, punishment here
must take the form of a separation.22 Still, this punishment threat has to be credible.
Assume that a player did not act as intended and is supposed to be punished by a
separation. If staying together is in the interest of both in the following period, the
punishment will be postponed until a suciently high draw of one of the outside utilities
is realized.23 Furthermore, a separation only eectively penalizes a player if it does not
occur in equilibrium anyway. Thus, transfers to reward cooperation can be enforced more
easily if separation is less likely in equilibrium and if the probability that  absent transfers
 one partner breaks up is higher. However, both issues might contradict each other to
some extent. As an example, take 2's divorce costs k2. It is straightforward and will be
21For example, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).
22In the household Nash bargaining literature, considerable discussion has taken place over whether
separation is too drastic a punishment for failure to disagree, and this has led to models which take as
threat points non-cooperative Nash equilibria within an ongoing household. It is said, for example, that
one would not threaten divorce over a failure to agree on the colour of a sofa. While we agree with
that viewpoint, the class of household decisions being analyzed in this paper is we believe suciently
fundamental that threats based on separation are the appropriate ones to assume.
23Formally, a player can always make sure to receive his/her minmax-payo. Furthermore, note that
as reneging triggers all cooperation to cease, it does not matter whose outside utility is suciently high.
Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and
Divorce 20
shown below that higher divorce costs generally make divorce less likely. But they also
increase the probability that the secondary earner is willing to stay within the marriage
anyway and does not need a compensation. Therefore, it is not clear whether higher
divorce costs k2 have a positive or negative impact on the enforceability of transfers.
However, a broken promise can also have an impact on the general quality of living
together as well. Thus we assume that after a player reneged, the partner`s outside utility
increases by ∆vi in every period in each state. The size of ∆vi has no qualitative impact
on our results, unless it is so large that a punishment is always credible and divorce
immediately occurs after a deviation. Both cases will be analyzed separately below.
Concluding, a spouse who wants to reward one's partner for cooperation has to make a
payment now but is punished in the future for not acting accordingly. Thus, ineciency
can still pertain in equilibrium, if either a punishment cannot be enforced immediately
after a deviation and/or if the future is not valuable enough.
While having children is a discrete act, the same is not necessarily true for making
transfers and inducing a breakup. The period between which payments are feasible could
be made arbitrarily small (Wickelgren, 2007, among others, is making this argument),
and there are good reasons why an articial division into xed periods does not reect
the real life of a couple. Thus, the main part of our paper will impose the assumption
that the decision whether to separate or remaining together is always made eciently
in equilibrium. In the Appendix, we show that we approach this outcome arbitrarily
close by assuming that time is continuous and each period of a given (discrete) length
can be divided into subperiods. If transfers can be made and a separation be induced
in each of these subperiods,24 making the latter arbitrarily small lets the couple getting
separated almost only when this is actually ecient. The reason is that any reneging is
almost immediately followed by a punishment. Afterwards, we take the initially assumed
discrete nature of the game literal and show what happens if inecient breakups can
happen on the equilibrium path.
Before continuing with the formal analysis, we briey want to discuss a separation
always is necessary to punish a devation from cooperative behavior, as it destroys surplus
(o equilibrium) and thus is not renegotiation proof. However, it is possible to construct
an o-equilibrium outcome that actually is renegotiation proof. Instead of breaking up
24Still, the interval between new draws of outside utilities remain xed.
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after a deviation, the couple can continue to play a cooperative equilibrium, but where
the reneging player is subsequently pushed down to their reservation utility. This is
possible because of one important feature of relational contracts  namely that any surplus
distribution can be induced as long as both players at least receive their reservation
utilities. However, both approaches give the same equilibrium outcomes, and our focus
on a non-renegotiation-proof equilibrium is without loss of generalitiy.
In the following, we derive necessary (and sucient) conditions to induce allocations
that increase eciency. These results do not depend on how the resulting surplus is
shared among players. Assuming a transfer to maintain the relationship can be enforced,
actually any surplus distribution is feasible - as long as both players at least receive their
reservation utilities. Thus, our objective is to characterize the set of subgame perfect
equilibria that are Pareto optimal and maximize the sum of players' utilities.
1.4 Constraints in t = 0
In this paragraph, we derive a general condition that species to what extent utility
transfers in period t = 0 are enforceable. If it binds, this condition determines (Pareto
optimal) equilibrium fertility. If it does not bind, the ecient fertility level can be at-
tained. Note that all results derived here hold independent of whether we assume that
the separation decision is always made eciently or not.
It will further become clear that only the (promised) allocation of utility streams that
matters for players' willingness to cooperate, and using an explicit formulation in form
of the transfer p0 is just a useful tool to obtain that objective. This also implies that
players are indierent between receiving/giving current funds (via p0) or expected future
payos as a reward for cooperative behavior - both can be substituted arbitrarily, and
we do not have to speciy how exactly funds are redistributed.
We start with the denition of the relevant payo streams. Dene
U
∗
i ≡ i's expected discounted continuation utility in equilibrium path in t = 1,
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taking into account both non-divorce and divorce states.25
Furthermore, dene
U i ≡ i's expected discounted utility o equilibrium in t = 1.
Note that o-equilibrium or reservation utilities U i do not necessarily coincide with ex-
pected separation utilities Ũi (dened above) because they might cover states where
divorce does not occur. To what extent they dier depends on the credibility of punish-
ment threats. Furthermore, we omit the time subscript. In this section, this is done for
convenience (only continuation utilities in period t = 1 are relevant). However, also in
later periods we do not have to make payos depend on calendar time without loss of
generality.26
At the beginning of period t = 0, both spouses unanimously decide on equilibrium
fertility n∗ and an associated transfer p0, taking future utility allocations into account
(which might be a function of fertility as well).27 If they fail to reach an agreement, they
have n∗∗ children and play the non-cooperative equilibrium from then on. n∗∗ is dened
as n∗∗ = min{n∗∗1 , n∗∗2 }, where n∗∗i is player i's individually preferred non-cooperative
fertility level, i.e., if pt = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Knowledge of n∗∗i also tells us who needs to be compensated in equilibrium, namely
the one with a lower level. We will generally assume that n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , which seems natural
as player 2's human capital reduction is substantially reducing her future earnings. Then,
the players can agree on the following deal at the beginning of period 0. Player 2 is willing
to accept n∗ > n∗∗2 . After the children are born, she receives a transfer p0(n
∗) at the end
of period 0 and/or the promise of higher continuation payos in the future. If she insists
on any smaller number of children, there will be no transfer in period t = 0 as well as in
any other subsequent period. Thus, if she insists on a smaller n, she will always choose
n∗∗.
The opposite is true for n∗∗1 < n
∗∗
2 . Then, the primary earner needs be compensated
25Furthermore, corresponding to the U
∗
i will be (possibly implicit) side payments p which in general
also vary across states
26The reason is that current and future payos are perfect substitutes, and we can thus focus on
stationary contracts.
27For a formal description see section 3.1 above.
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for agreeing on a higher fertility level, either with the (now negative) transfer p0(n
∗) or a
higher expected continuation utility.
Two kinds of conditions have to be satised that n∗ can actually be part of an equi-
librium. First of all, given players believe the transfers are made, it has to be optimal for
both to choose n∗ rather than any other level. Furthermore, transfers have to be credible,
i.e., making them has to give players a higher utility than not making them.
Making n∗optimal for both players giving that promised transfers are made is captured
by incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which are
(IC1)
u11(n
∗)− p0(n∗) + δU
∗
1(n
∗) ≥ u11(n∗∗) + δU
∗
1(n
∗∗)
for player 1, and
(IC2)
u21(n
∗) + p0(n
∗) + δU
∗
2(n
∗) ≥ u21(n∗∗) + δU
∗
2(n
∗∗)
for the second player.
There, ui1(n) is player i's period-0 utility and U
∗
i (n
∗) player i's expected discounted
equilibrium payo stream in period 1.
Note that both constraints have to hold for n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and n
∗∗
1 < n
∗∗
2 . Which of both
cases is actually true only determines whether transfers are negative or positive. In the
rst case, i.e., when n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , p0(n
∗) is positive. Otherwise, (when n∗∗1 < n
∗∗
2 ) p0(n
∗) is
negative.28
Furthermore, it has to be in the interest of players to make a promised transfer.
This is only the case if their utility is higher than otherwise. Thus, reneging requires
a punishment. As discussed above, this punishment takes the form of pushing a player
down to one`s reservation utility. The dynamic enforcement (DE) constraints make these
arguments precise. If a transfer is positive, the primary earner has to decide whether to
make it or renege. He will only keep his promise, if
28If continuation utilities alone give sucient incentives for rst-best equilibrium fertility, it would
even be possible that we observe n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and a negative transfer. However, p0(n
∗) then is solely used
for redistributive purposes in period t = 0 and not to give incentives. We are not further interested in
this possibility, as it would imply that constraints in period t = 0 do not bind in equilibrium and thus
are not relevant.
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(DE1)
p0(n
∗) ≤ δ[U∗1(n∗)− U1(n∗)]
is satised. If the payment is supposed to be negative, the secondary earner makes the
relevant decision. She will only cooperate if her utility after making it is at least as high
as if not, or if
(DE2)
−p0(n) ≤ δ[U
∗
2(n
∗)− U2(n∗)]
is satised.
Note that the (DE) constraints require players to believe that future equilibrium
transfers are made as well.
Combining (IC) and (DE) constraints then gives just one constraint which is both
necessary and sucient for an equilibrium fertility level n∗ to be enforceable.
Proposition 1: If n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 a fertility level n
∗ can be enforced if and only if it
satises the condition
u21(n
∗)− u21(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗) + U2(n
∗∗)
)]
≥ 0 (1.6)
.
If n∗∗1 < n
∗∗
2 , the necessary and sucient condition for equilibrium fertility n
∗ is
u11(n
∗)− u11(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗∗) + U2(n
∗)
)]
≥ 0 (1.7)
The proof for Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix.
The (IC-DE) constraint states that the gains from deviating today, i.e., u21(n
∗∗) −
u21(n
∗) in (1.6), must not exceed the future surplus, i.e., equilibrium payos net of reser-
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vation utilities.
The chosen fertility level has a direct impact on the enforceability of transfers, a fea-
ture usually not observed in relational contracting models, where the production process
tends to be independent across periods. This aspect becomes especially important when
inecient separation occurs in equilibrium, and higher fertility can help to increase rela-
tionship stability. Furthermore, although the kind of production process usually used in
the literature is independent over time, it still remains identical. This implies a further
dimension where our setup diers, as incentives to increase fertility are provided by using
the surplus from remaining together.
The fact that satisfying the (IC-DE) constraint is also sucient for enforcing a fertility
level n∗ (Proposition 1) allows us to separate surplus distribution from incentive giving.
This implies that any surplus distribution that gives players at least their reservation
utilities is enforceable. Thus, we can conne our interest to the (constrained) Pareto
optimal equilibrium, without having to worry about who gets what.
Denoting players' expected payos at the beginning of period t = 0 but after the
marriage decision has been made Ui, equilibrium fertility n
∗ solves
Max
n
U = U1 + U2 (1.8)
subject to (IC-DE).
Depending on the realizations of outside utilities, the couple might break up in equilib-
rium. Thus, the enforceability of transfers crucially depends on the perceived relationship
stability. If partners are convinced that they will end up getting separated anyway, they
are less willing to nd ways to cooperate early on. In the following, we will thus further
analyze the determinants of relationship stability in and o equilibrium.
1.5 Ecient Separation
In this section, we derive conditions for when breaking up is optimal for the couple.
As already pointed out, we also assume that a separation in equilibrium only occurs if it
is ecient (i.e., what the partners would choose if they were able to fully commit) during
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most of our analysis and allow for inecient separations later.
This assumption somehow neglects the discreteness of the model. As we will see
later, taking the discreteness seriously will always induce to situations where remaining
together is ecient but not not possible, as the necessary transfer is not enforceable.
Yet, it is not obvious why it should not be possible to make the separation decision - as
well as corresponding transfers - at any point in time. In Appendix II, we show that if
time is continuous and each original period is subdivided into very small subperiods, we
can get arbitrarily close to the outcome that the couple breaks up if and only if that is
actually ecient.29 Thus - even when this assumption is imposed - players still act within
the framework of a relational contract and not within a bargaining game. If the latter
were true and a bargaining structure like in MacLeod and Malcomson (1995) or Shaked
and Sutton (1984) would be imposed, the surplus distribution on and o equilibrium
would be the same - as well as the decision whether to remain together or break up.
Then, no punishment would be feasible, making it impossible to enforce any transfer.
However, as the game continues with positive probability after a transfer has been made
and since trust in the partner's ongoing willingness to cooperate is necessary to sustain
cooperation at any point in time, remaining within the relational contracts framework
even with the assumption regarding ecient separations seems sensible. This implies two
further issues. If all trust between the players is lost after one reneged, the couple will
break up o equilibrium even if remaining together would be optimal. Furthermore, any
surplus distribution is feasible.30
Take periods t ≥ 1 (note the couple gets together at the beginning of the period t = 0;
thus, the rst time it can break up is t = 1) and assume that the couple is married.31
Dene
u01 = w1 + ϕ1(n) (1.9)
u02 = w2(n) + ϕ2(n) (1.10)
29Note that we do not just want to assume that δ → 1, although this would yield a related outcome
as well. But this could cause problems when relating non-recurring factors - like divorce costs - to
ongoing eects. Furthermore, we would have to specify dierent discount factors between period 0 and
subsequent periods.
30Again, this would allow us to get an outcome that is renegotiation proof - even o equilibrium,
the separation decision could be made eciently, yet pushing the player who deviated down to his/her
reservation utility.
31The issue marriage versus cohabitation is considered below.
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as the per-period utilities the partners would have within the relationship with pt = 0
for t ≥ 1 and U0i as the respective innite discounted payo streams (taking into account
that a divorce might occur in future periods). If
∑2
i=1(U
0
i − Ũi) < 0, a separation is
optimal and will occur.
As all utility components are xed and constant over time except the realizations of ṽi,
the latter determine whether the couple should break up. More precisely, this is specied
by the sum of outside utility realizations, i.e., v1 + v2, independent of the respective
individual values. Thus, dene
ṽ ≡ ṽ1 + ṽ2.
ṽ has distribution F (ṽ) and continous density f(ṽ) (specied below) and is strictly
positive everywhere on the support [v01 + v
0
2, v
1
1 + v
1
2].
Lemma 1: Assume the separation decision is made eciently. Then, a divorce takes
place if and only if ṽ > v̂, where v̂ is dened by
ϕ1(n)(1− θ) + (1− δ)(k1 + k2) + δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ − v̂ = 0 (1.11)
Proof :
The assumption that the couple chooses to get separated if and only if
∑2
i=1(U
0
i −Ũi) <
0 is the rst component needed to establish the existence of the threshold v̂. In addition,
we need that given the threshold setting
∑2
i=1(U
0
i − Ũi) = 0 exists,
∑2
i=1(U
0
i − Ũi) is
decreasing in v̂.
Finding a value v̂ that satises
∑2
i=1(U
0
i − Ũi) = 0 is done recursively. First, we
assume this threshold exists and that a divorce takes place if and only if v > v̂ for any
value of v̂. Then, we derive the conditions for this behavior actually being optimal, i.e.,
specify v̂.
Given the threshold v̂, the partners` expected discounted payo streams within the
relationship when pt = 0 for an arbitrary period t ≥ 1 (which also allows as to omit time
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subscripts) are
U01 = w1 + ϕ1(n) + δ
[
F (v̂)U01 + (1− F (v̂))E[Ũ1 | v ≥ v̂]
]
(1.12)
U02 = w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + δ
[
F (v̂)U02 + (1− F (v̂))E[Ũ2 | v ≥ v̂]
]
(1.13)
Furthermore, recall that the payo streams in a period where a divorce happens equal
Ũ1(v1) =
1
1− δ
(w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)])− k1 + v1 +
δ
1− δ
v1
Ũ2(v2) =
1
1− δ
(w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + φ[w1 − w2(n)])− k2 + v2 +
δ
1− δ
v2
where we take into account the assumption that once a couple breaks up, it will not get
together again in the future. To obtain a characterization of E[Ũi | v ≥ v̂], the realizations
of vi in Ũi(vi) only have to be replaced by E[vi | v ≥ v̂].
There, note that (as v1 and v2 are independently distributed)
f(ṽ) = (f1 ∗ f2)(ṽ) =
v11∫
v01
f1(v1)f2(ṽ − v1)dv1 =
v12∫
v02
f1(ṽ − v2)f2(v2)dv2
and
F (ṽ) =
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)dṽ =
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
 v
1
1∫
v01
f1(v1)f2(ṽ − v1)dv1
 dṽ
Thus,
E[v1 | v ≥ v̂] = 11−F (v̂)
v11+v
1
2∫̂
v
(
v11∫
v01
f1(v1)f2(ṽ − v1)v1dv1
)
dṽ and
E[v2 | v ≥ v̂] = 11−F (v̂)
v11+v
1
2∫̂
v
(
v12∫
v02
f1(ṽ − v2)f2(v2)v2dv2
)
dṽ
Plugging all expressions into U01 + U
0
2 = Ũ1(v1) + Ũ2(v2), applying Bayes` rule (i.e.,
vi = E[vi | v > v̂](1− F (v̂)) + E[vi | v ≤ v̂]F (v̂)) and rearranging gives (1.11).
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Finally, it remains to show that (1.11) is decreasing in v̂. Dierentiating 1.11 with
respect to v̂ gives −(1− δF (v̂)) < 0, which completes the proof.
Note that this proof does not require v̂ ≤ v11 + v12, i.e., that the threshold is below the
upper bound of the support of ṽ. Thus, we also cover the case that divorce never occurs
in equilibrium. It is then easy to prove
Proposition 2: Given that the separation decision is ecient, divorce in a period is
less likely - for a given distribution of outside options - the higher are divorce costs, the
lower is the primary earner's post-separation right of access to the children, θ, and the
higher the number of children, while it is independent of the wealth division parameter
φ, the wage gap w1 − w2 and the second earner's labour supply 1− g(n).
Proof : These follow straightforwardly from implicitly dierentiating (1.11), which
gives dv̂
dk1
= dv̂
dk2
= (1−δ)
(1−δF (v̂)) > 0,
dv̂
dθ
= −ϕ1(n)
(1−δF (v̂)) < 0 and
dv̂
dn
=
ϕ′1(1−θ)
(1−δF (v̂)) > 0
These results are perfectly intuitive: wealth division simply represents a transfer
between the partners. Although it makes the primary earner less prone to le for a
divorce, the opposite is true for the secondary earner, with a net eect of zero. Loss of
the primary earner's access to the children is a form of deadweight loss to the couple,
as are divorce costs. This suggests that there is a tradeo from society's point of view
between the primary earner's post-divorce right of access to the children and the divorce
rate, since increasing the former also raises the latter, other things equal. In the restricted
context of the separation decision, higher fertility leads to a lower divorce rate, since the
deadweight loss from divorce increases with n, given ϕ′1(n) > 0 and θ < 1. Since fertility
is endogenous, however, there is still much more to be said on the relationship between
fertility and divorce.
Note that the results for ki are valid for couples married at the time when the law
changes. They do not imply that divorce rates have to go up in the long run (if costs are
reduced and is θ increased). Instead, a new institutional setting also changes incentives
to actually become married, thus aecting subsequent divorce propensities. We further
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explore this issue in section 9 below, just note that short-run indeed appear to dier from
long-run eects. As an example, take the change to unilateral divorce laws in many US
states some decades ago, which could be regarded as a reduction of divorce costs. In
the short run, divorce rates went up, conrming our predictions; however, they basically
returned to their initial levels after some time (see Wolfers, 2006, or Matouschek and
Rasul, 2008).
1.6 Fertility
We will now proceed with the characterization of equilibrium fertility and derive
comparative statics with respect to several divorce laws. This contributes to the public
discussion on why couples in (especially) Western countries have less and less children.
As already pointed out, this discussion usually restricts attention to a simple benet-
cost analysis and discusses the eectivity of various policies to reduce various costs (also
including parents' human capital loss). All these issues could be incorporated into our
model as well, yielding the predicted results.32 Here, we take a dierent approach and
show that legislation that is not directly aimed towards inuencing peoples' propensity
to have children might have a substantial impact as well. Since costs and benets are at
least partially exogenously given and xed (for reasons explained above), redistribution
within the household is needed to equalize the burden among spouses. However, no formal
contract determining within-household allocation can be written, and all transfers have
to be self-enforcing.
We assume that all cooperation ceases after a separation, and the implicit agreement is
replaced by formal rules.33 Dierent divorce laws have an impact on relationship stability
and/or the absolute and relative welfare levels of spouses after a separation. Thus, these
rules will directly aect each partner's utility as well as the enforceability of transfers by
having an impact on the credibility of punishment threats as well as the risk of being left
alone. Just note that the following results are true for a couple given it becomes married.
It does not necessarily imply that divorce laws have the predicted consequences on an
32For example, providing child-care facilities could to some extent reduce g(n) and thus increase
fertility.
33We will further specify below how our setup relates to the general matter of interactions between
explicit and implicit contracts, as for example analyzed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994).
Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and
Divorce 31
aggregate level. Instead, couples might also adjust their marriage-versus-cohabitation
decision. We will further explore this issue in section 9 below.
Absent any transfers, individually optimal fertility levels n∗∗1 and n
∗∗
2 will generally
dier. To what extent the spouses' interests can be aligned depends on the enforceability
of transfers.
Recall that the couples solves
max
n
U = U1 + U2
subject to the (IC-DE) constraint derived above, where Ui are the expected utility
streams at the beginning of period t = 0, i.e., when the household has just been formed.
The objective in period 0 is set on lifetime utility streams, taking into account the utilities
that will actually be chosen in each state (including divorce utilities in the corresponding
states). The distributional variables are those relevant in period 0, when the allocation
is being chosen. The decision must take into account the eect of the current fertility
choice on all future utilities along the equilibrium path.
If the (IC-DE) constraint does not bind, we get the ecient outcome (in a sense that
it would be chosen by the couple under full commitment), and equilibrium fertility is
described by
Proposition 3: Assuming (IC-DE) does not bind, optimal fertility n∗ satises
αϕ′1(n
∗) + ϕ′2(n
∗) = (1− δ)w20g′0(n∗)− δw′2(n∗) (1.14)
where
α ≡ 1− δ + δ(1− F (v̂))θ
1− δF (v̂)
≤ 1 (1.15)
The proof for Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix.
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This leads to the conclusion that in the presence of a positive probability of divorce
(1 − F (V̂2) > 0) and less than complete access to the children after divorce for the
primary earner (θ < 1) there will be a lower fertility rate than is socially optimal, since
this would require α = 1. The marginal social benet of fertility is 1
1−δ (ϕ
′
1(n
∗) + ϕ′2(n
∗)),
and the marginal social cost (recall that child consumption costs have been set to zero)
is the marginal value of the time the second earner spends in child rearing in both peri-
ods, taking into account also the value in period 1 of the loss of human capital in period 0.
This immediately allows us to obtain some comparative statics with respect to divorce
laws when the ecient fertility level is feasible. As we think it is more relevant given
only the secondary earner stays at home when having children, we only discuss it for the
case of n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 .
Proposition 4: Assume that n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and the respective (IC-DE) constraint does
not bind. Then, higher divorce costs increase equilibrium fertility, a lower access of the
primary earner to his children might or might not increase fertility, while wealth division
laws have no impact.
Proof: Ecient equilibrium fertility is characterized by (1.14). Note that the second
order condition is satised by construction, and we must have ∂
2U
∂n2
< 0 at the optimumal
n∗.
Thus, we have
dn∗
dk1
= dn
∗
dk2
= −f(v̂)δ(1−δ)
2
(1−δF (v̂))3
ϕ′1(n)(1−θ)
∂2U
∂n2
> 0
dn∗
dφ
= 0
dn∗
dθ
= −
f(v̂)(1−δ)
(1−δF (v̂))2
δ dv̂
dθ
ϕ′1(n)(1−θ)+
δ(1−F (v̂))θ
1−δF (v̂) ϕ
′
1(n)
∂2U
∂n2
≶ 0
As wealth division rules after a divorces only redistribute funds between spouses after
a divorce, they cancel out when the constraint does not bind and thus have no impact
on equilibrium fertility.
Condition 1.14 in Proposition 3 gives some intuition on whether increasing divorce
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costs or reducing θ could be expected to raise or lower fertility. Clearly for θ = 1 we
have α = 1 and so fertility will be at its rst best level, since the probability of divorce
no longer plays a role in determining fertility. However, realistically we must have θ < 1
if a couple ceases to cohabit after divorce and the children remain with the secondary
earner.34 Then, higher divorce costs always increase fertility by making divorce less
likely. The probability of the eciency loss induced by a separation is reduced, inducing
the couple to have more children. Thus, divorce costs serve as a commitment device,
an outcome supported empirically by Rasul (2005), Stevenson (2007), Matouschek and
Rasul (2008), or Bellido and Marcï¿½n (2011).
The results of reduing θ are ambiguous because there are two opposing eects. On
the one hand, the marginal return to fertility across divorce states goes down. Yet. the
probability of no divorce increases, and the net eect depends on parameter values and
the form of the distribution function F (.). If θ is close to 1, the latter eect is negligible,
and a reduction of a father's access to his children after a separation always leads to a
fertility reduction.
Finally, reducing the marginal cost on the right hand side of (1.14) would also increase
fertility, and this could be achieved by reducing the rate at which increased fertility
reduces the second earner loss of human capital, clearly strengthening the argument for
policies that allow second earners to combine raising a family with pursuing a career.
The question arises whether higher divorce costs or a decrease in θ are beneciary -
especially when they increase fertility. Although low birth rates aect a society as a whole
(just take the discussions on the nancing of the welfare state), we restrict attention to
the impact of divorce laws on the utitlities of the involved partners. Furthermore, in the
long run only the couple's welfare is relevant. If their utilities are lower in the presence
of divorce laws, they will simply abstain from getting married and instead cohabit. See
section 9 for an analysis of this matter.
Then, as long as the (IC-DE) constraint is not binding, restrictions like higher costs
or a decreased access to children after a divorce reduce total utility.
34Even if there are no legal restriction to a primary earner's access, the pure fact that the parents do
not live together anymore will reduce the time he can spend with his children.
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Lemma 3: Given the ecient fertility level can be enforced, higher divorce costs and
a lower θ decrease total equilibrium surplus U .
Proof: Applying the envelope theorem gives
dU
dki
= ∂U
∂ki
= −δ (1−F (v̂))
1−δF (v̂) < 0
dU
dφ
= 0
dU
dθ
= ∂U
∂θ
= δ
1−δϕ1(n)
1−F (v̂)
1−δF (v̂) > 0
The reason is that although higher costs or a lower access reduce the probability of
divorce, this destroys surplus as players can not consume outside utilities vi where it
would otherwise be optimal (note that marriage stability has no value per se). Thus,
although divorce costs and a lower value of θ serve as a commitment device to increase
fertility, the increased commitment is harmful if the (IC-DE) does not bind.
Binding (IC-DE) constraint
If the relationship is relatively unstable or the dierence between n∗∗1 and n
∗∗
2 large (for
example because 2's marginal human capital loss is high), it is likely that the (IC-DE)
constraint binds and equilibrium fertility is smaller than the ecient level.35
Then, n∗ is determined by the binding constraint, or, in case of n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 ,
u21(n
∗)− u21(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗) + U2(n
∗∗)
)]
= 0
There, it is worth to further specify o-equilibrium utilities U1(n
∗) and U2(n
∗∗). Recall
that after a player deviated, no more transfers are made in the future. The couple
breaks up if inducing a divorce is optimal for at least one player, which depends on the
35To see that equilibrium fertility is lower than the level specied by (1.14), take the Lagrange function
L = U0 + λ[(IC −DE)]. The rst order condition equals dU
0
dn + λ
d(IC−DE)
dn . If (IC-DE) does not bind,
λ = 0 and we are in the unconstrained case. If it binds, d(IC−DE)dn has to be negative. The reason is
that otherwise, increasing fertility would relax the constraint, contradicting that we are at an optimum.
Thus, dU
0
dn has to be positive in an equilibrium with the (IC-DE) constraint binding. As
d2U0
dn2 must has
to be negative as well, equilibrium fertility is lower when (IC-DE) binds. Furthermore, it decreases with
λ.
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realizations of outside utilities. If those are not suciently high, both just receive their
relationship-utilities wi +ϕi(n) in the respective period and wait for the next draw of ṽi.
In addition, the partner's failure to make an agreed payment has a negative impact on the
overall quality of the relationship and thus increases one`s own outside utility by ∆vi ≥ 0
in every subsequent period. This has an impact on the couple's ability to redistribute
funds, but only as it aects the likelihood of a separation o equilibrium.
In the Appendix we derive thresholds v∗i and v
∗∗
i (depending on who deviated) for
individual outside utilities. Only if either one of these thresholds is exceeded, a separation
occurs in the respective period. Otherwise, i.e., if both realizations of outside utilities are
below these thresholds, both players prefer to stay together for at least one more period
even though the partnership is not working properly anymore. Then, they just wait until
at least one's outside utility is suciently high to get out of the relationship.
The actual levels of ∆vi have no qualitative impact on comparative statics unless they
are that high that both thresholds are below the lower bound of the support of outside
utilities, i.e., if v∗i /v
∗∗
i ≤ v0i . Then, a deviation is immediately followed by a separation
in any case. This changes the impact of divorce laws on fertility if (IC-DE) binds, as
increasing marriage stability then does not make a divorce threat less credible, and thus
has an unambiously positive eect. Therefore, we treat the cases where ∆vi are high
enough to always induce a punishment and where this is not the case separately, still
focusing on the situation with n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 .
In the rst case, we have
Proposition 5 : Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , the (IC-DE) constraint binds and that both
values of ∆vi are suciently high that any deviation is immedialety followed by a sepa-
ration for all realizations of ṽi. Then, higher divorce costs and higher alimony payments
increase fertility, as well as a lower access of the primary earner to his children following
a divorce.
Proof : As v∗i /v
∗∗
i ≤ v0i , we have U i = Ũi. Plugging all values into the binding (IC-DE)
constraint gives
(IC-DE)
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w20 (g0(n
∗∗)− g0(n∗)) + ϕ2(n∗)− ϕ2(n∗∗)
+ δ
1−δ (w2(n
∗) + ϕ2(n
∗)− w2(n∗∗)− ϕ2(n∗∗))
+δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ + δ
1−δφ (w2(n
∗∗)− w2(n∗)) ≥ 0.
Taking into account that if it binds in equilibrium, ∂(IC−DE)
∂n
< 0 (otherwise, a higher
fertility would relax the constraint, contradicting that it binds and fertility is too low
at the same time) we have dn
∗
dki
= − dv̂
dki
δF (v̂)
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
> 0, dn
∗
dθ
= −dv̂
dθ
δF (v̂)
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
≤ 0, and
dn∗
dφ
= − δ
1−δ
w2(n∗∗)−w2(n∗)
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
≥ 0 (since n∗∗ ≤ n∗).
As higher divorce costs reduce the likelihood of a divorce without decreasing the
severity of punishment, the range of states where surplus can be redistributed and used
to provide incentives becomes larger. As empirically established, divorce costs thus also
serve as a commitment device when the (IC-DE) constraint binds.
Higher alimony payments partially compensate the secondary earner for her human
capital loss and thus reduce her marginal costs of having children. For a given fertility
level the dierence between her on- and o-equilibrium fertility gets higher as w2(n
∗∗) >
w2(n
∗). Thus, more redistribution between the spouses can be enforced, allowing them
to increase n∗. Note that the impact of higher alimony is not driven by reducing 1's
reservation equilibrium utility, as this cancels out against 2's increased reservation utility.
Although having no direct impact on relationship stability, alimony payments thus make
a separation less likely in equilibrium, namely as the probability of a divorce decreases in
equilibrium fertility n∗.
A reduction of θ now has an unambiguosly positive impact on fertility. As fertility
is too low, the utility reduction in case of a separation as a factor reducing fertility is
obviously not taken into account. Thus, a lower access of the primary earner increases
fertility by relaxing the (IC-DE) constraint.
As fertility is ineciently low when (IC-DE) binds, a divorce that is more regulated
can even increase the total relationship surplus. This is always the case for alimony
payments, which have no impact the surplus if the ecient fertility level is enforceable.
Lemma 3: Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , the (IC-DE) constraint is binds and that both values
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of ∆vi are suciently high that any deviation is immedialety followed by a separation
for all realizations of ṽi. Then, higher divorce costs and a lower θ might or might not
increase the relationship surplus. Higher alimony payments always increase the surplus
Proof : As fertility is ineciently low ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
> 0. Thus,
dU(n∗)
dki
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂ki
+ ∂U(n
∗)
∂ki
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂ki
− δ(1− F (v̂)) ≶ 0
dU(n∗)
dφ
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂φ
+ ∂U(n
∗)
∂φ
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂φ
> 0
dU(n∗)
dθ
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂θ
+ ∂U(n
∗)
∂θ
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂θ
+ δ
1−δϕ1(n
∗) 1−F (v̂)
1−δF (v̂) ≶ 0
If a player's deviation is not triggered by a suciently high increase of the partners
outside utilities and thus not immediately followed by a separation (i.e., v∗i /v
∗∗
i > v
0
i ),
the impact of divorce laws is less obvious. Now, they do not only aect divorce utilities
but also the likelihood that punishment can actually be carried out. Thus, we have
Proposition 6: Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and v
∗
i /v
∗∗
i > v
0
i . Then, the impact of divorce
laws on fertility is ambiguous.
The proof for Proposition 6 can be found in the Appendix.
The eect of higher divorce costs and a lower level of θ is ambiguous as these policies
not only lower utilities in case of a divorce (which helps to enforce transfers) but also
make it less likely that a punishment is actually carried - as it becomes more attractive
for players to remain within a marriage even if partners do not cooperate anymore.
Concerning wealth division rules, we have the same eect as before increasing equilibrium
fertility. Furthermore, 2`s willingness to actually induce a divorce in each period o
equilibrium increases, while the primary earner is less likely to do that. Which eect
dominates depends on the distributions of outside utilities. If those are for example
uniformly distributed on the same support, both eects cancel out, and the impact of
alimony on fertility is unambiguously positive.
The eect of divorce laws on total eciency is ambiguous as well, and we omit a
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formal analysis. When they increase fertility, they might increase total surplus for reason
that are the same as above.
1.7 Inecient Separation
In the preceding parts, we assumed that the separation decision is always made ef-
ciently in equilibrium. We further showed in Appendix II that this outcome can be
approximated arbitrarily closely in a continuous-time setting where the period length
between decisions gets smaller and smaller. Now, we take a dierent approach and the
discreteness of the game literally. The truth will probably lie somewhere in between, al-
though we think assuming an ecient decision is more convincing. For example, the fact
that initiating a divorce takes time does not play a role here. This creates a lag, namely
between the decision to break up and the time from which on the institutional changes -
costs, wealth division, and a reduced access - come into force. However, this just makes us
discount the relevant parameters accordingly and thus also aect the threshold v̂, giving
the same qualitative results as above.
The main dierence to above is that a separation can occur even if it is ecient to
remain together. The reason is that not all necessary transfers are enforceable anymore
- since their enforceability only depends on expectations about future payos. Still, the
results are not too dierent from above; the possibility of inecient divorce is just always
taken into account. Furthermore, fertility is aected, as children do not just provide
utility per se but can also have an impact on the likelihood of a separation. If this
likelihood is reduced, fertility can even be above the ecient level.
To start with the formal analysis, we briefy recall the timing within a period t ≥ 1 (if
the couple is still together):
• The realizations of players` outside utilities ṽi are revealed to both. Then, they
continue the relationship or break up. After a separation, players immediately
receive their reservation utilities Ũi(vi).
• If they remain together, they work and receive their wages. Then, the transfer pt
(also allowed to be negative) is made from 1 to 2. Finally, they consume the private
consumption good xt and enjoy utility from their kids.
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Furthermore, once the couple separates, it is assumed that the partners never come
together again. Note that the timing of the transfer is not important - if it can already
be made after outside utilities are revealed but before players have to make the separation
decision, no additional stability is created.
Obtaining the states in which a separation occurs is slightly more involved now, as
there does not exist just one value for the outside utilities above which the couple breaks
up. Instead we have three thresholds, one for ṽ1, one for ṽ2 and one for the sum ṽ. If
any one of these threshold is exceeded, a separation will occur. The reason is that we
do not only have to worry about eciency, but also about the enforceability of transfers
to maintain the relationship. As the latter only depends on expectations about future
payos, thresholds for enforceability and eciency generally will not coincide.
For concreteness, again assume that the couple chooses to marry. Recall the denitions
u0i = wi + ϕi(n) as the per-period utilities within the relationship with pt = 0 for any
t ≥ 1. Then, player i must be compensated to be willing to stay in the relationship if
u0i + δU
∗
i − Ũi(vi) < 0, where U
∗
i is the expected equilibrium utility stream of player i
(including transfers)36 and Ũi(ṽi) player i`s utility if ling for divorce in the respective
period. Any transfer p(vi) must make it optimal for both players to stay within the
relationship. Furthermore, it has to be in the interest of player 1 to provide a positive
payment and for 2 to provide a negative payment. Concerning o-equilibrium payos,
we assume for concreteness that if any player does not keep a promise, the increase in
the other`s outside utility, i.e., ∆vi, is large enough to immediately induce a subsequent
divorce.
To derive the relevant constraints, let us rst assume that u02 + δU
∗
2− Ũ2(v2) < 0, i.e.,
the secondary earner needs a transfer to remain within the relationship. This transfer,
denoted it p(v2), must be large enough to satisfy 2`s individual rationality (IR) constraint
u02 + p(v2) + δU
∗
2 − Ũ2(v2) ≥ 0 (1.16)
36Note that we omit a time subscript and thus do not allow expected equilibrium payos to change over
time. This is just done for convenience and without loss of generality, as - as we will see when computing
the relevant constraints - the enforceability of any transfer as well as the eciency of a separation always
depends on the sum of players' utilities in equilibrium and not on the surplus distribution.
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Furthermore, 1's (IR) constraint must hold, which is obviously the case if breaking
up would be inecient, i.e., if v1 + v2 ≤ v̂37 If this is the case, the primary earner
must actually be willing to make the transfer p(v2). This is captured by 1`s dynamic
enforcement (DE) constraint,
p(v2) ≤ δ[U
∗
1 − U1] (1.17)
Obviously, the right hand side of (1.17) is independent of current realizations of out-
side utilities. Thus, the maximum feasible value of p(v2) is the same in each period.
Denoting this maximum feasible transfer maxp ≡ δ[U∗1 − U1], a transfer that keeps 2 in
the relationship and satises 1's (DE) constraint exists if u02 +maxp+ δU
∗
2 − Ũ2(v2) ≥ 0.
Whether it is actually made also depends on 1's (IR) constraint, i.e., whether v1 is su-
ciently small such that v ≤ v̂.
Concluding the previous arguments, a transfer that keeps 2 in the relationship and
satises 1's (DE) constraint exists if v2 ≤ vmax2 , where vmax2 is dened by
u02 + δU
∗
2 − Ũ2(vmax2 ) + δ[U
∗
1 − U1] = 0
Equivalent considerations help us to dene the threshold vmax1 , stating when a negative
transfer exists that keeps player 1 within the relationship and satises 2's (DE) constraint
as long as v1 ≤ vmax1 :
u01 + δU
∗
1 − Ũ1(vmax2 ) + δ[U
∗
2 − U2] = 0
Therefore, a separation can never be prevented if either v1 > v
max
1 or v2 > v
max
2 . As
already pointed out, this does not imply that if v1 ≤ vmax1 and v2 ≤ vmax2 are satised,
the couple remains together. It still has to be in the interest of a player to make a transfer.
More precisely, the other's (IR) constraint must be satised as well, which will be the
case if staying together is ecient. Concluding, a couple will not break up in any period
t, if at the same time v1 ≤ vmax1 , v2 ≤ vmax2 and v1 + v2 = v ≤ v̂, where v̂ is characterized
by all combinations of (v1, v2) that satisfy u
0
1 + u
0
2 + δU
∗
2 + δU
∗
1 = Ũ1(v1) + Ũ2(v2).
In any period, the likelihood of remaining together thus is Prob(ṽ1 ≤ vmax1 ∩ ṽ2 ≤
37Note that v̂ here does not coincide with its value above, as separation probabilities will be dierent.
Just the meaning is identical, namely that in a given period a separation is ecient if v > v̂.
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vmax2 ∩ v ≤ v̂). In the Appendix, we give an explicit formulation of this probability and
also prove
Proposition 7: The divorce probability is higher than when this decision is made
eciently
The proof for Proposition 7 can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 is very intuitive and does not require further explanation - because a
transfer necessary to maintain a relationship might not be enforceable, the couple can
also break up in states where this is not ecient. What we also show in the proof to
proposition 7 is that the divorce probability is strictly lower (unless ki = φ = (1−θ) = 0)
than in the case of ecient divorce, i.e., that vmax1 ≥ v̂ and vmax2 ≥ v̂ cannot be satised
at the same time.
In the following proposition, we state the impact of divorce laws and fertility on
marriage stability.
Proposition 8: The probality of a divorce decreases with higher divorce costs and
a lower value of θ. The impact of alimony payments and more children on marriage
stability is ambiguous.
The proof for Proposition 8 can be found in the Appendix.
As before, divorce becomes more likely for lower divorce costs and a higher θ. They
increase the ecient threshold v̂ but also make transfers to maintain the relationship
easier to enforce (recall that we focus ont the case with suciently high ∆vi). Higher
alimony payments can have a positive or negative impact on marriage stability. On the
one hand, they make it more dicult to enforce a positive transfer, as the secondary
earner already gets alimony in the period of divorce, while the primary earner only takes
the future into account when considering whether to make the transfer. The opposite is
true for negative payments. Which eect dominates depends on the exact specications
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of the distribution functions of players' outside utilities. More children, on the one
hand, make a marriage more stable by reducing utility after a separation if θ < 1. Still,
children also aect stability via alimony payments. Thus, if those make a divorce more
likely (recall that their impact on stability is ambiguous), the total eect of a higher
fertility level on stability might be negative. Yet, the net impact of alimony payments on
stability should not be too high as it consists of two countervailing eects which might
cancel out depending on distributation. Thus, it seems more convincing that children
generally have a positive impact on relationship stability, by increasing the gap between
the primary earner's utility within and outside the relationship. Some characterstics of
equilibrium fertility are given in
Proposition 9: Assume the respective (IC-DE) constraint does not bind. If the
impact of children on marriage stability is positive, equilibrium fertility might be higher
than under full commitment. Otherwise it is lower. The impact of divorce laws on
equilibrium fertility is ambiguous.
The proof for Proposition 9 can be found in the Appendix.
Two issues are dierent compared to before, when the divorce decision was always
made eciently. As the marriage is less stable, the couple's propensity to have children
is lower, because the likelihood of the utility loss induced by θ < 1 is higher. Yet, if more
children increase marriage stability, a countervailing eect exists, and each of them can
dominate. In addition to providing utility, children might thus be used as a commitment
device that makes a separation less likely.
Concerning comparative statics, higher divorce costs and a lower value of θ still might
increase fertility by increasing relationship stability. Yet, if children also make a separatin
less likely, some substitution between these two instruments takes place. As the commit-
ment role of children is needed less due to a higher ki and lower θ, a countervailing eect
decreasing fertility exists, and it is not clear which one dominates.
When the constraint binds, the situation changes, and the impact of a change in costs
and θ becomes unambiguous again.
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Proposition 10: Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and that the respective (IC-DE) constraint binds.
Then, higher divorce costs and a lower level of θ increase equilibrium fertility. The impact
of alimony payments is ambiguous.
The proof for Proposition 10 can be found in the Appendix.
As fertility is too low anyway, potential substitution eects between fertility and higher
costs and a lower access play no role. Thus, these forms of increased regulation unam-
biguously increase fertility as the increase maximum enforceable transfers by reducing o
equilibrium utilities. Higher alimony payments have a positive impact on fertility if their
eect on marriage stability is not too large. Then, a higher φ increases the secondary
earner's compensation for her human capital loss in divorce states, induced by the wage
dierence w(n∗∗)− w(n∗).
1.8 The Interaction of Formal and Informal Arrange-
ments
This paper explores interactions between the institutional settings following a divorce
and the ability to informally enforce cooperation within a relationship. From a theoretical
point of view, this relates to the literature on the interaction between explicit and implicit
contracts (see Baker, Gibbons, Murphy, 1994, or Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995). Generally,
the two contractual arrangements are substitutes, and the existence of a protable explicit
contract reduces the eciency of the implicit relationship. To see that point, assume that
absent any formal contract, an implicit agreement yields the ecient outcome. Now, the
same matter can also be governed within an explicit framework. However, the latter is
less inecient - for example because the veriable signal is less precise than the non-
veriable one. Thus, players still prefer the informal agreement. But their situation
might be worse now. Since they cannot commit to not use the formal agreement o
equilibrium, i.e., after a player reneged, reservation utilities go up. This makes it more
dicult to enforce cooperation under the implicit contract, and eciency goes down. If
players there were able to reduce the attractiveness of the explicit contract, they would
do so.
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To some extent, divorce laws assume an identical role in our setup. Higher ki or a
lower θ decrease the utilities after a separation and thus reservation utilities. However 
as a divorce happens in equilibrium as well  divorce laws not only have an impact on o-
equilibrium but also on on-equilibrium payos. Thus, formal and informal arrangements
can be complements or substitutes.
More precisely, the impact of lower payos after a divorce on total welfare is threefold.
First of all, equilibrium utilities are reduced as divorce occurs in equilibrium. Furthermore
- if ∆vi is not suciently large after one's partner reneged - it gets more dicult to
enforce a punishment, also reducing welfare. Finally, lower reservation utilities improves
the enforceability of transfer, potentially fostering eciency.
The latter point is not relevant if the (IC-DE) constraint does not bind. Then, only the
reduction of on-equilibrium payos is relevant. If the (IC-DE) constraint binds, however,
reducing players' payos under the formal arrangement of a divorce can help as it slackens
the constraint. This point becomes more important in relation to the utility reduction in
equibrium if the welfare loss associated with the binding constraint is high.
Another issue is interesting when focussing on the primary earner's utility reduction
after a divorce, captured by θ. There, the choice of n also has an impact on the relative
attractiveness of formal compared to informal cooperation, since a higher n increase this
dierence for a given θ < 1.
Thus, our setup includes a nice application and extension of the interaction between
explicit and implicit arrangements. It can help to reduce the attractiveness of formal
contracts to foster informal cooperation. However  as all kinds of relationships can
break up  one has to be aware that a formal contract might also be used in equilibrium
at some point.
The case is slightly dierent for alimony payments/wealth division rules. These have
no impact on eciency and thus on the quality of the explicit relative to the implicit
contract. Since funds are redistributed to the weaker side and since these funds are
increasing with the amount of previous cooperation, i.e., the fertility level, implicit coop-
eration is enhanced by this formal redistribution rule.
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1.9 Marriage Versus Cohabitation
Until now, we remained silent about the couple's decision whether to get married or
live in cohabitation or to link it the discussion of the previous section, when the couple
is willing to choose the more regulated outside reservation utility, always taking into
account that it will also have to deal with it in equilibrium. The major part of our
analysis - especially when considering the impact of divorce laws - rather assumed that
the couple is married. In this section, we briey explore conditions for the optimality of
marriage. If k = φ = 0 (1's access to his children is also reduced after the termination
of a relationship without marriage), both settings are identical. Then, the couple will
only become married if the regulation induced after a divorce increases their utilities ex
ante. For convenience, we assume that it is sucient that the sum of utilities is higher
under marriage, i.e., we do not have to focus on individual utility levels. This can be
rationalized by letting partners make ex-ante transfers, which have to be self-enforcing
as well (if a partner receives a transfer and then refuses to marry, this is regarded as
a deviation.). We do not explore this issue further and make the assumption that the
couple gets married if and only if
U(m = 1) ≥ U(m = 0),
where m = m1m2 ∈ {0, 1} denotes the marriage decision and U(m) = U1(m) + U2(m) is
the sum of discounted payo streams.
If the separation decision is always made eciently in equilibrium, we can state a
rst result, namely that a marriage will not occur if the (IC-DE) constraint does not
bind under cohabition.
Proposition 11: Assume the separation decision is always made eciently in
equilibrium and that the relevant (IC-DE) does not bind for m = 0. Then, the couple
will not become married if ki > 0, i = 1, 2. The spouses are indierent if ki = 0 and φ ≥ 0.
Proof : Follows from Lemma 2, which states that U is monotonically decreasing in k
and independent of φ if (IC-DE) does not bind.
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Since fertility is at its ecient level, divorce costs are not needed as a commitment
device. Furthermore, they decrease utility in case of a divorce and unnecessarily increase
marriage stability (note that stability does not have a value per se - it can prevent the
spouses from consuming their outside utilities). This can change if the separation decision
is not always made eciently and if the associated eciency loss is suciently large. We
do not further explore the case of inecient separation in this paragraph, just note that
an increased relationship stability induced by a marriage can then be benecial.
Thus, a marriage can only be a useful institution in our setting if under cohabitation,
fertility is too low because of commitment problems. Before further exploring this issue,
let us make some general remarks. Of course, the present analysis only captures a lim-
ited part of potential benets of a marriage. For some couples, marriage might have a
value per se,38 and young adults still face more or less pressure to get married in some
societies. Furthermore, the tax system can induce a marriage, especially if joint instead
of individual taxation is applied. Finally, relationship stability can have a value per se.
Compensation for ongoing household production (like cooking, cleaning...) might have
to be self enforcing, and a higher stability increase the scope for cooperation39. Also
the welfare of children - which is left aside in the current analysis - might be negatively
aected by a separation.40
In our setting, the institutional framework a marriage provides can only be benecial
if the (IC-DE) constraint binds for a cohabiting couple. To simplify the analysis, we now
focus on the case where ∆vi, i.e., the increase in outside utilities after a partner reneged,
is suciently high for a divorce to occur immediately after someone deviated.41 Then, if
divorce costs are negligible and a wealth division rule φ > 0 is in place, a marriage will
always be optimal if n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 ,
42 captured in
38Which could be captured in our model by assuming dierent distributions of outside utilities for
spouses that are cohabiting and those that are married.
39It is not too convincing, though, that aspects of household production that can more easily be
substituted by the market than raising children are a driving force making a couple entering the unexible
institution of a marriage.
40However, if spouses care about their children's welfare, they will take the negative impact of a
separation into account and should not need commitment induced by divorce costs.
41If this is not the case, potential benets of divorce costs and thus a marriage are even lower, since
they do not only increase marriage stability in but also o equilibrium.
42Which we again assume for reasons stated above. To be fully precise, we would have to take into
account the possibility that for example under cohabitation, n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , while n
∗∗
1 < n
∗∗
2 after a marriage.
This could be induced by substantial alimony payments, which increase the secondary player's benets
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Proposition 12: Assume the separation decision is always made eciently in equilib-
rium, that n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , and that (IC-DE) binds for m = 0. Then, the couple will marry if
ki = 0, i = 1, 2 and φ > 0. If ki > 0, the couple might or might not get married
Proof : Follows from Lemma 3, which establishes dU(n
∗)
dφ
> 0 for n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 ,
and a binding (IC-DE) constraint. Furthermore, Lemma 3 establishes that
dU(n∗)
dki
= ∂U(n
∗)
∂n
∂n∗
∂ki
− δ(1− F (v̂)) ≶ 0 .
A generous wealth division rule combined with laws making a divorce very easy will
thus induce the couple to marry, since φ increases the enforceability of transfers without
having a negative impact on eciency. However, we have to be careful since we only con-
sider the impact of divorce laws on the sum of payos. If an ex-ante redistribution is not
feasible, things might be dierent. Despite an ineciently low fertility level, it can then
be in the interest of the primary earner to abstain from a marriage. To our knowledge,
the impact of wealth division rules on marriage rates has only found limited attention in
the empirical literature. One exception is Rasul (2003), who nds a negative eect on
marriage rates of a change to an equal division of property after a divorce. However, his
results have to be treated with care when comparing them to our analysis. Table 14 of
his paper shows that the explained negative impact is strongly and signicantly negative
only for spouses contemplating a second marriage. For those not previously married,
the coecient is not signicant at the 10% level, and positive for men and negative for
women. Since our prediction of a positive impact of an equitable wealth division after
divorce is only due to a subsequent increase of fertility rates, his results might be driven
by spouses who do not consider having any more children. Thus, wealth division rules
should be analyzed empirically in more detail, especially in connection to fertility levels.
The impact of divorce costs on marriage rates has received more attention in the
empirical literature, mainly due to the replacement of consent with unilateral divorce
laws in many US states some decades ago. Regarding this change as a reduction of
divorce costs,43 results are ambiguous. Whereas Rasul (2003) or Matouschek and Rasul
from children in case of a divorce. However, we restrict our attention to the case where n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 , no
matter whether the couple is cohabiting or married.
43Which is supported by the fact divorce rates immediately went up after the introduction of unilateral
Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility, and
Divorce 48
(2008) observe a decline in marriage rates, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) do not nd this
eect but rather an increase. This supports our claim that more commitment by higher
divorce costs is not automatically preferred by couples, since divorce utilities are reduced
as well as the option to utilize relatively high realizations of outside utilities. Only if the
utility loss induced by the fact that the (IC-DE) constraint binds is suciently high, the
existence of divorce costs can make a marriage optimal. If divorce costs are relatively
high, their reduction might make more couples willing to use them as a commitment
device to increase fertility. Alesina and Guiliano's (2007) results are perfectly in line with
this interpretation. In wedlock fertility basically remains unaected by the adoption of
unilateral divorce laws, while out of wedlock fertility decreases signicantly and fertility
rates for newly wedded couples go up.
In the remainder of the section, we consider conditions that actually make the (IC-DE)
constraint bind and thus increase a couple's propensity to get married when substantial
divorce costs are present. For n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and with ∆v1 suciently large, the (IC-DE)
constraint for a cohabiting couple equals
w20 (g0(n
∗∗)− g0(n∗)) + ϕ2(n∗)− ϕ2(n∗∗) +
δ
1− δ
(w2(n
∗)− w2(n∗∗))
+
δ
1− δ
(ϕ2(n
∗)− ϕ2(n∗∗)) + δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ ≥ 0,
where v̂ is dened by ϕ1(n)(1− θ) + δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ − v̂ = 0.
Note that the rst line of the expression above is negative because of n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 .
Furthermore - since n∗ ≥ n∗∗2 - it is decreasing in n∗.
Then, the (IC-DE) constraint is more likely to bind if more additional time is needed
to raise more children (g0(n) is steeper) and if more children imply a higher human capital
loss for the secondary earner (w2(n
∗) is steeper). This will also make it more likely that the
desired transfer is larger, implied by a bigger dierence between n∗∗1 and n
∗∗
2 . Furthermore,
a lower relationship stability (captured by a smaller value of
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)(v̂− ṽ)dṽ) decreases
divorce, see Friedberg (1998) or Matouschek and Rasul (2008).
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the value of the left hand side of the condition for given amounts of n∗ and n∗∗.
Although the rst components are exogenously given within our model, they deserve
some attention here. For example, g0(n) could be steeper if less child-care facilities were
available at reasonable costs. Thus, couples without the option to give their children
away for some time might be more inclined to marry. This point is also important for
the second aspect, a higher human capital loss associated with children. There, recall
our assumption that the secondary earner alone is responsible for raising the couple's
children. As argued above, it seems unlikely that the fact that women still assume major
parts of the responsibilities associated with having children is purely driven by an optimal
(in an economic sense) allocation of tasks, but should rather be given by issues outside
our model, for example cultural reasons.
If men were willing to substantially participate in child-rearing and if jobs were su-
ciently exible, i.e., if the couple were able to commit to any allocation of g(n), it would
be possible to obtain ecient fertility without the need of additional transfers. Thus,
if the couple is closer to an optimal time allocation, the (IC-DE) is less likely to bind.
Therefore, couples with more traditional views should be more likely to get married, a
claim that is supporated by empirical evidence44.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper analyzed interactions between divorce laws and fertility. Making precise
the conditions under which cooperation within a relationship can be enforced, we showed
how the institutional setting following a separation can make it easier or more dicult
to allocate resources within a household and thus compensate a partner for the human
capital loss associated with having children. However, our approach can only be a rst
step to analyze (often unintended) consequences legislative changes. Future research
could evolve along three lines.
Further empirical research is needed to test some predictions. Whereas the impact
of divorce laws on divorce rates, the propensity to marriage, and on fertility has been
extensively tested  especially using the natural experiment of a switch from consensual
44Kaufmann (2004) for example nds out that men with egalitarian counterparts are more likely to
cohabit than those with more traditional views
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or no-fault to unilateral divorce  the same remains to be done for alimony payments or
wealth division rules and a reduced access of one partner to his children after a separation.
Furthermore, our model is general enough to incorporate further laws that are im-
portant for a marriage. The impact of dierent forms of income taxation  for example
joint versus individual taxation  could be analyzed. The model is also precise enough
to look at the question consent versus unilateral divorce in more detail. Of course, a uni-
lateral divorce is very likely to be associated with lower divorce costs, what is shown by
the vast empirical literature that found an immediate increase in divorce rates following
its introduction. However, taking this matter literally and noting that under a consent
divorce regime, one partner alone can not easily induce a divorce anymore might allow us
to explain some empirical results that can not be explained by a change in commitment
power alone. For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2007) nd that after the introduction
of unilateral laws, fertility rates for newly wedded couples went up, while out-of-wedlock
fertility decreased. They claim that lower divorce costs make couples enter marriage more
easily, however without further specifying this explanation. Applying our model can also
give an explanation, since a consent divorce regime taken literally makes it much more
dicult to enforce payments between spouses. The reason is that no more transfers are
needed to keep the partner within a marriage, and allocations in and o equilibrium do
not dier.45
Finally, the model setup itself can be extended, for example by taking children's
welfare into account or assuming risk-averse players. In the latter case, it will be nec-
essary to analyze alimony payments and wealth division laws separately, since savings
will become an important aspect. In addition, these laws might not only compensate
the secondary earner for her human capital loss, but also help to equalize income across
states. Furthermore, relationship stability might have a value per se. Then, laws reducing
the attractiveness of a divorce could rather be welfare enhancing in comparison to the
present setup. Also, the role of children as a device to increase stability (via the access
parameter θ) would have to be reassessed.
We plan to pursue some of these extensions in our future research and hope they will
lead to further interesting results.
45This is even the case if transfers to prevent the inecient continuation of a marriage are feasible,
since such transfers go in hand with the end of the relationship.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Appendix I  The Fertility Choice
Omitted proofs
Proposition 1:
If n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 a fertility level n
∗ can be enforced if and only if it satises the condition
u21(n
∗)− u21(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗) + U2(n
∗∗)
)]
≥ 0
.
If n∗∗1 < n
∗∗
2 , the necessary and sucient condition for equilibrium fertility n
∗ is
u11(n
∗)− u11(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗∗) + U2(n
∗)
)]
≥ 0
Proof:
Assume that n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 . Then, we do not have to consider (IC1), since it is automati-
cally satised if equilibrium fertility is smaller or equal than the ecient level. Obviously,
we do not want to induce fertility that is higher than ecient, where eciency is dened
as the level players would choose if they were able to commit.
Necessity:
Rewriting (IC2) gives
p0(n
∗) ≥ u21(n∗∗) + δU
∗
2(n
∗∗) − [u21(n∗) + δU
∗
2(n
∗)]. Plugging this into (DE1) which
is the relevant constraint as p0(n
∗) is supposed to be positive46 yields condition 1.6.
46Note that in the case where continuation utilities alone are sucient to yield incentives for rst-best
fertility, a negative transfer p0 would be feasible in this case as well. Yet, then this transfer is solely used
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Suciency:
Assume that 1.6 is satised.
Set p+0 ≡ δ[U
∗
1(n
∗) − U1(n∗)] ≥ 0 and plug it into (IC-DE), which becomes
p+0 + u21(n
∗) − u21(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
2(n
∗)− U2(n∗∗)
]
≥ 0. Thus, (IC2) is satised. Fur-
thermore, (DE1) is satised by construction of p+0 .
Necessity and suciency for n∗∗1 < n
∗∗
2 is proven accordingly.
Proposition 3: Assuming (IC-DE) does not bind, optimal fertility n∗ satises
αϕ′1(n) + ϕ
′
2(n) = (1− δ)w20g′0(n)− δw′2(n)
where
α ≡ 1− δ + δ(1− F (v̂))θ
1− δF (v̂)
≤ 1
Proof: If the respective (IC-DE) constraint does not bind, players maximize the sum
of players' expected utility streams, which equals
U0 = w10 + w20(1− g0(n)) + ϕ1(n) + ϕ2(n)
+δ
(
F (v̂)[U01 + U
0
2 ] + (1− F (v̂))[E[Ũ1 | v > v̂] + E[Ũ2 | v > v̂]]
)
= w10 + w20(1− g0(n)) + ϕ1(n) + ϕ2(n)
+ δ
1−δ (w1 + w2(n) + ϕ2(n)) + δϕ1(n)
F (v̂)+(1−F (v̂)) 1
1−δ θ
1−δF (v̂)
+ δ(1−F (v̂))
1−δF (v̂)
(
−k1 − k2 + δ1−δE[ṽ1] +
δ
1−δE[ṽ2]
)
+ δ
1−δF (v̂)
v11+v
1
2∫̂
v
f(ṽ)ṽdṽ
As ∂U
0
∂v̂
= 0
the rst order conditions becomes
for redistributive reasons, making the (IC) constraints featuring the fertility decision irrelevant.
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αϕ′1(n) + ϕ
′
2(n) = (1− δ)w20g′0(n)− δw′2(n)
α ≡ 1− δ + δ(1− F (v̂))θ
1− δF (v̂)
We assume that the second order condition, is satised by construction.
Binding (IC-DE) constraint
We rst characterize the maximum feasible punishment o equilibrium. After any
player reneged, any trust in the relationship is lost, and both know there will be no
transfer anymore. Thus, a divorce occurs in any period if it is in the interest of at least
one player to le for a divorce, i.e. if any ṽi exceeds a threshold of outside utilities such
that divorce is associated with a higher utility stream than waiting for at least one further
period.
The thresholds will depend on who reneged, as this determines the o-equilibrium
fertility level and further whose outside utility increases by ∆vi in each subsequent period.
First, assume that player 1 reneged, i.e., he refused to make a positive transfer after 2
agreed on equilibrium fertility n∗. This implies that 2`s outside utility increases by ∆v2
in each subsequent period. This gives
Lemma A1: Assume that 1 refused to make a promised transfer p0(n
∗). Then, a
divorce o equilibrium occurs in the rst period with either v1 ≥ v∗1 or v2 ≥ v∗2, where v∗1
and v∗2 are characterized by
ϕ1(n
∗)(1− θ) +φ[w1−w2(n∗)] + (1− δ)k1 + δF (v∗2)
v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)(v
∗
1 − v1)dv1− v∗1 = 0 (1.18)
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−φ[w1 − w2(n∗)] + (1− δ)k2 + δF (v∗1)
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v
∗
2 − v2)dv2 −∆v2 − v∗2 = 0 (1.19)
Proof : We have o equilibrium utilities
wi + ϕi(n) + δ
[
F1(v
∗
1)F2(v
∗
2)U
0
i + (1− F1(v∗1)F2(v∗2))E[Ũi | v1 > v∗1 ∪ v2 > v∗2]
]
and
Prob[v1 > v
∗
1 ∪ v2 > v∗2] = Prob[v1 > v∗1] +Prob[v2 > v∗2]−Prob[v1 > v∗1]Prob[v2 > v∗2]
=
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1 +
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2 −
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2
=
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1 +
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2
(
1−
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1
)
=
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1 +
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2
(
v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)dv1
)
Then,
E[v1 | v1 > v∗1 ∪ v2 > v∗2] = 11−F (v∗1)F (v∗2)
(
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)v1dv1 +
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2
v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)v1dv1
)
E[v2 | v1 > v∗1 ∪ v2 > v∗2] = 11−F (v∗1)F (v∗2)
(
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)v2dv2 +
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)dv1
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)v2dv2
)
Substituting the respective expressions and rearranging gives (1.18) and (1.19).
Equivalently, we obtain
Lemma A2: Assume that 2 refused on equilibrium fertility n∗. Then, a divorce o
equilibrium occurs in the rst period with either v1 ≥ v∗∗1 or v2 ≥ v∗∗2 , where v∗∗1 and v∗∗2
are characterized by
ϕ1(n
∗∗)(1−θ)+φ[w1−w2(n∗∗)]+(1−δ)k1−δF (v∗∗2 )
v∗∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)(v
∗∗
1 −v1)dv1−∆v1−v∗∗1 = 0
(1.20)
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−φ[w1 − w2(n∗∗)] + (1− δ)k2 + δF (v∗∗1 )
v∗∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v
∗∗
2 − v2)dv2 − v∗∗2 = 0 (1.21)
Proof: Now, we have U1 = Ũ1(v
∗∗
1 + ∆v1) and U2 = Ũ2(v
∗∗
2 ), and the fertility level is
n∗∗. All other steps are as in the proof to Lemma A2.
Comparative Statics
For later use, we will now derive some comparative statics for v∗2 and v
∗∗
1 . It will
become clear below that we do not need the ones for v∗1 and v
∗
2:
Lemma A3: Comparative statics for v∗2 are
dv∗2
dk1
≥ 0, dv
∗
2
dk2
≥ 0, dv
∗
2
dφ
≤ 0 and dv
∗
2
dθ
≤ 0,
while those for v∗∗1 satisfy
dv∗∗1
dk1
≥ 0, dv
∗∗
1
dk2
≥ 0, dv
∗∗
1
dφ
≥ 0, dv
∗∗
1
dθ
≤ 0.
Proof:
Denote equation (1.18) F ∗1 , equation (1.19) F
∗
2 , equation (1.20) F
∗∗
1 and equation
(1.21) F ∗∗2 .
Then, the implicit function theorem gives
dv∗2
dk1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
−∂F
∗
1
∂k1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
−∂F
∗
2
∂k1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− (1− δF (v∗1)F (v∗2)) −(1− δ)
δf(v∗1)
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2) (v
∗
2 − v2) dv2 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− (1− δF (v∗1)F (v∗2)) δf(v∗2)
v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1) (v
∗
1 − v1) dv1
δf(v∗1)
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2) (v
∗
2 − v2) dv2 − (1− δF (v∗1)F (v∗2))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
δ(1−δ)f(v∗1)
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v∗2−v2)dv2∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0
Note that the denominator must be positive as the matrix of rst derivatives with
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respect to v∗i must be negative denite. The reason is that otherwise, a higher outside
utility than v∗i would make a separation optimal, implying that the game is not in an
equilibrium.
Equivalently, we have
dv∗2
dk2
=
(1−δ)(1−δF (v∗1)F (v∗2))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0,
dv∗2
dφ
=
[w1−w2(n∗)]
δf(v∗1)v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v∗2−v2)dv2−(1−δF (v∗1)F (v∗2))

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 0, where the nominator is
negative due to the requirements for a stable equilibrium as well (which also requires
that
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
+
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
< 0), and
dv∗2
dθ
=
−ϕ1(n∗)δf(v∗1)
v∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v∗2−v2)dv2∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗1
∂v∗1
∂F ∗1
∂v∗2
∂F ∗2
∂v∗1
∂F ∗2
∂v∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 0
Furthermore,
dv∗∗1
dk1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−∂F
∗∗
1
∂k1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
−∂F
∗∗
2
∂k1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(1− δ) δf(v∗∗2 )
v∗∗1∫
v01
f1(v1) (v
∗∗
1 − v1) dv1
0 − (1− δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− (1− δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 )) δf(v∗∗2 )
v∗∗1∫
v01
f1(v1) (v
∗∗
1 − v1) dv1
δf(v∗∗1 )
v∗∗2∫
v02
f2(v2) (v
∗∗
2 − v2) dv2 − (1− δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
(1−δ)(1−δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 ))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0,
dv∗∗1
dk2
=
(1−δ)δf(v∗∗2 )
v∗∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)(v∗∗1 −v1)dv1∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0,
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dv∗∗1
dφ
=
[w1−w2(n∗∗)]
(1−δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 ))−δf(v∗∗2 )v∗∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)(v∗∗1 −v1)dv1

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 and
dv∗∗1
dθ
=
−ϕ1(n∗∗)(1−δF (v∗∗1 )F (v∗∗2 ))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗1
∂v∗∗2
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗1
∂F ∗∗2
∂v∗∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 0
This helps us to prove
Proposition 6: Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and v
∗
i /v
∗∗
i > v
0
i . Then, the impact of divorce
laws on fertility is ambiguous.
Proof :
The binding (IC-DE) constraint now equals
w20(1− g0(n∗)) + ϕ2(n∗)− (w20(1− g0(n∗∗)) + ϕ2(n∗∗))
+ δ
1−δ (w2(n
∗) + ϕ2(n
∗))− δ
1−δ (w2(n
∗∗) + ϕ2(n
∗∗)) + δϕ1(n
∗)
F (v̂)+(1−F (v̂)) 1
1−δ θ
1−δF (v̂)
+ δ(1−F (v̂))
1−δF (v̂)
(
−k1 − k2 + δ1−δE[ṽ1] +
δ
1−δE[ṽ2]
)
+ δ
1−δF (v̂)
v11+v
1
2∫̂
v
f(ṽ)ṽdṽ
−δϕ1(n
∗)[F1(v∗1)F2(v∗2)+ θ1−δ (1−F1(v∗1)F2(v∗2))]
(1−δF1(v∗1)F2(v∗2))
+δ
1−F1(v∗1)F2(v∗2)
1−δF1(v∗1)F2(v∗2)
(
1
1−δφ[w1 − w2(n
∗)] + k1 − δ1−δE[ṽ1]
)
−δ 1
1−δF1(v∗1)F2(v∗2)
(
v11∫
v∗1
f1(v1)v1dv1 +
v12∫
v∗2
f2(v2)dv2
v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)v1dv1
)
−δ 1−F1(v
∗∗
1 )F2(v
∗∗
2 )
1−δF1(v∗∗1 )F2(v∗∗2 )
(
1
1−δφ[w1 − w2(n
∗∗)]− k2 + δ1−δE[ṽ2]
)
−δ 1
1−δF1(v∗∗1 )F2(v∗∗2 )
(
v12∫
v∗∗2
f2(v2)v2dv2 +
v11∫
v∗∗1
f1(v1)dv1
v∗∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)v2dv2
)
= 0
There, it can be shown that
∂(IC−DE)
∂v∗1
= 0
Furthermore,
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∂(IC−DE)
∂v∗2
= −δf2(v∗2)
F1(v∗1)(ϕ1(n∗)(1−θ)+φ[w1−w2(n∗)]+(1−δ)k1)−v∗1∫
v01
f1(v1)v1dv1

(1−δF1(v∗1)F2(v∗2))
2 < 0
∂(IC−DE)
∂v∗∗1
= −δf1(v∗∗1 )
F2(v∗∗2 )((1−δ)k2−φ[w1−w2(n∗∗)])−
v∗∗2∫
v02
f2(v2)v2dv2
(1−δF1(v∗∗1 )F2(v∗∗2 ))
2 < 0
and
∂(IC−DE)
∂v∗∗2
= 0
Using these results, it follows that
d(ICDE)
dk1
≶ 0
d(ICDE)
dk2
≶ 0
d(ICDE)
dφ
≶ 0
Appendix II  Relational Contracts in Periods t ≥ 1
Continuous Time Approximation
Here, we derive how the assumption that a separation occurs if and only if it is ecient
(in equilibrium) could be generated endogenously, by slightly adjusting the model setup.
Note that the analysis of decisions in period t = 0 remains unaected as long as this
period remains suciently large (i.e., discrete).
Now, assume that time t ∈ [1,∞) is continous and the discount rate equalsr > 0.
A new realization of outside options vi is drawn for each interval of length ∆t  0 and
immediately observed by both players. Furthermore, ∆t is divided into K subintervals
of equal length, K ∈ N, where the length of each subinterval equals ∆t
K
.
At the beginning of each subintervall k = 1, ..., K, both players rst decide whether
they want to stay together or break up. Subsequently, a transfer pk(v) is made.
This allows us to state
Proposition A1: Assume all transfers pk(v) must be self enforcing. Then, the
probability of an inecient divorce goes to zero as K approaches innity.
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Proof :
To get a better idea of the impact of continuous time, let us rst characterize the
relevant continuation utilities.
If a divorce occurs at the beginning of date t, the players receive the following utility
levels.
Ũ1,t(v1) =
∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(τ−t)v1dτ + e
−r∆t ∫∞
t
e−r(τ−t)v1dτ − k1
+
∫∞
t
e−r(τ−t) (w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)]) dτ
= [1− e−r∆t]1
r
v1 + e
−r∆t 1
r
v1 − k1 + 1r (w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)])
Ũ2,t(v2) =
∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(τ−t)v2dτ + e
−r∆t ∫∞
t
e−r(τ−t)v2dτ − k2
+
∫∞
t
e−r(τ−t) (w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + φ[w1 − w2(n)]) dτ
= [1− e−r∆t]1
r
v2 + e
−r∆t 1
r
v2 − k2 + 1r (w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + φ[w1 − w2(n)])
Note that although new realizations of ṽi are only drawn every ∆t periods, the
expectation vi is the same throughout. After the interval of length ∆t with the realiza-
tion of vi is over, expected discounted utility streams of the outside options thus equal∫∞
t
e−r(τ−t)vidτ from then on.
If a divorce is initiated at the beginning of any subinterval k, we have
Ũ1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v1) =
∫ t+∆t
t+(k−1) ∆t
K
e−r(τ−(t+(k−1)
∆t
K
))v1dτ + e
−r(∆t−(k−1) ∆t
K
) 1
r
v1 − k1
+1
r
(w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)])
= [1 − e−r∆t
K−(k−1)
K ]1
r
v1 + e
−r(∆t−(k−1) ∆t
K
) 1
r
v1 − k1 + 1r (w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)])
and
Ũ2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v2) = [1− e−r∆t
K−(k−1)
K ]1
r
v2 + e
−r(∆t−(k−1) ∆t
K
) 1
r
v2 − k2
+1
r
(w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + φ[w1 − w2(n)])
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Accordingly, when the couple is married at the beginning of any subinterval k ≥ 1
within the period ∆t, continuation utilities are
U1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v) =
∫ t+k∆t
K
t+(k−1) ∆t
K
e−r(τ−(t+(k−1)
∆t
K
)) (w1 − pk(v) + ϕ1(n)) dτ
+
∫ t+∆t
t+k∆t
K
e−r(τ−(t+(k−1)
∆t
K
)) (w1 + ϕ1(n)) dτ −
K∑
κ=k+1
∫ t+κ∆t
K
t+(κ−1) ∆t
K
e−r(τ−(t+(k−1)
∆t
K
))pκ(v)dτ
+e−r(∆t−(k−1)
∆t
K
)U
∗
1,t+∆t
= [1− e−r∆tK ]1
r
(w1 − pk(v) + ϕ1(n)) + 1r [e
−r∆t
K − e−r∆t
K−(k−1)
K ] (w1 + ϕ1(n))
−1
r
K∑
κ=k+1
[e−r
∆t
K
(κ−k) − e−r∆tK (κ−(k−1))]pκ(v) + e−r(∆t−(k−1)
∆t
K
)U
∗
1,t+∆t and
U2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v) = [1− e−r∆tK ]1
r
(w2(n) + pk(v) + ϕ2(n))
+1
r
[e−r
∆t
K − e−r∆t
K−(k−1)
K ] (w2(n) + ϕ2(n))
+1
r
K∑
κ=k+1
[e−r
∆t
K
(κ−k) − e−r∆tK (κ−(k−1))]pκ(v) + e−r(∆t−(k−1)
∆t
K
)U
∗
2,t+∆t
Now, assume a positive transfer is needed in subinterval k ≥ 1 to maintain the mar-
riage.47 Assuming all subsequent transfers are made, the payment in subinterval k must
satisfy the secondary earner's (IC) constraint:
(IC2)
[1− e−r
∆t
K ]
1
r
pk(v) ≥ Ũ2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v2)−
(
U2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v)− [1− e−r
∆t
K ]
1
r
pk(v)
)
,
where we just added and substracted the transfer-term to the condition U2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v) ≥
Ũ2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v2).
Furthermore, given all subsequent transfers are made, the primary earner is willing
to make p(v) in the rst subinterval (i.e., if he reneges, divorce will be initiated at the
beginning of the second subinterval), if U1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v) ≥ [1 − e−r∆tK ]1
r
(w1 + ϕ1(n)) +
e−r
∆t
K Ũ1,t+k∆t
K
(v1) is satised. Using Ũ1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v1)− e−r
∆t
K Ũ1,t+k∆t
K
(v1)
47Note that if divorce occurs at any point within the a time interval [t, t+ ∆t], it will happen at the
beginning (if it happened later, no earlier transfer would be enforceable.
Still, transfer for any subinterval k must be self enforcing.
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=
(
1− e−r∆tK
)
1
r
[v1 − rk1 + w1 + θϕ1(n)− φ[w1 − w2(n)]] and adding and substract-
ing the term [1− e−r∆tK ]1
r
(w1 − pk(v) + ϕ1(n)), we obtain
(DE1)
[1− e−r
∆t
K ]
1
r
pk(v)
≤ U1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v)− Ũ1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v1) + [1− e−r
∆t
K ]
1
r
pk(v)
+
(
1− e−r
∆t
K
) 1
r
[v1 − rk1 − ϕ1(n)(1− θ)− φ[w1 − w2(n)]]
Note that the last term on the right hand side must be negative, as otherwise (IC1)
would not be satised.
Merging (IC2) and (DE1) gives
(IC-DE)
U1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v) + U2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v)− Ũ1,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v1)− Ũ2,t+(k−1) ∆t
K
(v2)
+
(
1− e−r
∆t
K
) 1
r
[v1 − rk1 − ϕ1(n)(1− θ)− φ[w1 − w2(n)]] ≥ 0
For lim
K→∞
(
1− e−r∆tK
)
= 0, the last term approaches zero, and (IC-DE) and the con-
dition for an ecient divorce coincide.
Note that the assumption of a suciently high ∆v to make an immediate divorce a
credible punishment threat is not necessary for this argument. If at any point in time
within the interval ∆t, the divorce threat is not credible, this also implies that a transfer
to maintain the marriage is not required anymore.
Inecient Divorce Feasible
A divorce can only be prevented if at the same time v1 ≤ vmax1 , v2 ≤ vmax2 and v ≤ v̂.
Thus, the probability of remaining together equals P ≡ Prob(ṽ1 ≤ vmax1 ∩ ṽ2 ≤ vmax2 ∩v ≤
v̂). Recall that vmax1 , v
max
2 and v̂ are characterized by
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w1 + ϕ1(n) + δU
∗
1 + δU
∗
2 = δŨ2 + Ũ1(v
max
1 )
w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + δU
∗
1 + δU
∗
2 = δŨ1 + Ũ2(v
max
2 )
U1 + U2 = Ũ1(v1) + Ũ2(v2), with v1 + v2 = v̂
where Ũi = E[Ũ(ṽi)] and we use make use of the assumption that ∆vi is large enough
for U i = Ũi.
In the following we will denote
P ≡ Probability of no divorce in a given period
and the conditional expectation
E[ṽ | NODIV] ≡ Expected value of ṽ conditional on no divorce
Then, plugging in values and using Bayes' rule gives
ϕ1(n)(1−θ)+(1− δP) (φ[w1 − w2(n)]− vmax1 )+(1−δ)(k1 +δPk2)−δPE[ṽ | NODIV] = 0
(1.22)
δPϕ1(n)(1−θ)−(1− δP) (φ[w1 − w2(n)] + vmax2 )+(1−δ)(δPk1+k2)−δPE[ṽ | NODIV] = 0
(1.23)
ϕ1(n)(1− θ) + (1− δ)(k1 + k2)− δPE[ṽ | NODIV]− (1− δP) v̂ = 0 (1.24)
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Proposition 7: The divorce probability is higher than when this decision is made
eciently.
Proof :
It is only possible that the couple separates eciently if vmax1 ≥ v̂ and vmax2 ≥ v̂ are
satised simultaneously. Assume this is the case.
Then, the proof to Lemma A4 below shows that we can use equations (1.22) to (1.24)
to obtain v̂ =
δPE[ṽ|NODIV]+(vmax1 +vmax2 )
(1+δP) .
For vmax1 ≥ v̂, we need vmax1 ≥
δPE[ṽ|NODIV]+(vmax1 +vmax2 )
(1+δP) or δPv
max
1 ≥ δPE[ṽ |
NODIV] + vmax2 , whereas v
max
2 ≥ v̂ requires δPvmax2 ≥ δPE[ṽ | NODIV] + vmax1 .
Combining both gives us a necessary conditions that has to be satised, namely
vmax1 (1− δP) ≤ −δPE[ṽ | NODIV]. Merging this with equation (1.22) yields the condi-
tion ϕ1(n)(1− θ) + (1− δP)φ[w1 −w2(n)] + (1− δ)k1 + δP(1− δ)k2 ≤ 0, which is never
satised unless (1− θ) = φ = k1 = k2 = 0.
Lemma A4: The probability of remaining together equals
P =
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f(ṽ)dṽ −
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
(
v11∫
vmax1
f1(v1)f2(ṽ − v1)dv1
)
dṽ
−
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
(
v12∫
vmax2
f1(ṽ − v2)f2(v2)dv2
)
dṽ
Proof :
The term above states that the probability of remaining together equals the probility
that remaining together is ecient minus the probability that it is ecient but a necessary
transfer cannot be enforced. We have to show that vmax1 + v
max
2 ≥ v̂, as otherwise the
term above would double-count the state where we are below v̂ and at the same time
above vmax1 and v
max
2 .
Thus, assume that vmax1 + v
max
2 < v̂ is possible and use equations (1.22) and (1.23) to
obtain
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(1 − δ)(k1 + k2) =
2δPE[ṽ|NODIV]+(1−δP)(vmax1 +vmax2 )
(1+δP) − ϕ1(n)(1 − θ). Plugging this
into (1.24) (which still holds although it is not necessary to determine the probability of
divorce when vmax1 + v
max
2 < v̂) gives
v̂ =
δPE[ṽ | NODIV] + (vmax1 + vmax2 )
(1 + δP)
Then, v̂ > vmax1 + v
max
2 implies
δPE[ṽ|NODIV]+(vmax1 +vmax2 )
(1+δP) > v
max
1 + v
max
2 or PE[ṽ |
NODIV] > P (vmax1 + v
max
2 ).
Furthermore, we use that P = F1(v
max
1 )F2(v
max
2 ) and
PE[ṽ | NODIV] = P (E[ṽ1 | NODIV] + E[ṽ2 | NODIV])
=
vmax1∫
v01
f1(v1)v1dv1F2(v
max
2 ) +
vmax2∫
v02
f2(v2)v2dv2F1(v
max
1 ).
Thus, PE[ṽ | NODIV] > P (vmax1 + vmax2 ) becomes
F2(v
max
2 )
vmax1∫
v01
f1(v1)v1dv1 + F1(v
max
1 )
vmax2∫
v02
f2(v2)v2dv2
> F2(v
max
2 )
vmax1∫
v01
f1(v1)dv1v
max
1 + F1(v
max
1 )
vmax2∫
v02
f2(v2)dv2v
max
2 or
F2(v
max
2 )
vmax1∫
v01
f1(v1)(v1 − vmax1 )dv1 + F1(vmax1 )
vmax2∫
v02
f2(v2)(v2 − vmax2 )dv2 > 0, which is
not possible as the term within the integral, (v1 − vmax1 ) ≤ 0. Thus, v̂ ≤ vmax1 + vmax2 ,
proving the Lemma.
Now, we can use the characterization of P to prove
Proposition 8: The probality of a divorce decreases with higher divorce costs and
a lower value of θ. The impact of alimony payments and more children on marriage
stability is ambiguous.
Proof :
Let us denote equation (1.22) g1, (1.23) g2 and (1.24) g3 and dene the matrix D ≡
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
∂g1
∂vmax1
∂g1
∂vmax2
∂g1
∂v̂
∂g2
∂vmax1
∂g2
∂vmax2
∂g2
∂v̂
∂g3
∂vmax1
∂g3
∂vmax2
∂g3
∂v̂
 . D must be negative denite as otherwise the situation would
not be stable in a sense that values of the outside utilities above the thresholds would not
necessarily lead to a termination. Thus, we assume negative denitess of D from now on
. To obtain the impact of divorce laws on the probability P, we rst nd the impact of
divorce laws on each of the three thresholds and then combine all outcomes. For example,
note that dP
dki
= ∂P
∂vmax1
∂vmax1
∂ki
+ ∂P
∂vmax2
∂vmax2
∂ki
+ ∂P
∂v̂
∂v̂
∂ki
.
To get tractable characterizations for the comparative statics, we rst derive some
helpful expression:
Using above expression for P and PE[ṽ | NODIV], we obtain
∂P
∂vmax1
=
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )dṽ ≥ 0
∂P
∂vmax2
=
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )dṽ ≥ 0
∂P
∂v̂
= f(v̂)−
v11∫
vmax1
f1(v1)f2(v̂− v1)dv1−
v12∫
vmax2
f1(v̂− v2)f2(v2)dv2 ≥ 0 as vmax1 + vmax2 ≥ v̂.
∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax1
=
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )ṽdṽ
∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax2
=
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )ṽdṽ
∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂v̂
= f(v̂)v̂ −
v11∫
vmax1
f1(v1)f2(v̂ − v1)dv1v̂ −
v12∫
vmax2
f1(v̂ − v2)f2(v2)dv2v̂
Using the denitions of g1, g2 and g3 and the previous results then gives
∂g1
∂vmax1
= δ ∂P
∂vmax1
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax1
− (1− δP)
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ − (1− δP)
∂g1
∂vmax2
= δ ∂P
∂vmax2
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax2
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ
∂g1
∂v̂
= δ ∂P
∂v̂
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂v̂
= 0
∂g2
∂vmax1
= δ ∂P
∂vmax1
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax1
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ
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∂g2
∂vmax2
= δ ∂P
∂vmax2
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax2
− (1− δP)
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ − (1− δP)
∂g2
∂v̂
= δ ∂P
∂v̂
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂v̂
= 0
∂g3
∂vmax1
= δ ∂P
∂vmax1
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax1
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ
∂g3
∂vmax2
= δ ∂P
∂vmax2
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂vmax2
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ
∂g3
∂v̂
= δ ∂P
∂v̂
v̂ − δ ∂PE[ṽ|NODIV]
∂v̂
− (1− δP) = − (1− δP)
Now, we show that dP
dki
= ∂P
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dki
+ ∂P
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dki
+ ∂P
∂v̂
dv̂
dki
≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. As ∂P
∂vmax1
,
∂P
∂vmax2
and ∂P
∂v̂
are positive, it remains to show that
dvmax1
dki
,
dvmax2
dki
and ∂v̂
∂ki
are positive as well.
dvmax1
dk1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(1− δ) ∂g1
∂vmax2
∂g1
∂v̂
−δP(1− δ) ∂g2
∂vmax2
∂g2
∂v̂
−(1− δ) ∂g3
∂vmax2
∂g3
∂v̂
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|D| = (1−δ) (1− δP)
2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≥
0, as |D| ≤ 0 and the negative denites of D further requires that
∂g1
∂vmax1
= δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ − (1− δP) ≤ 0.
dvmax2
dk1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1
∂vmax1
−(1− δ) ∂g1
∂v̂
∂g2
∂vmax1
−δP(1− δ) ∂g2
∂v̂
∂g3
∂vmax1
−(1− δ) ∂g3
∂v̂
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|D| = −(1−δ) (1− δP)
2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ+δP

|D| ≥
0
dv̂
dk1
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂g1
∂vmax1
∂g1
∂vmax2
−(1− δ)
∂g2
∂vmax1
∂g2
∂vmax2
−δP(1− δ)
∂g3
∂vmax1
∂g3
∂vmax2
−(1− δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|D| = (1−δ) (1− δP)
2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≥
0
⇒ dP
dk1
≥ 0
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dvmax1
dk2
= −(1− δ) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ+δP

|D| ≥ 0
dvmax2
dk2
= (1− δ) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≥ 0
dv̂
dk2
= (1− δ) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≥ 0
⇒ dP
dk2
≥ 0
Concerning dP
dφ
= ∂P
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dφ
+ ∂P
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dφ
+ ∂P
∂v̂
dv̂
dφ
, we have
dvmax1
dφ
= (1− δP)2 [w1 − w2(n)]
2δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−(1−δP)
|D| ≷ 0
dvmax2
dφ
= − (1− δP)2 [w1 − w2(n)]
2δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−(1−δP)
|D| ≷ 0
dv̂
dφ
= (1− δP)2 [w1−w2(n)]
δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−δ
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ
|D| ≷
0
⇒ dP
dφ
≷ 0
Finally,
dP
dθ
= ∂P
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dθ
+ ∂P
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dθ
+ ∂P
∂v̂
dv̂
dθ
≤ 0, since
dvmax1
dθ
= −ϕ1(n) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≤ 0
dvmax2
dθ
= ϕ1(n) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(vmax1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ+δP

|D| ≤ 0
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dv̂
dθ
= −ϕ1(n) (1− δP)2
δ v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ−1

|D| ≤ 0
⇒ dP
dθ
≤ 0
The impact of children on marriage stability is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher
n decreases stability due to the eciency loss after a divorce induced by θ < 1. On
the other hand, a potentially negative eect of alimony payments on marriage stability
might induce a countereect.
Fertility
Proposition 9: Assume the respective (IC-DE) constraint does not bind. If the
impact of children on marriage stability is positive, equilibrium fertility might be higher
than under full commitment. Otherwise it is lower. The impact of divorce laws on
equilibrium fertility is ambiguous.
Proof : As the (IC-DE) constraint does not bind, players choose fertility to maximize
U = w10 + w20(1− g0(n)) + ϕ1(n) + ϕ2(n)
+δ
(
P[U∗1 + U
∗
2 ] + (1− P)[E[Ũ1 | DIV] + E[Ũ2 | DIV]]
)
= w10 + w20(1− g0(n)) + ϕ1(n) + ϕ2(n)
+ δ
1−δ (w1 + w2(n) + ϕ2(n) + E[ṽ1] + E[ṽ2]) + δϕ1(n)
P+(1−P) 1
1−δ θ
1−δP
− δ(1−P)
1−δP (k1 + k2)−
δ
1−δPPE[ṽ | NODIV]
Making use of ∂U
∂v̂
= δ
(1−δP)
(
dP
dv̂
v̂ − dP(E[ṽ|NODIV])
dv̂
)
= 0 gives
∂U
∂n
= ∂U
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dn
+ ∂U
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dn
− g′w20 + δ1−δw
′
2 +
1
1−δϕ
′
2 + ϕ
′
1
(
1+(1−P) δ
1−δ θ
1−δP
)
= 0 or
α∗ϕ′1 + ϕ
′
2 + (1− δ)
(
∂U0
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dn
+
∂U0
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dn
)
= (1− δ)g′w20 − δw′2
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where
α∗ ≡ 1− δ + δ(1− P)θ
1− δP
As F (v̂) ≥ Pand dα∗
dP =
δ(1−θ)(1−δ)
(1−δP)
2 ≥ 0, we have α ≥ α∗, where α was dened above for
the case where the divorce decision is always made eciently. On the one hand, having
α∗ ≤ α decreases equilibrium fertility as long as θ < 1. Yet, if the term in brackets is posi-
tive (which is the case if
dvmaxi
dn
> 0 as ∂U
0
∂vmax1
= δ
(1−δP)
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ−vmax1 )(v̂−ṽ)dṽ ≥ 0
and ∂U
0
∂vmax2
= δ
(1−δP)
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ−vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂− ṽ)dṽ ≥ 0), a countervailing eect exists,
and we can not say which one dominates.
Comparative statics
Here we subsume all eects of for example ki on relationship stability under
∂2U
∂P2
∂P
∂ki
∂P
∂n
+ ∂U
∂P
∂2P
∂n∂ki
, where the sign is ambiguous for all divorce laws, since it depends
on exact characteristics of the outside utility's distribution functions (which we did not
specify further).
Thus,
dn∗
dki
= −
∂2U0
∂P2
∂P
∂ki
∂P
∂n
+ ∂U
0
∂P
∂2P
∂n∂ki
+δϕ′1
 1−θ(
1−δP
)2
 ∂P∂ki
d2U0
dn2
≷ 0
dn∗
dφ
= −
∂2U0
∂P2
∂P
∂φ
∂P
∂n
+ ∂U
0
∂P
∂2P
∂n∂φ
+δϕ′1
 1−θ(
1−δP
)2
 ∂P∂φ
d2U0
dn2
≷ 0
dn∗
dθ
= −
∂2U0
∂P2
∂P
∂θ
∂P
∂n
+ ∂U
0
∂P
∂2P
∂n∂θ
+δϕ′1
 1−θ(
1−δP
)2
 ∂P∂θ
d2U0
dn2
≷ 0
Proposition 10: Assume n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 and that the respective (IC-DE) constraint
binds. Then, higher divorce costs and a lower level of θ increase equilibrium fertility.
The impact of alimony payments is ambiguous.
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Proof :
Recall that equilibrium fertility when n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 is characterized by the binding (IC-
DE) constraint, taking into account that ∆vi is suciently big to make an immediate
divorce optimal o equilibrium:
u21(n
∗)− u21(n∗∗) + δ
[
U
∗
1(n
∗) + U
∗
2(n
∗)−
(
U1(n
∗) + U2(n
∗∗)
)]
= 0 or
u21(n
∗)− u21(n∗∗) + δ1−δ (w2(n
∗) + ϕ2(n
∗))− δ
1−δ (w2(n
∗∗) + ϕ2(n
∗∗))
+ δPϕ1(n
∗)(1−θ)
(1−δP)
+ δP
(1−δP)
(1− δ)(k1 + k2)
− δ
(1−δP)
PE[ṽ | NODIV] + δ
1−δφ[w2(n
∗∗)− w2(n∗)] = 0
As
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax1
= δ
(1−δP)
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(v
max
1 )f2(ṽ − vmax1 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ ≥ 0
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax2
= δ
(1−δP)
v̂∫
v01+v
0
2
f1(ṽ − vmax2 )f2(vmax2 )(v̂ − ṽ)dṽ ≥ 0 and
∂(IC−DE)
∂v̂
= 0, we have
dn
dki
= −
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax1
dvmax1
dki
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax2
dvmax2
dki
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂ki
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
≥ 0
dn
dφ
= −
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax1
∂vmax1
∂φ
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax2
∂vmax2
∂φ
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂φ
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
≷ 0
dn
dθ
= −
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax1
∂vmax1
∂θ
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂vmax2
∂vmax2
∂θ
+
∂(IC−DE)
∂θ
∂(IC−DE)
∂n
≤ 0
where we make use of the fact that ∂(IC−DE)
∂n
must be negative.
Chapter 2
Minimum Wages and Relational
Contracts
2.1 Introduction
Minimum wage laws and associated positive or negative eects are one of the most
controversially debated issues in economics. Many discussions deal with distributional
aspects or employment eects, but also the impact on employees not directly aected by
the minimum wage is analyzed. When trying to understand its consequences, however,
only limited attention has been paid to how a minimum wage might aect incentives.
Especially aspects like the hold-up problem, relationship specic investments, or the
eciency of employment relationships have basically been neglected, and we are just
beginning to understand potential interactions (see MacLeod, 2010).
The following paper shows that if agents must be motived to exert eort, various 
empirically observed  consequences of a minimum wage can be explained. Then, a higher
minimum wage can increase employment, reduce turnover of employees, have spillover
eects on higher wages, and reduce wage dispersion. The driving factor behind these
results is a rm's optimal choice of incentives. If rms are forced to pay a higher wage
than actually intended, they will also require their employees to work harder. Further-
more, if only relational contracts, i.e., contracts based on observable but non-veriable
measures, can be used, an appropriate a minimum wage can even be eciency-enhancing
and increase the surplus within an employment relationship.
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The need to give incentives has largely been neglected in the (theoretical) literature
on minimum wages.1 For example, this aspect is absent in search-and-matching models,
which assume a prominent part in explaining a lot of empirical results (see Flinn, 2006,
or Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2011). However, many employees receiving a minimum wage
are subject to performance pay, like waiters or retail employees (Kadan and Swinkels,
2010). In addition, it might be impossible or too costly to verify certain aspects of an
occupation within these industries. For example, employees of a fast food restaurant
are supposed to be friendly to customers and careful when preparing their products.
A barber will have to exert eort to provide sucient quality, and a nightwatchman
can be more or less attentive. While all these jobs have standardized components  for
example the time an employee must be present  the aspects pointed out generally can
not be veried. Then, incentives can only be given in dynamic games, with the use
of relational contracts.2 More precisely, this implies that employees need incentives to
perform a desired task but that neither eort nor a signal induced by the employee's
eort are veriable3. A court-enforceable contract that induces the agent to work is thus
not feasible, and all contingent compensation must be enforceable within an equilibrium
of the dynamic game. Then, cooperation can only be sustained if the discounted future
value of the employment relationship is suciently high.
The present paper uses relational contracts to analyze the impact of a minimum wage.
In addition, a labor market with many homogeneous rms (also denoted as principals) and
employees (or agents) exists, with more employees than rms.4 The market is frictionless,
and no (exogenous) turnover costs exist, why it is always possible for a rm to costlessly
replace an agent. Furthermore, the market is not fully transparent in a sense that if
turnover occurs, it is not possible to detect the reason, i.e., if an agent is red or leaves
voluntarily. Thus, a rm cannot build up an external  or market  reputation for
honoring its promises. This creates a commitment problem: Instead of making promised
payments as a reward for previous eort, rms might have an incentive to renounce and
replace employees. Therefore, the only way to induce agents to work is the existence
1Exceptions are Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) who apply an eciency wage model, or Kadan and
Swinkels (2010), who use a standard moral hazard setting.
2For an elaborate and complete analysis of relational contracts see MacLeod & Malcomson (1989)
and Levin (2003).
3Alternatively, they might be veriable, but actually verifying them is too costly.
4See MacLeod & Malcomson (1998) for a relational contracts model within a market setting.
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of endogenous turnover costs, i.e., as part of an equilibrium. A natural way to induce
these costs (and preventing surplus destruction) is an equilibrium where all new agents
receive a rent (as in MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998) which is at least as high as the
payment promised to agents as a reward for their eort. However, rms are also exposed
to these turnover costs whenever their employees leave for exogenous reasons. Although
they have all bargaining power, rms are thus not able to capture the whole surplus of
an employment relationship. Then, they face a tradeo between giving high incentives
(induced by high wages) and reducing turnover costs (which also increase with equilibrium
wages). Even if maximum incentives are possible, employers voluntarily decrease them
and enforce an eort level which is ineciently low. Forcing rms to pay higher wages 
for example induced by a minimum wage  will make it optimal for rms to let agents
work harder, inducing a surplus increase.
Although the minimum wage increases eciency, prots of the rms go down, which
should have an impact on employment. However, the previous results were derived in a
setup where the number of rms is xed and each of them employs exactly one agent.
Then, a mininum wage does not aect employment, at least as long as rms' prots are
still positive. Instead, it redistributes surplus from rms to employees, a result empirically
conrmed by Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991).
To capture employment eects as well, the model is extended accordingly. A min-
imum wage can have positive or negative employment eects, which crucially depends
on whether rms make positive prots or not. Firms make positive prots if they have
considerable market power or had to face sunk investment costs at the time of entry.
Prots are certainly made in some industries where a minimum wage applies (take the
fast-food industry and some of its major players), but probably not for all. Thus, we
analyze both cases separately. First, rms have no market power and can freely enter the
market, implying that employment is characterized by a zero-prot condition. As a mini-
mum wage decreases rms' prots, it also lowers total employment. However, the surplus
of each remaining individual employment relationship increases. Thus, the impact of a
minimum wage on total (or market) eciency might or might not be positive.
Subsequently, we assume that prots are positive. Furthermore, a rm can employ
many agents. Then, employment is chosen eciently for a given level of equilibrium eort.
However, since rms voluntarily decrease incentives to reduce endogenous turnover costs,
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eort and consequently also employment will be ineciently low. By increasing eort, a
minimum wage thus also induces a rm to employ more agents than before.
The impact of a minimum wage on employment thus depends on the aected rms'
protability. This might explain why positive employment eects can be observed in the
fast-food industry (for the most prominent example see Card & Krueger, 1994), where
several large players have a substantial degree of market power.
Furthermore, we test the robustness of our main result  that a minimum wage in-
creases induced eort levels  in an almost identical setup, but where the principal is
not able to observe an agent's eort. Instead, he can just use the resulting output as an
imperfect signal. If a minimum wage is suciently high, it will still cause higher eort
and eciency levels. In addition, asymmetric information can make it optimal to use
a termination threat to give incentives. The reason is that if only contingent payments
are used, compensation for a good will be higher than for a low outcome. Since the
low wage must not exceed the minimum wage, compensation after observing the good
outcome must be adjusted accordingly to maintain incentives (giving rise to spillover
eects caused by the minimum wage). However, it is also possible to re the agent after
a low outcome. This raises incentives but also increases turnover costs (which are still
required to keep the principal from reneging). If the minimum wage is suciently high,
it is optimal to always re an agent after a observing the low outcome. Then, only one
wage is paid to all agents, implying that compensation is more compressed than before.
Summarizing, turnover levels are generally higher when a minimum wage is present.
However, a marginal increase of the minimum wage will at some point induce a decrease
of employment turnover. The latter is implied by the positive impact of the wage oor on
eort. When agents work harder, the likelihood of a low output  and correspondingly
the probability of termination  decreases.
All of these results have been observed empirically. Industries facing a minimum
wage are usually characterized by high turnover levels (see Brown et al., 1982). We show
that this does not have to be an exogenuously given property but can also be driven by
a rm's consideration to give incentives optimally. Furthermore, the negative marginal
impact of a higher minimum wage on turnover has been found by Portugal and Cardoso
(2006), Dube, Naid and Reich (2007) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2011). Evidence for a
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negative impact of minimum wages on wage dispersion is provided by Grossman (1983),
Katz and Krueger (1998) or Lee (1999). Finally, spillover eects of a minimum wage
have been found as well (see Card and Krueger, 1995, or Neumark and Wascher, 2008,
for summaries).
In the last part of this paper, we discuss the assumption of non-veriability of eort
and output. This aspect is necessary for the normative component of our arguments,
namely that a minimum wage can increase eciency. The positive component, i.e., the
explanation of many observed consequences of the minimum wage, does not require this
assumption. It is also possible to get these results if the agent's eort is veriable, only the
need to give incentives is crucial. Therefore, we show that for a binding minimum wage,
a further decrease also raises the induced eort level if eort can be veried. However,
higher eort now is not associated with more eciency, since the principal would induce
rst-best eort absent a minimum wage. Furthermore, the minimum wage has a spillover
eect on higher wages and  if a rm making positive prots can employ more than one
agent  also might raise employment.
Related Literature
An important and considerable amount of research deals with employment eects
of minimum wages. The hypothesis derived from the standard textbook model of a
labor market  that a binding minimum wage leads to job losses  is now seriously
questioned. Empirical studies like Card & Krueger (1994), Katz and Krueger (1992),
Machin and Manning (1994) and most recently Dube, Lester and Reich (2010) suggest
that the employment eect of a minimum wage is not necessarily negative and might even
be slightly positive. Other papers (for a good overview see Brown (1982) or Neumark
and Wascher (2007)) still claim that a minimum wage destroys jobs. Many theoretical
models have been developed to explain the observed patterns. Bhashkar and To (1999)
develop a model of monopolistic competition where a minimum wage raises employment
per rm but causes rms to exit the market. However, they do not take the need to give
incentives into account, and require job characteristics and agents' reservation wages to
be heterogenous.
Other models stress the importance of match specic human capital (see Miller, 1984
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or Flinn, 1986). Generally, most theoretical papers assume that labor markets are char-
acterized by rent-creating frictions (for a recent approach see Flinn, 2006). The present
paper does not need labor-market frictions to get positive employment eects of a min-
imum wage. Furthermore, none of our results depends on heterogeneity with respect to
job and/or worker characteristics. Even if all principals and agents are identical and the
labor market is frictionless, a minimum wage can increase employment. We only require
that rms make positive prots ex post, no matter whether this is induced by xed entry
costs or reduced competition on the product market.
Less focus has been put on the interaction of a minimum wage with individual in-
centives and eort choices. Exceptions are Kadan and Swinkels (2009, 2010), where the
impact of a wage oor in the standard moral hazard setting is analyzed. They claim that
a minimum wage generally has a negative impact on induced eort levels. Dierent from
our setting, they assume that agents are risk averse, eort can not be observed and an
explicit contract is feasible. Then, a higher wage oor (i.e. payments that have to be
made for the lowest output realization) generally increase the marginal costs of inducing
eort, reducing total incentives given to employees. Total employment might or might
not fall, depending on whether incentives are redistributed among agents. Unfortunately
- as also noted by Kadan and Swinkels (2010) - there seems to be no empirical paper so
far studying the impact of minimum compensation on productivity.
To some extent, we can use results from the literature on the impact of unionization
on rm productivity. At least in the USA, this interaction appears to be positive, and
unionized rms are more productive (for example, see Brown and Medo, 1978, Clark,
1980 or Allen, 1984). Furthermore, although their impact on productivity seems positive,
the eect of unions on employment is small. This outcome has been regarded as unintu-
itive by Wessels (1985), but perfectly ts with our model as long as rms make positive
prots.
However, our results depend on the ability of rms to costlessly re agents. This is
not the case for countries with rigid employment protection laws. There, a minimum
wage is likely to have only a little or no positive impact on eciency. This might explain
why unionized rms tend to be more productive in the US, whereas this relation is more
ambiguous in countries like the UK, Germany or Japan (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003).
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2.2 Model Setup
The economy consists of a mass M of small, identical rms (principal, he) and
a mass of N > M identical employees (agent, she). Principals and agents are risk
neutral. The time horizon is innite, time is discrete (periods are denoted t = 1, 2, ...),
and all players share a common discount factor δ. As principals and agents are identical,
they are not further indexed.
At the beginning of each period t, we distinguish between whether a player currently
is part of a match or not (in t = 1, everyone is obviously unmatched). Each unmatched
principals can oer a contract to exactly one unmatched agent (we assume that this
process is completely arbitrary and contains no frictions).5 This oer consists of a legally
enforceable wage payment wt which is not restricted to positive values. A principal who
does not make an oer gets an outside utility π in the respective period, where we make
the normalization π = 0. If an unmatched agent receives no oer from any principal or
receives one and rejects it, she has to consume her exogenuous outside utility, which is
normalized to zero as well. If she gets an oer and accepts it, she consumes wt and then
chooses an eort level et ∈ [0, 1]. This leads to output yt = θ with probabability et, and to
yt = 0 with probability (1− et). While the output is directly consumed by the principal,
the agent suers eort costs c(et), with c
′, c′′, c′′′ > 0, c(0), c(0)′ = 0 and c(1) suciently
large to never be optimal. After output realization, each agent - no matter whether
employed or not - leaves the market for exogenuous reasons  for example because the
partner found a job somewhere else  with probability (1 − γ) and remains for another
period with probability γ. If an agent exits the market for exogenous reasons, she also
receives a payo equalized to zero.6 Furthermore, she does not return in any subsequent
period. To keep the number of employees xed over time, (1− γ)N new agents enter the
market in every period. At the end of the period, the principal can make a new oer
consisting of the wage payment wt+1 to a remaining agent. If the agent accepts it, the
above procedure is repeated in the next period: the agent receives wt+1 and chooses eort
et+1, after which the output yt+1 is realized. In each other case, i.e. if the principal does
not make an oer or the agent does not accept, both enter the matching market in the
5The case where a principal can employ more than 1 agents is considered below.
6Note that this assumption is without loss of generality even when the agent expects a positive utility
while being on the market.
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next period.
Using dPt ∈ {0, 1} to describe whether a principal is in a relationship, the payo
stream of an arbitrary principal at the beginning of a period t equals
Πt = E
[
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tdPτ (eτθ − wτ )
]
where the expectation is over eort and wage levels, which might depend on whether the
principals enters a new relationship in a period or keeps his past employee.
Using dAt ∈ {0, 1} to describe whether an agent is in a relationship, an arbitrary agent
receives
Ut = E
[
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tdAt (wt − c(et))
]
Here, expectation is over dAt  an agent can leave the market for exogenuous reasons,
while if she remains, she might or might not receive an oer from a principal.
We assume the following information structure. Within a match, there is no asym-
metric information. This implies that eort and output can be observed by both players.
Still, neither eort nor output are veriable, i.e., no explicit contract using them can be
written.
All players outside a match (the market) can not observe anything that happens
within.7 However, the market can see whether an agent leaves a relationship. It cannot
detect the reason, i.e., whether she left for exogenous reasons, did not receive a new oer
from her previous employer, or decided to not accept an oer herself. Finally, rms can
not distinguish new agents from those that already have been on the market for a longer
time.
Although information within a match is perfectly symmetric, we thus have an in-
nitely repeated game of imperfect public monitoring. Any employee has no information
concerning the oers a principal made in the past but can use each rm's turnover history
as an imperfect signal. Therefore, we follow the literature and use the solution concept
of a public perfect equilibrium (PPE) in a sense that each player's actions only depend
7Whether or not the only veriable component - the wage payment - can be observed by the market
is of no relevance here.
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on the public history they share with the respective partner. Put dierently, the oer a
principal makes to a new agent only depends on his turnover history; the same is true for
the agent's acceptance- and rst-period eort-decision. When a match has been active
for a while, players' actions in addition depend on the events that were observed in the
relationship.8 We will later impose some additional restrictions on strategies used by
players. These restrictions simplify the analysis with having a substantial impact on the
results.
Note that no additional bonus is used, and payment contingent of the agent's eort
level only occurs wia the wage wt. However, this assumption is without loss of gener-
ality given our model assumptions (for an equivalent argument see Fong and Li, 2010),
since bonus payments could be postponed until the next period (taking the possibility of
exogenous termination into account), then becoming part of the xed wage.
2.3 Stationary Contracts and the Commitment Prob-
lem
Contracts can be stationary without loss of generality in a sense that for any new
match, eort and contingent compensation are constant as long as the relationship re-
mains.9 The reason is that it does not matter for an agent whether she is compensated for
her eort immediately (i.e., by the wage paid in the subsequent period) or by a (credible)
promise for some future payments (always taking into account the possible termination
of the relationship). Each non-stationary contract could thus be replaced by a stationary
one, namely by averaging out changes in promised continuation payos.
However, focusing on individually stationary contracts does not automatically imply
that stationarity of the whole game can be assumed without loss of generality. Each new
contract can depend on the whole turnover history of a principal. This is relevant because
market intransparency does not allow a principal to build up an external reputation for
keeping his promises, and thus creates an additional commitment problem. The market
8We analyze the case of asymmetric information - the principal cannot observe the agent's eort
choice - later; then, the equilibrium concepts remains the same in a sense that within a relationship,
actions only depend on what was observed by both players.
9See Levin (2003) or the Appendix of MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), where the latter considers
the case with replaceable agents.
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only receives an imperfect signal, namely a rm's total turnover, but cannot detect the
reason. Thus, principals are not able to extract the whole feasible surplus, although they
are endowed with all the bargaining power. To better understand this point, assume that
the maximum feasible surplus is realized (feasible in a sense that it satises all relevant
constraints derived below). Furthermore, assume that the principal completely gets this
surplus. Then, he would always renege, re an agent at the end of the period instead
of oering her a new contract, and employ a new one. Therefore, turnover has to be
costly for the principal, where these costs could for example assume some kind of surplus
destruction or an upfront payment to new agents (i.e., a payment that cannot be used to
give incentives). For convenience, we assume that the principals use the latter tool, and
pay new agents a rent.
To simplify the following analysis, we restrict attention to contract-specic strategies
in the sense of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2011). This implies that actions of the rm
and workers do not depend on the identity of the worker, calendar time, or history outside
the current relationship. However, this assumption has only a slight impact on generality
in our setup. Not using information outside a current relationship implies that the rm's
total turnover history is not part of strategies. Instead, the punishment imposed on a
principal when starting a new employment relationship (i.e., the rent going to a new
agent) is always the same. Thus, we only have to distinguish between any period in an
ongoing and the rst period of a new relationship. In Appendix I, we prove that giving
new agents the same rent independent of the whole turnover history is without loss of
generality.
Furthermore, conditioning strategies on calendar time could increase a rm's rent. The
reason is that future turnover costs are needed to persuade agents today that promises are
honored. Thus, turnover costs are only necessary for all periods except for the rst period
of the whole game. However, relaxing the assumption of contract-specic strategies and
allowing for a dierent countract in the rst period of the game would have no qualitative
impact on our results and just slightly increase prots and equilibrium eort levels.
Concluding, the punishment, i.e., the rent going to new agents, will keep the principal
from reneging and ring agents in equilibrium. However, he cannot completely prevent
this punishment, but will be exposed to it all the time an agent leaves for exogenuous rea-
sons and has to be replaced. As these costs must increase with equilibrium compensation,
Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts 81
the principal faces a trade-o between giving optimal incentives and reducing turnover
costs, a problem inducing him to voluntarily reduce the feasible eort level and thus the
relationship surplus.
2.4 Payos and Constraints
Let us denote the stationary equilibrium eort level e∗, the wage in ongoing relation-
ships w, and U the agent's payo in such an ongoing relationship. Then, U can be dened
recursively as
U = w − c(e∗) + δγU (2.1)
The discounted future stream δU only enters with probability γ, since there is a chance
that the agent leaves the market for exogenous reasons (happening with probability
(1− γ)), then receiving a payo of zero.
If an agent is on the market and gets a job, her expected payo in the rst period of
employment equals
U0 = w0 − c(e∗) + δγU
where w0 denotes the wage an agent receives in this rst period of employment.
Finally, an agent currently unemployed but on the market at the beginning of a
period receives a job oer with probability µ ≡ (1−γ)M
(N−M)+(1−γ)M =
(1−γ)M
N−γM . Thus, an agent`s
endogenous reservation utility U equals
U = µU0 + δ(1− µ)γU
There, note that an agent remains in the market with probability γ, no matter
whether she currently is employed or not.
In equilibrium, some constraints have to be satised for each agent who is part of a
match. First of all, an agent must prefer to be employed rather than not. This implies
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that the utilities U and U0 must exceed the endogenuous reservation utility U . This is
captured by an agent's individual rationality (IRA) constraints,
U ≥ U
and U0 ≥ U
Furthermore, given U , U0 and U , it must be in the interest of an employed agent
to actually choose equilibrium eort e∗, i.e., her incentive compatibility (IC) constraint
must be satised. Here, we assume that an agent who does not exert e∗ is red10 and
re-enters the job market in the subsequent period. If an agent deviates and chooses eort
e 6= e∗, she will obviously set e = 0 (or put dierently: if satised for e = 0, (IC) also
holds for any other eort level). Thus, (IC) equals
c(e∗) ≤ δγ
(
U − U
)
A principal's payo starting a new relationship is denoted Π0, while he gets Π in an
ongoing match. These payos can be characterized recursively as well, giving
Π = e∗θ − w + δ[γΠ + (1− γ)Π0]
and Π0 = e∗θ − w0 + δ[γΠ + (1− γ)Π0]
Each principal faces some constraints as well. First of all, starting a new employ-
ment relationship should be better than shutting down completely, giving the individual
rationality (IRP) constraint
Π0 ≥ 0.
Furthermore, each principal must have an incentive to honor his promises. If he
reneges and oers a wage dierent from the one specied in the relational contract,
we make the standard assumption that all trust is lost in the specic relationship, the
employed agent does not believe the rm`s promises anymore, and thus is not willing to
exert positive eort from then on. After a deviation, the principal thus has the choice to
either shut down and receive his exogenous reservation utility with a value of zero, or to
10Which is optimal for the principal due to the observability of eort and will not occur in equilibrium.
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employ a new agent. Since either choice must not be optimal, we have two constraints,
where the incentive compatibility (ICP) constraint covers the rst case and equals
Π ≥ 0
The second one is denoted the non-reneging (NR) constraint, and characterized by
Π ≥ Π0
Obviously, (ICP) is automatically satised given (IRP) and (NR), and we can omit it
from now on.
2.5 Basic Results
As rms have all bargaining power, we focus on outcomes that maximize a principal's
prots (subject to the relevant constraints). This can be motivated by assuming that
each rm with a vacant employment opportunity makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to an
arbitrary agent. Considering prot maximizing equilibria is without loss of generality in
a standard relational contracts setting with one principal and one agent. There, giving
incentives can be separated from surplus distribution. However, since the market is not
transparent, the prot maximizing equilibrium yields a dierent outcome with respect
to eort and eciency than other equilibria, where either agents' rents or total surplus
is maximized. The missing transparency creates a commitment problem and forces each
principal to induce endogenous turnover costs. This creates a tradeo between surplus
maximization and the minimization of these turnover costs. Therefore, rms decide to
enforce an eort level lower than the one that (possibly) maximizes total surplus.
Solving for the equilibrium that maximizes a rm's prots, we assume players only use
the aforementioned contract-specic strategies. Since we do not consider the possibility
of collusion among rms, every principal takes U as given. Recall that the equilibrium
wage level in an ongoing relationship is denoted w, while the wage paid at the beginning
of a new employment relationship equals w0.
Then, a principal's (NR) constraint  which is supposed to keep him from renouncing
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and replacing an employed agent  boils down to
w0 ≥ w. (2.2)
As this constraint obviously binds, an agent always receives the same wage, no matter
whether she is a new employee or not.
Proposition 1: Given Π > 0, the induced per period eort level e∗ is characterized
by c′ = δγθ.
Proof: First, note that (NR) and (IC) constraints are satised as equalities in equi-
librium. Since w0 can not be used to give incentives and thus just redistributes funds to
the agent, the principal will set it as low as possible. Similarily, for a given eort level
e∗, there is no point in oering the agent a higher wage than necessary to satisfy her (IC)
constraint.
This allows us to compute wage levels, w0 = w = c(e
∗)
δγ
+ U(1 − δγ), and substitute
them into the principal's prot function,
Π = 1
1−δ (eθ − w) =
1
1−δ (eθ −
c(e∗)
δγ
− U(1− δγ)).
Then, the rst order condition (which also is sucient given the modelling assump-
tions) with respect to induced eort gives θ − c′
δγ
= 0, proving the proposition.
The induced eort level is lower than the ecient one, which is characterized by
c′ = θ
Note that - unlike in standard relational contracts models - the ineciency is not induced
by the future surplus being too low (which we assume it is not) but by the fact that when
giving stronger incentives and consequently increasing the surplus, a principal also raises
the rent he has to give to new agents. The bigger the probability that agents leave
for exogenous reasons, the stronger are the tendencies to limit these losses by reducing
incentives. As minimum wage workers tend to have high turnover rates (Brown et al,
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1982), the eciency loss induced by limited commitment should be considerable in these
markets.
2.6 The Minimum Wage and Eciency
The introduction of a minimum wage above market compensation has the following
impact on production. Given that θ is suciently high (such that principals' prots
remain non-negative), a binding minimum wage increases eort and total surplus of each
employment relationship.
Proposition 2: A mandatory wage increase (for example induced by the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage) increases agents' eort and can raise the surplus created within
each occupation.
Proof : Since w = w0, and since the (IC) constraint binds, eort as a function of the
wage level is implicitly dened by w = c(e
∗)
δγ
+ (1 − δγ)U . Since a minimum wage holds
for all rms, we also must take its impact on U into account, and have de
dw
= δγ(1−µ)
c′
> 0.
The per period surplus created by an employed agent equals s ≡ eθ− c(e). Therefore,
we have,
ds
dw
=
de
dw
(θ − c′)
which is positive as long as θ ≥ c′.
The introduction of a (binding) minimum wage has two kinds of consequences. First
of all, resources are distributed from rms to agents, which is in line with empirical results
found by Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991). Furthermore, the total surplus created in
the relationship increases.
Firms' prots, however, go down. For relationship starting after the introduction of
the minimum wage, the impact on a rm's prots is given by
dΠ0
dw
=
1
1− δ
de
dw
(θ − c
′
γ
1
1− µ
) < 0
Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts 86
All our results are only valid as long as the principals' (IR) constraints do not bind
and each rm makes a strictly positive prot. If the constraint binds, a mandatory
wage increase would lead the rms to leave the market and not produce anymore, since
otherwise they would make losses. We will analyze the case of (partial) market exit in
more detail below .
Finally, note that using a bonus paid at the end of the period would not improve the
situation for principals, as long as the total compensation in a period must not be below
the miniumg wage.
2.7 Employment Eects of the Minimum Wage
The previous sections contain the assumption that each rm can employ exactly one
agent and that  recall thatM is xed  total employment remains constant. This further
requires each rm to make positive prots, since otherwise a minimum wage would have
made it optimal to not employ an agent and receive the outside option of zero instead.
If we relax the assumption that M is xed and analyze potential employment eects
of a minimum wage, the results depend on whether rms make positive prots or not. If
not, a (binding) minimum wage will in any case cause employment losses. If prots are
made, a minimum wage can even increase employment and eciency. In the following,
we analyze both cases in isolation.
First, we assume that rms can enter the market at no costs and that the productivity
parameter θ decreases with M . Since each rm only employs one agent, and since the
number of rms is determined by a zero-prot condition, a minimum wage  reducing a
rm's prots  will obviously induce an employment reduction.
Then, we allow rms to make positive prots. This might be a consequence of positive
entry costs (i.e., although ex-ante prots are zero, they are positive after entry) or market
power on the product market (which is certainly the case for big fast food chains). Now,
a rm can hire more than one agents, but faces decreasing returns to scale. In this
case, the prot maximizing employment level is ecient given the induced eort. As the
commitment problem makes it optimal for rms to voluntarily reduce eort, however,
employment is ineciently low. Since a minimum wage increases eort, it will raise
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employment as well. Note that the mechanism here has nothing to do with arguments
using monopsony power, which probably is the classical example for positive employment
eects of a minimum wage. The latter requires agents to be heterogeneous with respect
to their outside options. Here, the employment eect is solely driven by the minimum
wage's positive impact on eort, and homogeneous agents make labor supply innitely
elastic.
In the rst part, rms neither have market power on the product market, nor do they
face substantial entry costs. Instead, they can freely enter and leave the market. Thus,
M is endogenous and determined by a zero-prot condition. Each output depends on
M via the dierentiable and (strictly) decreasing function θ(M).11 Furthermore, N is
assumed to be suciently large for N > M always to be satised in equilibrium.
Since we focus on contract-specic strategies, rms entering the market are treated
equally to those already present for a longer time.12 Thus, equilibrium employment M∗
 as well as equilibrium eort  is characterized by the zero- prot-condition Π(1− δ) =
e∗θ(M∗) − w = 0. Wage payments are given by an agent's (IC) constraint, which is
identical to above. Thus, we can further specify equilibrium employment M∗, namely by
e∗θ(M∗)− N − γM
∗
N −M∗
c(e∗)
δγ
= 0. (2.3)
This immediately gives
Proposition 3: Assume equilibrium employment is characterized by 3.9. Then, the
introduction of a (binding) minimum wage reduces employment.
Proof : Implicitly dierentiating 3.9 gives dM
∗
dw
= −
de∗
dw
(θ(M∗)− c
′
δγ(1−µ∗) )
e∗θ′− N(1−γ)
(N−M∗)2
c(e∗)
δγ
. As equilibrium
eort is still dened by θ(M∗) = c
′
δγ
, the nominator  as well as the denominator  are
11For simplicity, we assume that this relation is independent of the number of realized total successes
but that - given the output is high - the level depends on M always in the same way.
12If this were not the case new rms did not have to pay a rent to their rst employed agent, they
could immediately exit the market after their rst agent left for exogenuous reasons. Since this would
allow them to make strictly positive prots, establishing an equilibrium could be dicult. If θ(M) were
strictly positive for allM , the number of rms would approach innity (at some point, however, it would
exceed the number of agents N). If θ(M) would be zero for M ≥ M̃ , at least M̃ rms, all inducing zero
eort, would be on the market.
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negative.
However, there will be a transition period. After the minimum wage is introduced,
rms remain in the market until their agent leaves for exogenuous reasons (note that the
payo decrease rms face is mainly driven by employment relationships starting in the
future. The existing agent only receives a slightly higher rent). Therefore, it will take
some time until employment actually falls.
The impact of a minimum wage on total eciency now is ambiguous. While indi-
vidual matches become more productive, some output is lost due to the employment
reduction. However, combining the minimum wage with a subsidy S can unambiguously
increase eciency. Just assume that each rm that employs an agent for the minimum
wage receives S. If this subsidy is just high enough to oset the prot loss induced by
the minimum wage, total employment will be identical to before. To nance the subsidy,
an income tax T = S could be collected. Then, agents are still better o than in the
situation without a minimum wage, since the surplus increase more than osets the tax
T . An appropriate subsidy and tax policy combined with a minimum wage can therefore
lead to a Pareto improvement in the respective market.
If rms make positive prots, because of market power or since they face suciently
high entry costs,13 a minimum wage rather increases employment. Now, assume that
the number of rms is xed but that each of them can employ an arbitrary number of
agents. Furthermore, the production function of one rm only depends on the number of
agents employed by this rm, and not on the total number of principals or employees in
the market. Then, it is without loss of generality to that the market consists of just one
principal (this implies that U = 0). This rm's employment level is given by J , where
we maintain the assumption that J < N is satsied in equilibrium. The productivity of
each employed agent is characterized by the dierentiable and decreasing function θ(J).14
Furthermore, θ′′ < 0 is assumed as a sucient condition for a maximum.
13Furthermore, it is required that, upon entry, the rm did not expect the minimum wage to come.
14For convenience, we assume that an additional agent does not have a lower productivity than
those employed previously, but that this new agents uniformly lowers the productivities of all employees.
Assuming a production function where an additional agent has no impact on others' productivities would
not give dierent results.
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Here, we have to further specify the assumption concerning contract-specic strategies
in a sense that the strategies of employed agents do not depend on the rm's behavior
towards their colleagues. Otherwise, multilateral contracts in the sense of Levin (2002)
could be feasible.
Then, the constraints that have to be satised are equivalent to above. As long as
prots are positive, only an agent's (IC) and the rm's (NR) constraint  stating that
all new agents have to receive at least the same wage as those with longer tenure  are
relevant. As both will obviously bind, the rm's payo stream in an arbitrary period
t > 1 equals
Π(J) = J
eθ(J)− w
1− δ
Maximizing total prots, an agent's eort again is characterized by δγθ(J∗) = c′ as
long as no binding minimum wage is present. Otherwise, i.e., with a minimum wage
suciently high, eort is given by an agent's (IC) constraint, namely w = c(e
∗)
δγ
.
Then, equilibrium employment J∗ is characterized by eθ(J∗) + Jeθ′ − w = 0. For
given eort and wage levels, employment is ecient. The reason is that labor supply
is innitely elastic. If eort remained constant, a minimum wage increase (given the
minimum wage binds) would thus always be associated with an employment reduction,
i.e., dJ
dw
|e constant= 12eθ′+Jeθ′′ < 0. However, a higher eort countervails the direct
negative of a minimum wage on employment.
Proposition 4: Assume equilibrium eort and employment are characterized by
w = c(e
∗)
δγ
and eθ(J∗) + Jeθ′−w = 0. Then, a higher minimum wage increases an agent's
eort and total employment J .
Proof :
Note that we are only interested in the case that the minimum wage binds. Then,
eort and employment are characterized by
w − c(e
∗)
δγ
= 0 and eθ(J) + Jeθ′ − w = 0.
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Thus, we have de
dw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 0
1 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J) + Jθ′ 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −(2eθ
′+Jeθ′′)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J) + Jθ′ 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0,
since 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′ is negative. Furthermore
dJ∗
dw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
−1
θ(J) + Jθ′ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J) + Jθ′ 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
− c
′
δγ
+θ(J)+Jθ′∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J) + Jθ′ 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. Substituting
θ(J∗) + J∗θ′ = w
e
gives
− c
′
δγ
+w
e∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J) + Jθ′ 2eθ′ + Jeθ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
, which is positive as − c′
δγ
+w = 0 and
e < 1.
Thus, a minimum wage initially also increases eciency. If it becomes too high,
however, eort and employment turn out to be ineciently high as well.
Summarizing, a minimum wage can only have a positive impact on employment if
rms make positive prots. In many real life situations, intermediate cases might exist.
Firms have some market power, but it is some extent bounded by entry. Then, a minimum
wage might or might not increase employment.
2.8 Asymmetric Information
In this section, we show that our results continue to hold if the agent's eort is her
private information and if the principal can only observe the resulting output. This result
is important, since in many cases it will not be possible or simply too expensive for a
rm to continuously monitor an employee's actions. For example, McDonald's does not
have managers steadily taking care of whether its employees treat their customers nicely,
and the owner of a barber shop will not always have an eye on all their sta.
We will thus check the robustness of our main result  that a minimum wage can
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increase the surplus of an employment relationship  in an identical setup but where the
principal is not able to observe an agent's eort. Instead, he just can use the resulting
output as an imperfect signal for an employee's cooperation. Then, the impossibility to
create an external reputation again leads to an imposed eort level that is ineciently
small (even if rst best eort were enforceable). If a minimum wage is suciently high,
it will also lead to eort and surplus that is higher than before. However, the impact
of a higher minimum wage on eort is not monotone. When it just becomes binding,
the minimum wage rst decreases eort and needs a certain level to impose the positive
impact derived above. We do not explicitly analyze employment eects in this section.
Those should not be too dierent from before as  in the case where rms make positive
prots  the employment increase was solely driven by higher eort and not by eort
being observable.
Furthermore, the case of asymmetric information raises some additional issues absent
before. If the minimum wage becomes binding, it can be optimal for the principal to re
the agent with positive probability after a low outcome. The reason is that if an agent
is never red in equilbrium, incentives are solely given by two wage levels - a high wage
following high outcome, and a low wage when y = 0. Since the low wage can not be below
w, the principal must also increase the high wage (for a given eort level). However, the
inability to build up an external reputation forces the principal to pay the high wage
to any new agent  otherwise, the principal would always renege after a good outcome.
Instead of only using wages to give incentives, the principal could re the agent after a
low outcome with positive probability. Then, expected turnover costs increase for a given
high wage, since agents do not only leave the rm for exogenuous reasons anymore. On
the other hand, it becomes cheaper to give incentives, as the agent does not necessarily
receive the minimum wage after a failure. If a minimum wage is suciently high, it
becomes optimal for a rm to solely use a termination threat to induce eort. If agents
are always red after a low outcome, only one wage level for all agents  whether new or
remaining  is paid.
Thus, a minimum wage not only has an impact on chosen eort levels, but also
on turnover and wage compression within an industry. With respect to turnover, our
model thus makes the following predictions. If a minimum wage exists, turnover should
generally be higher than otherwise. However, if the minimum wage is suciently high, a
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further increase will lead to less turnover. The latter is implied by the minimum wage's
positive impact on eort, which makes a realization of the low output  and thus a layo
 less likely. Furthermore, a minimum wage implies a compression of wages. When the
minimum wage is low and employees are also kept after a low outcome, wages paid after
a low and those after a high output realization are dierent. When the minimum wage
is high and only termination is used to give incentives, all workers receive the same wage
in every period.
Finally, spillover eects exist, i.e., minimum wages also have an impact on higher
wages. As long as dierent wage levels exist (i.e, the termination probability after a low
output is smaller than 1), the lower one will be equal to the minimum wage. However,
the high wage will be aected as well  if incentives are supposed to remain at a constant
level, for example, it might increase.15
There exists a considerable amount of empirical evidence that our predictions with
respect to turnover, wage compression, and spillover eects are indeed observed when a
minimum wage is present.
Generally, industries where a minimum wage is relevant  like the fast food industry
 are characterized by high turnover levels (see Brown et al., 1982). Although low wage
industries are generally considered to generally face high turnover, some of it might be
driven by the a rm's consideration to give incentives optimally. Furthermore, early
empirical suggest that industries where a minimum wage applies are actually associated
with higher turnover rates (for example, see Wessels, 1980).
The negative marginal impact of a minimum wage increase on turnover is well estab-
lished empirically. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) nd that separations of teenage workers
in Portugal decreased after a minimum wage increase, while Dube, Naid and Reich (2007)
observe that average tenure rose substantially in restaurants in San Francisco. The most
recent contribution is Dube, Lester, and Reich (2011), who also nd strong evidence that
turnover rates for teens and restaurant workers fall after a minimum wage increase.
An early contribution exploring wage compression is Grossman (1983), later followed
by Katz and Krueger (1998), who nd that the minimum wage has greatly compressed
wages in the Texas fast food industry. Furthermore, Lee (1999) provides evidence that
15Below, we nd that spillover eects also exist when eort is veriable.
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a substantial decline of the real minimum wage in the US was mainly responsible for a
sharp increase of the wage dispersion among low income workers in the eighties.
Finally, for evidence on spillover eects see Card and Krueger (1995), or Neumark and
Wascher (2008). Several reasons have been provided, for example that rms substitute
low wage with high workers or that an adjustment of wages is necessary to maintain
dierentials between high and low skilled workers (Grossman (1983)). In our setting,
spillover eects occur even with homogenous workers, and we neither need fairness
perceptions (Falk et al., 2006) or a more advanced bargaining concept (Dittrich, Knabe,
2010) to show that an increase in reservation utilities induced by non-binding minimum
wages has this impact.
We will now briey present the main results formally, a full formal analysis  as well
as the proofs to the associated propositions  is delegated to Appendix II. In each period
t, the principal can observe yt but not et (still, the output remains non-veriable). Thus,
the agent's compensation can only be based on past output levels. Let us denote the
wage an agent receives after a success in the previous period w+t , while w
−
t equals the
compensation after yt−1 = 0. In the latter case, i.e. after observing a low outcome,
the principal might also terminate the relationship. We denote the probability of a
continuation of the relationship after a low output was observed (conditional on the
agent not leaving for exogenuous reasons) αt.
16
We derive the equilibrium in contract-specic strategies that maximizes each prin-
cipal's prots at the beginning of a new employment relationship.17 The most relevant
constraints are an agent's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and a principal's non-
reneging (NR) constraint. The latter states that a principal must not have an incentive to
16Note that α can only adopt an intermediate value, i.e., strictly lie between 0 and 1, if a public
randomization device exists. If an intermediate value was supposed to just be supported by a mixed
strategy, the principal would always keep an agent after a low output. The reason is that turnover is
associated with real costs. A new agents has to receive w+ and is thus more expensive than keeping an
agent whose output was low and who is supposed to receive w−. Without a randomization device, only
equilibria where an agent either gets never or always replaced after a low output can be supported. We
will assume that this randomization device exists and thus allow for intermediate values of α. Still, it
might be that α ∈ {0, 1}, with the conditions made more precise in the Appendix.
17Note that the restriction on stationary contracts is not without loss of generality here. Instead
of terminating the relationship with the same probability in every period, the principal could make αt
contingent on the whole respective output history. Fong and Li (2010) provide a complete characterization
of optimal relational contracts in non-market relationships (i.e., with just one principal and one agent),
where the agent faces a limited liability constraint and eort is binary.
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replace an agent when this is not part of an equilibrium. Since w+ ≥ w−, this constraint
is only relevant after a success. Thus, a new agent's wage, w0, must not be below w+.
Finally, a principal's prots must remain positive, also when a minimum wage is present.
We subsequently assume that this is the case.
We solve this problem for all dierent levels of a minimum wage, and have the
following development. If the minimum wage does not bind for w− (note that we do not
impose any further limited liability constraint), α = 1, i.e. no termination is used.
Proposition 5: Assume the minimum wage is lower than the optimal level of w−.
Then, α = 1.
Here, a failure allows the principal to set w− low enough to extract the whole future
surplus the agent is expects from this relationship. Since a new agent always gets a rent,
it is never optimal to re an employee.
However, if the minimum wage is suciently large, an agent always is red after a
low output.
Proposition 6: There exists a w# such that α = 0 for all w ≥ w#.
Firing an agent with positive probability after a low output increases her incentives
to exert eort, since remaining in a relationship is strictly better than getting red and
receiving U . However, termination is costly for the principal who has to pay new agents
the wage w+. If an agent is always red after a low outcome, only one wage level exists,
and turnover costs are reduced again. Thus, if the minimum wage is suciently high, it
becomes optimal to only use a termination threat to provide incentives.
Concerning the development of α (given changes of the minimum wage), it is either
possible that α gradually falls from α = 1 to α = 0, or that it only adopts corner
solutions, i.e., α ∈ {0, 1}. In the latter case, α = 1 for w < w# and α = 0 for w ≥ w#,
where w# is specicied in Proposition 6.
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Turning to equilibrium eort, we rst show that, absent a minimum wage, the
commitment problem makes the principal induce an ineciently low eort level.
Proposition 7: If the minimum wage does not bind (i.e., w− > w), equilibrium eort
is characterized by θ−c′−c′′ 1−δγ
δγ
= 0. Then, U−  the payo an agent receives after a low
output  is equal to U . When w increases and becomes binding, eort continuously de-
creases to the level specied by θ−c′−c′′ (1−δγ(1−e))
δγ
= 0, where it remains as long as α = 1.
As long as α = 1, a higher minimum wage thus has no impact on the induced
eort level. Only if α adopts a level strictly smaller than 1, w has an actual impact on
equilibrium eort. When α can also assume intermediate values, de
dw
can be positive or
negative, depending on parameter values. If w is large enough such that α = 0, a higher
minimum wage always leads to a higher equilibrium eort level.
Proposition 8: Assume α = 0. Then, de
dw
≥ 0.
As long as the minimum wage does not bind when α = 0 (which might or might not
be possible), we have de
dw
= 0. When it is binding, the impact of the minimum wage on
equilibrium eort becomes strictly positive.
Finally, the impact of a minimum wage increase on turnover is negative if α = 0,
captured in
Proposition 9: Assume α = 0. Then, a higher minimum wage reduces total turnover.
This result immediately follows from the previous discussion. Since a higher minimum
wage increases eort, the probability of y = 0 is reduced as well.
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2.9 The MinimumWage and Non-Veriability of Eort
and Output
Our main results consist of a normative and a positive components. Since the com-
mitment problem makes it optimal for rms to induce ineciently low eort levels, a
minimum wage can increase eciency. On the other hand, various empirically observed
consequences of a minimum wage are explained. However, the latter would still hold if
markets were fully transparent in a sense that everyone could detect deviations (i.e., the
principal would be able to build up an external reputation), and even if an agent's eort
or output were veriable. Therefore, our positive results are robust to changes in rms'
commitment power. Only the need to give agents incentives remains crucial.
In this section, we briey validate that this claim is true in the case of veriable
eort. More precisely, we rst show that the minimum wage increases agents' eort
levels if it binds (however, the level where the minimum wage becomes binding is higher
than before). This outcome continues to hold since an agent's (IC) constraint when
eort is veriable is identical to above. But higher eort now is not associated with
more eciency, since the principal would induce rst-best eort absent a minimum wage.
Furthermore, the minimum wage has a spillover eect on higher wages and  if a rm
making positive prots can employ more than one agent  also can raise employment.
The latter is only true if the minimum wage binds. As long as it does not bind, it reduces
employment. These results are implied by the fact that the condition determining a
rm's optimal employment level is identical to above. Thus, higher individual eort
levels increase employment.
We do not formally analyze the case where a formal contract can only be written on an
agent's output. However, the impact of a minimum wage on turnover well basically be the
same as above, since an agent's (IC) constraint is unaected by the rm's commitment
power. For a suciently high minimum wage, it will then be optimal to solely use
termination threats to provide incentives, and increased eort levels again reduce turnover
rates.
Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts 97
Veriable Eort
If eort is veriable and rms are not forced to pay a minimum wage, they will choose
rst-best eort (assuming that production is ecient per se). Furthermore, they are
able to keep agents at their reservation utilities. In this section, we slightly adjust the
contracts rms write. Since eort is veriable, contingent payments are made at the end
of a period, before agents might leave the market for exogenous reasons. However, if a
minimum wage has to be paid, this aects the total wage paid in a period. Note that if
we used the same contract as before (payment occurs at the beginning of the next period,
but only if the agent has not left the market), the following results would not be aected.
Throughout, we assume that a rm's prots are always positive.
Thus, we have
Proposition 10: Assume the agent's eort is verable. As long as no positive
minimum wage exists, equilibrium eort is characterized by θ = c′, i.e. the ecient eort
level eeff . Furthermore, the rm can capture the full rent of each relationship.
Proof : First, note that U = 0, which follows from the fact that rms are just
required to compensate agents for their eort. The latter also determines the (IC)
constraint, which will bind in equilibrium, and thus gives w = c(e∗). Plugging into the
principal's prot function, Π(1−δ) = e∗θ−c(e∗), and solving for e∗ proves the proposition.
Now, assume that each rm is forced to pay a strictly positive minimum wage w in
every period. Then, the introduction of a minimum wage will initially have no impact
on the eciency of the relationship (which is equal to the rst best), but only lead to
a redistribution to employees. When w is further increased, though, eort will become
ineciently high.
Furthermore, even if a minimum wage does not bind, it has spillover eect on higher
wages. More precisely, assume the minimum wage w is set at a level between the original
values of w0 and w. This immediately increases U0, but also has a positive impact on
agents already employed. Since reservation utilities U increase after the introduction of
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the minimum wage, rms either have to reduce induced eort levels or increase w as
well. It turns out that they choose the latter. Furthermore, even if the minimum wage
is set at a level above the original value of w, it might not bind ex post, and rms might
adjust wages to a level even above w.
Proposition 11: Assume a strictly positive minimum wage w is introduced. Then,
a rm wil induce equilibrium eort e∗ ≥ eeff . As long as e∗ = eeff , the wage in an
ongoing relationship, w, remains higher than the minimum wage. Only if e∗ > eeff , the
minimum wage will bind for ongoing relationships.
Proof : An employed agent's (IC) constraint equals w∗−c(e∗)+δγU ≥ w̃+δγU , where
w∗ denotes the agent's wage after exerting equilibrium eort, and w̃ the corresponding
wage for no eort. Obviously, a rm will set w̃ = w.
Using U = w
∗−c(e∗)
1−δγ and the fact that (IC) will bind in equilibrium, we have
w∗ = c(e∗) + (1− δγ)
(
w + δγU
)
.
Thus, the principal solves
max
e
Π = 1
1−δ (e
∗θ − w∗)
s.t.
(IC) w∗ = c(e∗) + (1− δγ)
(
w + δγU
)
(MW) w∗ ≥ w
Substituting gives the Lagrange function
L = 1
1−δ
[
e∗θ − c(e∗)− (1− δγ)
(
w + δγU
)]
+λMW
[
c(e∗) + (1− δγ)
(
w + δγU
)
− w
]
,
and the rst order condition
1
1− δ
[θ − c′] + λMW c′ = 0
If λMW = 0, θ = c
′; if λMW > 0, θ < c
′, proving the proposition.
Thus, the minimum wage induces upward pressure on all wage levels, i.e., we observe
spillover eects. Furthermore, wage dispersion is decreased since all agents  independent
Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts 99
of their tenure  receive the same wage at some point.
Furthermore, we can establish
Proposition 12: As long as w(1 − µ) < c(e
eff )
δγ
, where µ denotes the probability
an unemployed agent nds a job in any period, a marginal increase of the minimum
wage has no impact on equilibrium eort. If w(1 − µ) ≥ c(e
eff )
δγ
, a further increase of w
increases eort.
Proof : Note that an agent's payo equals U = w
∗−c(e∗)
1−δγ . Substituting the binding (IC)
constraint, i.e., w∗ = c(e∗) + (1 − δγ)
(
w + δγU
)
, we have U = w + δγU . This further
gives U = µU + δ(1− µ)γU , and U = µ
1−δγw. The latter expression is again plugged into
(IC) to obtain
w∗ − w (1− δγ(1− µ)) = c(e∗)
Now, assume that w is gradually increased starting from w = 0, and recall that
e∗ ≥ eeff . Then, w∗ must rise as well to keep eort at eeff , but relatively less than
w. When w reaches the level c(e
eff )
δγ(1−µ) , the minimum wage thus just becomes binding.
Therefore, de
∗
dw
= 0 for w(1 − µ) < c(e
eff )
δγ
. If w(1 − µ) ≥ c(e
eff )
δγ
, equilibrium eort is
determined by w(1− µ) = c(e
∗)
δγ
, and de
∗
dw
= (1−µ)δγ
c′
> 0.
Finally, we show that positive employment eects of a minimum wage can also be
observed if an agent's eort is veriable. Thus, we return to the case where only one rm
making positive prots is on the market and can employ several agents.
This gives
Proposition 13: Assume that eort is veriable, a rm can employ more than one
agent, and that each agent's productivity is characterized by the decreasing and convex
function θ(J), where J denotes rm employment. Then, equilibrium eort e∗ = eeff if
w ≤ c(e
eff )
δγ
, and e∗ > eeff if w > c(e
eff )
δγ
. Furthermore, increasing the minimum wage w
has no impact on equilibrium eort and decreases employment J∗ as long as w ≤ c(e
eff )
δγ
.
When w > c(e
eff )
δγ
, further raising w increases equilibrium eort as well as equilibrium
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employment.
Proof : Since we only consider one rm, U = 0. Thus, an agent's (IC) gives w∗ =
c(e) + (1 − δγ)w. As the rm maximizes Π = J eθ(N)−w
1−δ , the Lagrange function equals
L = J eθ(J)−c(e)−(1−δγ)w
1−δ + λMW (c(e)− δγw), which gives rst order conditions
θ(J∗)− c′ + 1− δ
J∗
λMW c
′ = 0
e∗θ(J∗)− c(e∗)− (1− δγ)w + J∗e∗θ′ = 0
If the minimum wage constraint is not binding (which will be the case if w < c(e
eff )
δγ
),
λMW = and e
∗ = eeff . Furthermore, de
∗
dw
= 0, and
dJ∗
dw
= (1−δγ)
2e∗θ′+N∗e∗θ′′
< 0.
If w ≥ c(e
eff )
δγ
, the minimum wage constraint binds, λMW > 0 and thus equilibrium
eort e∗ > eeff . Furthermore, this allows us to characterize equilibrium eort by w −
c(e∗)
δγ
= 0 and equilibrium employment by e∗θ(J∗)− w + J∗e∗θ′ = 0. Thus,
de∗
dw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 0
1 2e∗θ′ + J∗e∗θ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J∗) + J ∗ θ′ 2e∗θ′ + J∗e∗θ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −2e
∗θ′−J∗e∗θ′′∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J∗) + J ∗ θ′ 2e∗θ′ + J∗e∗θ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 and
dJ∗
dw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
−1
θ(J∗) +N∗θ′ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J∗) + J ∗ θ′ 2e∗θ′ + J∗e∗θ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
− c
′
δγ
+θ(J∗)+J∗θ′∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− c′
δγ
0
θ(J∗) + J ∗ θ′ 2e∗θ′ + J∗e∗θ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. Substi-
tuting θ(J∗) + J∗θ′ = w
e∗
, the nominator becomes − c′
δγ
+ w
e∗
. This expression is positive,
since w − c(e
∗)
δγ
= 0 and e∗ < 1.
Thus, an increase of a non-binding minimum wage destroys employment, while further
raising a binding minimum wage increases employment. However, a minimum wage is
always associated with an eciency loss if an agent's eort is veriable.
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2.10 Conclusion
We showed how a minimum wage can increase eort and employment, reduce turnover,
have spillover eects, and reduce wage diversion if incentives are taken into account.
Moreover, if eort and output are not veriable, and if a rm can not build up an
external reputation to honor its promises, the minimum wage has a positive impact on
eciency.
Several further aspects deserve are worth pursuing. First of all, a minimum wage
can not be analyzed in isolation from other labor market institutions. Especially in
many European countries, many labor markets are highly regulated, implying that a
minimum wage might have dierent consequences on employment or production than
in a less regulated country like the US. Take employment protection, which eectively
induces costs on a rm which wants to re employees. These costs can be used as a
commitment device as well, allowing the principal to capture the whole rent (see Yang,
2008). A combination of a minimum wage with employment protection might therefore
either increase or decrease employment and eciency.
Furthermore, we do not take the possibility of collustion into account. Firms do
not consider the impact of their choices on agents' outside options and thus on rents
other rms have to give away. By colluding and choosing the wage that maximizes
joint prots, the induced eort levels (then characterized by c′ = δγ(1 − µ)θ, compared
to c′ = δγθ absent collusion) would even be lower relative to the rst best, increasing
potential benets of a minimum wage. This might be dicult to sustain in a market with
many small rms. However, our results continue to hold in a market with a few large
players. It is just necessary that the dierent principals have a substantial amount of
freedom when making their decisions and that the information concerning (non-veriable)
performance of agents is not shared between restaurants. This might hold for the fast food
industry, where many restaurants are run by franchisees who are relatively independent
when running their outlets. Coordinating on wages (and thus indirectly on eort) would
increase their prots. Then, a minimum has an even bigger potential to increase the
productivity of employment relations.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Appendix I:
Here, we show that the restriction to contract-specic strategies is without loss of
generality in a sense that allowing strategies to depend on the whole turnover history of
a rm would not increase attainable prots. Thus, we make
Proposition A1: Denote the maximum payo a principal can get in any period t if
equilibrium strategies by any player are only contingent on the turnover in period t − 1
Πmax. Then, Πmax will be the maximum payo of the rm in any equilibrium.
Proof:
Let us use the replacement variable rt ∈ {0, 1}, where rt = 1 if a rm starts an new
employment relationship in period t and rt = 0 otherwise. Then, R
t = {r1, r2, ..., rt}
denotes the full replacement history of the respective principal until the beginning of
period t + 1. Rt is observable by the whole market. We want to show that Π0(Rt−1) =
Π0(R
t−1
), all Rt−1, R
t−1
, in the class of contracts that maximize the principal`s prots.
Note that contracts can be assumed to be stationary with the exception that they
might depend on the full turnover history. Thus, each rm faces the constraints
(IC)
c(e∗(Rt−1)) ≤ δγ(U(Rt−1, rt = 0)− U)
(IRA)
U(Rt) ≥ U
(IRP)
Π(Rt) ≥ 0
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(NR)
Π(Rt−1, rt = 0) ≥ Π(Rt−1, rt = 1)
for all t ≥ 1.
To satisfy (NR), the principal must get punished after a turnover. We already pointed
out that we use a rent going to new agents as the means of punishment; here, we still keep
it general and thus refer to the punishment rms face after turnover. This punishment
is denoted P (Rt).
First of all, note that (ICA) must bind, as the market cannot observe payments made
between the principal and the agent. If it were not binding, the principal could increase
prots by decreasing U without violating any constraint. Therefore, agents who remain
in an employment relationship get no rent, and the surplus stream in each period, St,
consists of expected prots Πt and expected punishments, Pt. Obviously, a punishment
never occurs if no replacement has taken place.
As a next step, we establish that equilibrium eort can without loss be independent
of the replacement history Rt. To see that, rst note that the replacement history has no
impact on enforceable eort levels. Thus, if it is optimal to have eort dier in equilibrium
based on the turnover history, this is solely used to punish the principal. But then we
can just play a payo equivalent equilibrium where eort is independent of Rt and the
respective punishment is carried out via other means, for example a rent going to new
agents.
Furthermore, the principal's non-reneging constraint Π(Rt−1, rt = 0) ≥ Π(Rt−1, rt =
1) has to bind for every history. Assume this is not the case. Then, we show that by in-
creasing Π0t (R
t−1), the principal can increase prots Π1 without violating any constraints
in any period after and before t.
First, take periods later than t and note that all future eort levels are independent of
the replacement literature. Furthermore, it can be assumed without loss that a necessary
punishment occurs immediately, i.e., in the period of turnover. Then, the punishment in
period t can obviously be reduced without violating any further incentives.
Concerning incentives for periods before t, again assume that Πt(R
t−1) > Π0t (R
t−1)
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and that all constraints in previous periods are satised. Now, consider the following
change. Decrease P (Rt−1) until (NR) as satised as an equality in period t and denote
the dierence between the old and the new amount of punishment ∆P . As Πt−1(R
t−1) =
e−w(Rt−1)−p(Rt−1)+δ[γΠ(Rt−1, r = 0)+(1+γ)Π(Rt−1, r = 1)] and since Π(Rt−1, r = 1)
is reached with positive probability starting at every period along this replacement history
together with the assumption that everything else remains unchanged, this increases the
expected prot stream in each period along the history path Rt. For all periods τ along
this history where rτ = 0, this does not impose a problem for (IRP). If rτ = 1, (IRP)
might be violated now. If this is the case, increase pτ such that (IRP) is just not violated
anymore. Still, prots in any period prior to τ are not lower than originally. To see
that, take an arbitrary period τ < t with rτ = 1. Assume the history R
t requires k
replacements between τ and t (the exact order is not important for the argument used
here). Then, Π0τ increases by the discounted value of ∆pt times the probability that the
principal actually gets there, namely by δt−τ∆ptγ
t−τ−k(1 − γ)k. If (IRP) was binding
in period τ (otherwise, our argument is satised even easier), pτ has to be increased by
exactly this amount. Now, it is obvious that prots before period τ are not smaller than
in the original situation.
Having derived that equilibrium eort is independent of the replacement history Rt
and that Π(Rt−1, r = 0) = Π(Rt−1, r = 1) for each period t and any replacement history,
we can now show that in each period t, Π0(Rt−1) = Π0(R
t−1
) for all replacement histories
Rt−1 and R
t−1
. First of all, Π0(Rt−1) = Π0(R
t−1
) implies Π(Rt−1) = Π(R
t−1
). Note that
Π(Rt−1) = eθ − w(Rt−1) + δ[γΠ(Rt, r = 0) + (1 − γ)Π(Rt, r = 1)]. Furthermore, from
Π(Rt, r = 0) = Π(Rt, r = 1) follows Π(Rt−1) = eθ − w(Rt−1) + δΠ(Rt, r = 0); thus, by
induction we can say that if equality is true at period t, this also has to be the case for
all future periods for all possible histories.
Finally, it may never be optimal to re the agent in equilibrium: If an agent was red
with positive probability, payo needed to incentivize him would increase. But this also
increases necessary punishment in the case where no replacement occurs.
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Appendix II: The Optimal Stationary Relational Contract Under
Asymmetric Information
Here, we are interested in the optimal (i.e., prot maximizing) stationary contract
when the principal is not able to observe the agent's eort but only the respective output.
Then, it might be optimal to use a termination of the relationship to provide incentives
when a binding minimum wage is present. Thus, the principal res the agent with
probability (1− α) when y = 0 is observed.
This implies the following timing. At the beginning of the period, the agent receives
her wage. Then, eort is exerted and the output realized. After that, the agent leaves for
exogenuous reasons with probability (1− γ). If this does not happen, the principal oers
her to remain for an additional period, receiving the wage w+, if y = θ was observed. If
the output was low, the agent gets red with probability (1−α). Otherwise, she can stay
and gets oered to receive w− in the following period.
Note again that α ∈ [0, 1] is only feasible if a public randomization exists (what we
assume from now on). Otherwise, α can only adopt the values 0 or 1. If only a mixed
strategy was used, the principal would always keep the agent after a low output - as new
agents have to receive w+ and w+ ≥ w−.
In the following, we assume that such a randomization device exists.
As already mentioned, we derive the contract that maximizes each principal's payo
stream at the beginning of the whole game. Here, it is identical to the payo he receives
after a failure is observed, i.e. Π−.
The following constraints have to be satised: It may never be optimal to replace
an agent instead of compensating her after a high output. Thus, the wage a new agent
receives, w0, has to be at least as high as w+. Obviously, w0 = w+, which we already
substitute in the following. After a success or when starting a new relationship, i.e.,
when the wage w+ has to be paid, the principal's payo must be larger than his outside
option, namely Π+ ≥ 0. Furthermore, the agent's utility after a failure must not lie
below her outside option, implying U− ≥ U . The agent's eort is determined by her
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, claiming that e ∈ argmax− c(e) + δγ[eU+ + (1−
e)
(
αU− + (1− α)U
)
]. For us to be able to use the rst order approach, some conditions
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concerning the agents' functions have to be satised. We will make them precise below.
Finally, α must lie between 0 and 1, and the wages paid by the principal must exceed
a potential minimum wage.
For convenience, we also set U = 0 in this section, i.e., assume that there is only one
rm present. However, changing this has no impact on our results.
Then, the objective is to maximize prots from starting a new relationship, i.e.,
max
e,α,w+,w−
Π+ = eθ − w+ + δ [γ (eΠ+ + (1− e) (αΠ− + (1− α)Π0)) + (1− γ)Π0]
= eθ−w
++δαγ(1−e)(w+−w−)
1−δ
s.t.
(IRP) Π+ = eθ−w
++δαγ(1−e)(w+−w−)
1−δ ≥ 0
(NR) w0 ≥ w+
(IRA) U− = w− − c(e) + δγ[eU+ + (1− e)αU−] ≥ 0
(IC) e ∈ argmax− c(e) + δγ[eU+ + (1− e)αU−]
(MW+) w+ ≥ w
(MW-) w− ≥ w
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
First of all, note that (MW+) can only bind when α = 0, as otherwise w+ > w− ≥ w.
Then, we can use the rst order approach to rewrite the agent's (IC) constraint. Note
that some additional conditions have to be imposed on the agent's eort cost function to
make the rst order approach valid in our case. We will make these conditions precise
below.
Thus, an agent's eort is characterized by
−c′ (1− δγ (e+ α(1− e))) + δγ
(
w+ − αw− − c(e)(1− α)− δγα
(
w+ − w−
))
= 0
This allows us to substitute w+ in the principal's problem by
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w+ =
c′
δγ
(1− δγ (e+ α(1− e))) + c(e)(1− α) + (1− δγ)αw−
(1− δγα)
Taken together, we get the Lagrange function, which equals
L = eθ−w
++δαγ(1−e)(w+−w−)
1−δ + λIRPΠ
+ + λIRA
w−−c(e)+δγe(w+−w−)
1−δγ(e+α(1−e)) + λMW+(w
+ − w)
+λMW−(w
− − w) + λα≥0α + λα≤1(1− α)
and gives the rst order conditions
∂L
∂α
=
− ∂w
+
∂α
+δαγ(1−e)( ∂w
+
∂α
− ∂w
−
∂α
)+δγ(1−e)(w+−w−)
1−δ + λIRP
∂Π+
∂α
+λIRA
((
∂w−
∂α
+δγe
(
∂w+
∂α
− ∂w
−
∂α
))
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e)))+δγ(1−e)(w−−c(e)+δγe(w+−w−))
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e)))2
)
+λMW+
∂w+
∂α
+ λMW−
∂w−
∂α
+ λα≥0 − λα≤1 = 0
∂L
∂e
=
θ− ∂w
+
∂e
+δαγ(1−e)( ∂w
+
∂e
− ∂w
−
∂e
)−δαγ(w+−w−)
1−δ + λIRP
∂Π+
∂e
+λIRA
(
∂w−
∂e
−c′+δγ(w+−w−)+δγe
(
∂w+
∂e
− ∂w
−
∂e
))
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e)))+δγ(1−α)(w−−c(e)+δγe(w+−w−))
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e)))2
+λMW+
∂w+
∂e
+ λMW−
∂w−
∂e
= 0
∂L
∂w−
=
− ∂w
+
∂w−−δ(
∂w+
∂w−−1)(1−αγ(1−e))
1−δ + λIRP
∂Π+
∂w−
+λIRA
(
1+δγe( ∂w
+
∂w−−1)
1−δγ(e+α(1−e))
)
+ λMW+
∂w+
∂w−
+ λMW− = 0
From now on, assume that Π+ > 0. This implies that the principal makes positive
prots after a success.
Now we can prove
Proposition 5: Assume the minimum wage is lower than the optimal w−. Then,
α = 1.
and establish
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Lemma A1: Assume the minimum wage is lower than w−. Then U− = U = 0, and
equilibrium eort is determined by θ − c′ − c′′ 1−δγ
δγ
The assumption means that λMW− = 0 (⇒ λMW+ = 0 as well)
This is the case if there is either no minimum wage or that it is that small to have no
impact on the principal's decisions.
Then, λIRA > 0, implying U
− = 0 and thus
w− = c(e)− ec′
⇒ w+ = c′
(
1
δγ
− e
)
+ c(e) and w+ − w− = c′
δγ
Thus, ∂w
+
∂e
= c′′
(
1
δγ
− e
)
and ∂w
−
∂e
= −ec′′
This allows us to rewrite the conditions above as
∂L
∂α
= (1−e)c
′
1−δ + λIRA
−δγ(1−e)+δγ(1−e)
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e))) + λα≥0 − λα≤1 = 0 and
(1−e)c′
1−δ + λα≥0 − λα≤1 = 0⇒ λα≤1 > 0, and no termination occurs in equilibrium
∂L
∂e
=
θ−αc′−c′′( 1δγ−e)+α(1−e)c′′
1−δ = 0 and - as α = 1 -
θ − c′ − c′′1− δγ
δγ
Lemma A2: Assume the minimum wage binds for w−, i.e., w− = w. As long as
α = 1, equilibrium eort is determined by θ − c′ − c′′ (1−δγ(1−e))
δγ
+ (1− δ)λIRA e(c
′′)2
(1−δγ) = 0,
where λIRA > 0 for a suciently low minimum wage and then becomes zero as w increases.
Proof :
Now, we have λMW− > 0 and thus w
− = w.
If λIRA > 0, eort is determined by w = c(e)− ec′. Thus,
w+ = c′
(
1
δγ
− e
)
+ c(e) and
w+ − w = c′
δγ
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Furthermore,
∂L
∂α
= (1−e)c
′
1−δ + λMW+
∂w+
∂α
+ λα≥0 − λα≤1 = 0 ⇒ λα≤1 > 0 and α = 1, implying
λMW+ = 0, and
∂L
∂e
=
θ−c′−c′′ (1−δγ(1−e))
δγ
1−δ + λIRA
δγec′′ ∂w
+
∂e
(1−δγ) = 0
Thus, we have a further characterization of e, namely
θ − c′ − c′′ (1− δγ(1− e))
δγ
+ (1− δ)λIRA
e (c′′)2
(1− δγ)
= 0
This allows us to prove
Proposition 7: If the minimum wage does not bind (i.e., w− > w), equilibrium
eort is characterized by θ − c′ − c′′ 1−δγ
δγ
= 0. Then, U− - the payo an agent receives
after a low output - is equal to U . When w becomess binding, eort continuously de-
creases to the level specied by θ−c′−c′′ (1−δγ(1−e))
δγ
= 0, where it remains as long as α = 1.
Proof :
Follows from Lemmas and and the fact that e(w) has to be continuous as long as
α = 1. Therefore, λIRA > 0 when the minimum wage just becomes binding.
−∂w
+
∂α
(1− δαγ(1− e))+ δγ(1−e)(w+−w−)+(1− δ)
(
λMW+
∂w+
∂α
+ λα≥0 − λα≤1
)
= 0
(2.4)
θ − ∂w
+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))− αγδ(w+ − w−) + (1− δ)λMW+
∂w+
∂e
= 0 (2.5)
Now we want to show that for a suciently high minimum wage, the constraint
MW+ must bind. Our approach is to assume that if λMW+ = 0, the left hand side of
equation (2.5) becomes strictly positive at some level of w.
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Lemma A3: There exists a w∗ such that if w ≥ w∗, λMW+ > 0.
Proof :
Assume that is not the case, then there are levels w ≥ w∗ where
θ − ∂w
+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))− αγδ(w+ − w−) = 0 (2.6)
is satised.
Adding and substracting the terms 1
e
αδγ(w+ − w) and 1
e
w+ in (3.8) gives
θ−αγδ(w+−w−)+ 1
e
αδγ(w+−w)− 1
e
w++ 1
e
w+− 1
e
αδγ(w+−w)− ∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))
= 1
e
[
eθ − w+ + αδγ(w+ − w)(1− e) + w+ − αδγ(w+ − w)− e∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))
]
= 1
e
[
(1− δ)Π+ + w+ − αδγ(w+ − w)− e∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))
]
≥ 1
e
[
w+ − αδγ(w+ − w)− e∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))
]
as Π+ ≥ 0
Now, we use (3.8) to get αγδ(w+ −w−) = θ− ∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e)) and substitute it
into the previous term, which becomes
1
e
[
w+ − θ + ∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e)) (1− e)
]
As long as MW+ does not bind, w+ > w, and thus (furthermore using that ∂w
+
∂e
≥ 0)
1
e
[
w+ − θ + ∂w+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e)) (1− e)
]
≥ 1
e
[w+ − θ]
> 1
e
[w − θ], which is positive for w suciently large, contradicting the assumption
This immediately allows us to prove
Proposition 6: There exists a w# such that α = 0 for all w ≥ w#.
Proof : Follows from Lemma A3: If w+ = w, α has to be equal to zero.
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Corner versus interior solution
Note that for an interior solution of α,
−∂w
+
∂α
(1− δαγ(1− e))+ δγ(1−e)(w+−w−)+(1− δ)
(
λMW+
∂w+
∂α
+ λα≥0 − λα≤1
)
= 0
and
θ − ∂w
+
∂e
(1− δαγ(1− e))− αγδ(w+ − w−) + (1− δ)λMW+
∂w+
∂e
= 0
must be satised. Furthermore, the matrix of second derivatives, i.e.,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Π
−
αα Π
−
αe
Π−eα Π
−
ee
∣∣∣∣∣∣,
has to be negative denite, implying that we need ∂
2Π−
∂α2
< 0, ∂
2Π−
∂e2
< 0 and
∂2Π−
∂α2
∂2Π−
∂e2
−
(
∂2Π−
∂α∂e
)2
> 0.
Since ∂
2Π+
∂α2
= −2δγ [1− δγ] c
′e−c(e)+w
(1−δγα)3(1−δ) [δ + e] = −2δγ
[1−δγ]
(1−δ)
U−
(1−δγα)2 e < 0, an interior
solution is feasible.
Furthermore, ∂
2Π+
∂e2
= 1
1−δ
(
−∂2w+
∂e2
(1− δαγ(1− e))− 2αγδ ∂w+
∂e
)
< 0. Note that this
always has to be the case, even if α only assumes corner solutions, i.e., if α ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, if α = 0, ∂
2w+
∂e2
has to be positive. If α = 1, ∂
2w+
∂e2
=
c′′′
δγ
(1−δγ(e+α(1−e)))−c′′(1−α)
(1−δγα) is
positive for sure.
There might be a case where each agent's cost function is such that ∂
2w+
∂e2
is positive
for α = 0 and α = 1 but negative for intermediate values. Still, it will not have a too big
impact on our results if we assume that ∂
2w+
∂e2
> 0, which we do from now on.
When we can have an interior solution, i.e., α does not fall from 1 to 0 but moves
smoothly, this generally happens monotonically. It might only be the case that somewhere
α increases again. We already know that for a suciently high minimum wage, α = 0.
Furthermore, we know that eort decreases initially, i.e., when the minimum wage just
becomes binding, and remains at a certain level as long as α = 1 (which still is the case
when IRA just gets non-binding). However, the exact pattern is of no interest for us.
Thus, we omit comparative statics for the range when α assumes an interior solution and
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immediately move on to levels of w where α = 0, and analyze comparative statics with
respect to eort in this range.
α ∈ {0, 1}
Now, assume an interior solution for α does not exist.
Proposition: If α ∈ {0, 1}, α = 1 for w < w# and α = 0 for w ≥ w#. When α = 0,
de
dw
= 0 if the constraint MW+ does not bind and de
dw
> 0 if it binds. When α = 1 and
w− = w, de
dw
< 0 as long as (IRA) binds. If it does not bind, de
dw
= 0.
The result that de
dw
< 0 as long as the (IRA) constraint binds has already proven
above, as well as the fact that de
dw
= 0 as long as α = 1 if (IRA) does not bind.
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows. We determine equilibrium prots for α = 1
and α = 0 separately and show that the former decrease stronger with w than the latter,
because if α = 0, then de
dw
≥ 0. Then, we determine w# by setting Π−(α = 1) = Π−(α =
0).
If α = 1 and (IRA) does not bind anymore, equilibrium eort is characterized by
θ − c′ − c′′
(
1−δγ(1−e)
δγ
)
= 0, implying that de
dw
= 0 in that range.
Thus, Π+(α = 1) = eθ−w
++δγ(1−e)(w+−w)
1−δ =
eθ−w− (1−δγ(e+(1−e)))
(1−δγ)
c′
δγ
δ(1−γ(1−e))
1−δ , and
dΠ−(α=1)
dw
= − 1
1−δ
If α = 0 and the (MW+) constraint does not bind, equilibrium eort is characterized
by θ − c′′ (1−δγe)
δγ
, implying that de
dw
= 0.
Then, we have Π+(α = 0, w+ > w) =
eθ− c
′
δγ
(1−δγe)+c(e)
1−δ and
dΠ−(α=0,w+>w)
dw
= 0
If α = 0 and w+ = w, equilibrium eort is determined by the minimum wage, namely
by w = c
′
δγ
(1− δγe) + c(e).
Then, de
dw
= − 1
− c′′
δγ
(1−δγe)
> 0.
Then, we have Π−(α = 0, w+ = w) = eθ−w
1−δ , with
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dΠ−(α=0,w+=w)
dw
=
de
dw
θ−1
1−δ > −
1
1−δ
Thus, setting prots with α = 1 equal to α = 0, we get the desired threshold. As
dΠ−(α=0)
dw
> dΠ
−(α=1)
dw
, α = 0 remains optimal for all minimum wage levels to the right of
w#. As we already gured out that α = 1 is optimal for relatively low levels of w, we
are done with the proof.
The proof to Proposition then is sucient for
Proposition 8: Assume α = 0. Then, de
dw
≥ 0.
Finally, it could be of interest whether (MW+) binds at w#. There, both cases are
possible, depending on respective eort levels, why we do not explore this issue further.
Proposition 9: Assume α = 0. Then, a higher minimum wage reduces total turnover.
This follows from previous results and the production function.
Chapter 3
On the Genesis of Multinational
Networks1
3.1 Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to pursue a gradual expansion strategy of their
network of foreign aliates over time rather than exploring all protable opportunities
simultaneously. They typically establish themselves in their home countries and then
enter new foreign markets step by step. This paper studies the optimal dynamic behavior
of MNEs to explore international growth opportunities. It contributes to the literature
on the international organization of rms by investigating sequential location decisions.
We propose a model where MNEs face uncertainty concerning their success in new
markets and learn about that after entry. Conditions in dierent markets are not inde-
pendent, and the information gathered in one country can also be used to learn about
conditions in other, in particular, similar countries. This so-called correlated learning
can explain why rms expand step by step: market entry is associated with considerable
costs, and sequential investments help to economize on these costs by reducing uncer-
tainty. The learning model developed in this paper serves to derive a number of testable
hypotheses regarding market entry in general and simultaneous versus sequential market
entry in specic. These hypotheses are assessed in a data-set of the universe of German
MNEs and their foreign aliates. The results provide empirical evidence for correlated
1This chapter is joint work with Peter Egger, Valeria Merlo, and Georg Wamser.
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learning as a main driver behind international expansion strategies.
Our paper is related to recent work on sequential exporting. For instance, Evenett
and Venables (2002) point out that initial exports to one market are typically followed
by exports to adjacent markets at the product level. Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout
(2007) nd that Columbian rms start exporting in a single foreign market and gradually
enter additional destinations. They also show that further expansions crucially depend on
the export market served initially. A similar pattern was found by Schmeiser (2009) who,
using Russian rm-level data, demonstrates that export experience determines export
dynamics: a typical rm rst enters one destination and then slowly expands. More
recently, Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2011) explore how rms learn about
their export protability. They illustrate that rms use their rst export market as a
testing ground to learn about their export protability and, subsequently, exit, continue
to export, or enter further markets. Hence, the rst export decision not only provides
information about the export market, it also reveals information about the rm itself (in a
given market). We argue that learning is particularly crucial for foreign direct investment
(FDI; as an alternative to exporting), which denitely involves discrete real investments
while exporting does not necessarily.
We also relate to the literature on the mode and depth of rms' international activ-
ities. Models of heterogenous rms describe how rms make decisions depending on the
associated costs and their productivity levels. Assuming that xed costs are higher for
exporting than for domestic sales only and that they are even higher for foreign plant
set-up and running a multinational network than for exporting, the most productive rms
engage in FDI, less productive companies export, and the least productive rms stay in
the domestic market only (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). This theoretically
predicted pattern has been supported by a number of empirical studies (for the dierence
between exporters and non-exporters, see Arnold and Hussinger, 2005a; Bernard and
Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller, 2002;
for the dierence between exporters and MNEs, see Girma, Kneller, and Pisu, 2005;
Arnold and Hussinger, 2005b). Recently, Conconi, Sapir, and Zanardi (2010) illustrate
that learning through exporting matters for the decision of how to serve a market, via
exports or FDI. Empirically, many MNEs are multi-plant units which are established
gradually. It appears that no research on the genesis of multinational networks exists to
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this date, and it is this paper's purpose to ll this gap.
Given that establishing a multinational network is protable per se beyond other
options, further choices are available to the rm. For example, it has to decide on where
to locate the rst foreign entity (location choice). This choice among several alternative
rst locations may depend on local factor costs, on the accessibility of production factors,
or on various measures of proximity to the home market (for empirical investigations on
the location choice of MNEs, see Devereux and Grith, 1998; Becker, Egger, and Merlo,
2009; Chen and Moore, 2010). Managers of the rm then have to answer related questions
of the following kind. Should the rst investment involve high or low capacity levels? Is
the rst investment the basis for other investments in the region? Given the location
choice of previous investments, where should subsequent aliates be located?
In this context, the present paper analyzes foreign location decisions of MNEs, why
sequential entry patterns can be optimal, and how decisions depend on earlier location
choices. Our theoretical approach is related to the theoretical learning (or bandit) litera-
ture. Early contributions to this literature include Bellman (1956) and Berry and Fristedt
(1979), while a learning process similar to ours has been applied recently by Bergemann
and Hege (1998, 2005) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005). Specic to our model is the
possibility that entry decisions in dierent countries depend on each other, since mar-
ket conditions exhibit similarities. How consumers preferences or attitudes of employees
dier across countries depends on issues such as geographical or cultural distance. If
the correlation between market features is suciently high, a rm can make use of the
knowledge it gains in one market to learn about conditions elsewhere. Then, a rm may
want to enter a second country if it was suciently successful in the rst one. This leads
to one of our main results: even if expected prots in a market are positive, it can be
optimal to delay or later on even abandon subsequent entry. The reason is that market
entry is costly, and sequential investments can increase expected prots by using infor-
mation gathered elsewhere. On the other hand, the reduced uncertainty through delayed
entry comes at the cost of foregone prots. This result is related to the vast literature on
investment under uncertainty (starting with McDonald and Siegel, 1986; see Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, for an overview). If the value of an irreversible investment project follows
a stochastic process, the option to wait for a better realization is valuable even if imme-
diate entry would be protable. Our result follows a similar logic. Uncertainty combined
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with correlated learning creates an option value of waiting, and a sucient amount of
uncertainty must exist to make sequential entry potentially optimal. The main dierence
is that learning is not induced exogenously but by a rm's activities elsewhere. Thus, the
rm can also inuence the degree of learning by adjusting its investment levels in other
markets.
Based on the proposed theoretical model, we derive several testable hypotheses. First,
entry should be more likely in foreign markets where expected prots are higher. Expected
prots do not only increase only with market size and productivity but also with proximity
to the domestic market. The reason for the latter is the following. Firms for which FDI
is possibly attractive are successful at home. Such rms will enter closer foreign markets
more likely, since their positive experience at home is ceteris paribus more valuable there.
Second, sequential entry rather than simultaneous entry abroad can be optimal with
sucient uncertainty about returns on FDI and high-enough success at markets entered
rst. Then, with sequential entry more proximate countries should be entered rst on
average. The reason is that uncertainty creates a value of waiting, rendering it worthwhile
to stagger FDI decisions across markets in an order which declines in expected prots.
Third, subsequent foreign entry is more likely in markets which are proximate to previous
investments for the same correlated learning reasons as before.
We assess these hypotheses empirically using a unique micro-level panel data-set pro-
vided by Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central Bank) that allows us to track Ger-
man MNEs' sequential location decisions over time. We are able to identify the rst,
the second, etc., up to the eleventh location decision of rms across large-enough sam-
ples. Using a conditional logit model for the empirical analysis, we nd that rst, foreign
entry is more likely for countries that are closer to the MNE's home base and where
higher prots may be expected in general terms. This nding is supported by variables
measuring the proximity of markets at large, e.g., whether the same language is spoken
or if the target country used to be a colony of the home country. Moreover, proximate
countries tend to be entered rst as a multinational network evolves. Third, subsequent
entry in later expansion phases is generally more likely in markets that are closer to the
ones entered previously.
To analyze whether it is actually correlated learning that drives the observed expan-
sion patterns or not, we conduct a number of tests. An important result of our theoretical
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model is that the average capacity of investments should ceteris paribus be higher in case
of a sequential entry pattern compared to the average capacity of investments when en-
tities are established simultaneously. The reason is that in the former case a higher
capacity in a country not only raises expected revenues there, but also the amount of
learning about other markets.
Furthermore, the reason for not observing sequential investments could either be that
isolated entry or simultaneous entry was intended from the beginning or that a rm
initially planned sequential entry but was not suciently successful in the rst market.
There, we can use the result that the average capacity in sequentially entered markets
is higher than in simultaneously entered ones. This allows us to hypothesize that, if a
rm only enters one market in one phase and does not establish any subsequent aliates,
the more successful ones should have a lower capacity than the others. The latter is
consistent with the notion that aliates with an above-average capacity were intended to
be followed by sequential investments elsewhere. Then, one reason for a lack of subsequent
investments to high-capacity rst investments should be that rst investments were not
suciently successful.
Finally, correlated learning makes the rm ceteris paribus more optimistic about the
prospects in a market. Thus, it will lower its requirements for later entry with respect to
market size or entry costs over time.
We nd support for all of these hypotheses in our empirical analysis, leading us to the
conclusion that the proposed correlated learning mechanism is indeed an important factor
determining international expansion strategies of multinational networks. To investigate
whether other alternative mechanisms can explain the results of our model as reported
above, we analyze alternative mechanisms such as stochastic shocks across markets, dis-
economies of scale (i.e., constrained resources available to rms), or learning by doing.
All of these mechanisms may be used to derive dynamic expansion strategies of MNEs.
But, as we illustrate, none of these models ts the data as well as correlated learning
does.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present a theoretical model
and main results in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 derive testable hypotheses, introduces the
data and empirical model, and summarizes the benchmark estimates. Section 5 provides
On the Genesis of Multinational Networks 119
extensions and robustness tests, while Section 6 develops alternative models that might
also explain the observed rm behavior. Section 7 oers concluding remarks.
3.2 Model Setup
The following model portrays the international expansion pattern of a rm. This
rm (or multinational, or MNE) is active for two periods, t = 1, 2, and considers
establishing aliates in two countries, j = {A,B}. Entry in country j is possible in
either period. Upon entry, the rm chooses a capacity level Xj which can not be adjusted
subsequently.2 In the period of entry, the investment level Xj is associated with costs
Kj(Xj) = Fj + kj
(Xj)
2
2
, where Fj ≥ 0 are xed entry costs and kj > 0 captures marginal
investment costs.
Each investment may be protable or not. More precisely, the rm possesses an
exogenously given type θj in country j, with θj ∈ {0, θh} and 0 < θh ≤ 1. The type
θj covers rm- as well as market-specic characteristics and is related to the idea of a
matching quality between the rm and the market in the spirit of Jovanovic (1979).3 If
θj = θ
h, the aliate generates a constant return Rj > 0 with probability Xjθ
h in each
period.4 Future prots are discounted with the factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. If θj = 0, the project
does not yield any prots. Formally, per-period returns are denoted by Yjt ∈ {0, Rj}, with
Prob(Yjt = Rj | Xj, θj) = Xjθj ∈ [0, 1]. The latter requires suciently high marginal
investment costs, kj ≥ θhRj(1 + δ), j = A,B, which we assume subsequently. Finally,
the rm is not nancially constrained.
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict the rm's success to two states  an
aliate is either protable or not. Allowing for several or even continuous degrees of
success would have no qualitative impact on our results but substantially complicate the
2This assumption has no qualitative impact on our results; see Appendix III for a characterization
of capacity investments when Xj can be adjusted later on.
3For instance, θj captures the success of a marketing campaign and other specic characteristics
of demand for a rm's products in country j. It could also reect the ability to make use of natural
resources and other local factors in country j and, in general, the eciency of the rm's production
process there.
4We interpret Rj quite broadly. It may include revenues attributable to the investment in j but also
general eciency gains to the rm through a foreign investment. Furthermore, we choose the probability
function to be linear in Xj for convenience. Generally, any probability function which is monotonic in
Xj and less convex than the cost function Kj(Xj) would serve our purpose.
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analysis.
A Firm's Belief About Its Type
One crucial element of the proposed model is that, before market entry, an MNE does
not know whether its type in country j is high or low. Instead, it assigns the (subjective)
probability ρj to being the high type. In the following, we call this probability the rm's
belief. The belief is given before period t = 1 and may have been formed by previous
activities in this market such as market research. A rm's type is specic to a market
so that being of the high type at home does not guarantee to be the high type also in a
foreign market.5
For a rm in our model, there are three relevant markets in each of which the rm
is either of the high or the low type: home, A, and B. All rms initially are active at
home and learn about their type there over time. We conne our interest to rms of
the high type at home. This is consistent with results in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004) suggesting that only the most productive rms become MNEs. While decisions
about home do not feature in our analysis, the type there is relevant because conditions in
dierent markets  and thus the realizations of types  are not independent. For example,
geographical or cultural neighborhood across markets is a source of such correlation.
In our model, the type at home is drawn rst. Recall that we focus on rms of
θh at home. Then, the type in country A is realized. The type is determined by two
dierent components. The rst component relates to the type at home, the second one is
idiosyncratic. To be precise, with weight rA ∈ [0, 1] the type in A is high with the same
probability  namely unity  as at home. rA captures the proximity between home and
country A and is larger if markets are geographically and culturally close to each other.
With weight (1− rA), the type in A is high with an idiosyncratic probability of ρ0A. The
latter is formed by generally available information, market research, or other previous
activities. Thus, the rm's subjective ex-ante belief of being a high type in country A
5Prior to foreign market entry, a rm faces substantial uncertainty concerning its protability there.
It may be argued that rms considering FDI in some market have already gathered information about
local market conditions. This does not contradict the maintained assumptions, as long as there is still
some uncertainty left.
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equals
ρA = rA + (1− rA)ρ0A.
Finally, the type in country B is realized. It is identical to home with weight rB. With
weight (1− rB), the type is determined by B's idiosyncratic component and its proximity
to country A. Formally, the belief in B is characterized by
ρB = rB + (1− rB)[rABρ0A + (1− rAB)ρ0B].
The parameter rAB captures potential correlations between A and B that are not already
covered by the proximity to home, rA and rB, respectively. Hence, we introduce dierent
dimensions of proximity. For example, assume that home is Germany and that the MNE
considers investments in Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark. The (geographical and
cultural) distance of each of these countries to Germany is quite low. However, while
Austria and Switzerland share a common language and other cultural aspects with each
other so that they are quite proximate in general terms (high rAB), the geographical and
cultural distance between Austria and Denmark is much bigger (lower rAB) than the one
between Austria and Switzerland.
The beliefs are increasing in the respective proximity parameters rj, so that the rm
is more optimistic about a country closer to home. The parameters ρ0j , rj and rAB are
known ex ante and determine the subjective beliefs ρj. After the rst period, when
respective output values are observed, these observations are used to update beliefs using
Bayes' rule. We will explore the updating process in more detail below when analyzing
respective entry patterns.
3.3 Optimal Behavior
3.3.1 Entry Patterns
Conditional on being active abroad, the MNE will choose one of the three following
options.
• Isolated Entry: Entry into one country in period 1, no further entry in period 2.
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• Simultaneous Entry: Entry into both countries in period 1.
• Sequential Entry: Entry into one country in period 1 and into the other one in
period 2, conditional on a success of the rst foreign investment.
All other possibilities are dominated by one of the options mentioned above. Isolated
or simultaneous entry in the second period would come at the cost of foregone prots
in the rst period. Entering a second market sequentially after a failure in the rst one
would be dominated ex-ante by simultaneous entry. The reason for the latter lies in the
correlated updating of beliefs, as will become clear below.
The MNE will choose isolated entry into one country if beliefs in the other country are
too low to ever justify an investment there. Otherwise, the rm will consider simultaneous
or sequential entry, facing the following tradeo. Under sequential entry, the rm looses
potential prots in the rst period. On the other hand, the risk of wasting investment
costs is reduced, i.e., there is a value of waiting. The reason is that the rm learns
something about the conditions in the second market because of the correlation of the
rm's types in the two markets. We will analyze this tradeo in more detail below.
3.3.2 Isolated Entry
In this section, the MNE only considers entry into one country, which allows us to
omit the country subscript. If entry is optimal, it will already occur in period 1. Then,
the rm chooses a capacity X to maximize the expected discounted prot stream
Πiso = X
(
ρ1Rθ
h + δE[ρ2]Rθ
h
)
−K(X), (3.1)
where expectation is taken concerning ρ2, the belief in period 2. To be able to characterize
the optimal level of X, we have to consider the updating process. ρ2 is derived using
Bayes' rule, given the initial belief and capacity X. To simplify issues, we omit time
subscripts and denote the initial belief ρ. After a success (Y1 = R), the period-2 belief
equals ρ+, while after a failure (Y1 = 0), that belief equals ρ
−.
As the bad type always fails, a success immediately reveals a good type, and
ρ+ = 1.
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After a failure, we have6
ρ(X)− =
(1−Xθh)ρ
1− ρXθh
.
As ∂ρ(X)
−
∂X
< 0, a larger investment is generally associated with more learning. More
updating occurs for intermediate values of the initial belief, while there is less updating
if the belief is close to zero or unity.7
Note that, as running the aliate requires no further costs once the capacity is set, it
is never optimal to exit a market, no matter how low the belief may be.8 The assumption
of no operating costs has no substantial impact on our results. In a more general model
with operating costs and a longer time horizon, the possibility of exit in the future would
aect the decisions associated with entry. However, this impact is lower the further
ahead a potential exit lies in the future. In our analysis, rms are suciently productive
to engage in FDI and face substantial entry costs. This implies that the belief necessary
to make entry optimal has to be high enough that an immediate exit after only a few
failures will not occur. The optimal activities of the MNE in case of isolated entry may
be described as follows.
Proposition 1 (Isolated Entry): Given market entry, the optimal capacity under
isolated entry equals
X iso =
ρθhR(1 + δ)
k
, (3.2)
and entry is only optimal if
Πiso =
(ρθhR)2(1 + δ)2
2k
− F ≥ 0. (3.3)
Proof: See Appendix II for the proof.
6Recall that ρ(X)− = Prob[θ = θh | Y1 = 0] = Prob[θ=θ
h∩Y1=0]
Prob[Y1=0]
= Prob[Y1=0|θ=θ
h]Prob[θ=θh]
Prob[Y1=0|θ=θh]Prob[θ=θh]+Prob[Y1=0|θ=0]Prob[θ=0]
= (1−Xθ
h)ρ
(1−Xθh)ρ+1(1−ρ) .
7This is the case since ρ− ρ(X)− = ρXθh 1−ρ
1−ρXθh .
8Thus, we do not consider the standard value of learning, namely the option to stop the project. If
running the aliate was costly, this option value would make the rm willing to accept some expected
short-term losses in the rst period.
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Throughout, we assume that condition 3.3 is satised for each country if ρj = 1, i.e.,
market entry is protable at prot-maximizing capacity levels for suciently high beliefs.
Comparative statics can easily be derived. The capacity is increasing in R (which could
reect fundamentals such as market size). It is decreasing in the distance to home (i.e.,
a larger value of r) and in investment costs k. Higher R and r as well as lower k also
render entry more likely, whereas larger xed costs (which in a market perspective could
reect fundamentals such as corruption or investment freedom) make entry less likely.
3.3.3 Simultaneous Entry
When choosing simultaneous entry, the rm enters both countries A and B at the
beginning of period 1. Now, beliefs in country A are also aected by outcomes in B (and
vice versa). But, after capacities are set, events in A have no impact on decisions in B
and vice versa. Thus, correlated learning does not provide an additional benet under
simultaneous entry, and we postpone the analysis of the correlated updating process to
the case of sequential entry. Total expected prots of the rm just equal the sum of
prots under isolated entry:
Πsim =
(
XsimA ρAθ
hRA +X
sim
B ρBθ
hRB
)
(1 + δ)−KA(XsimA )−KB(XsimB ).
Therefore, the chosen capacity levels are identical to above and we get
Xsimj =
ρjθ
hRj(1 + δ)
kj
,
yielding total prots
Πsim =
(ρAθ
hRA)
2(1 + δ)2
2kA
+
(ρBθ
hRB)
2(1 + δ)2
2kB
− FA − FB.
The non-negativity condition is identical to the one under isolated entry and has to be
satised here as well. Comparative statics for capacity and the likelihood of entry are
also the same as under isolated entry.
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3.3.4 Sequential Entry
When choosing sequential entry, the rm uses information gathered in one country,
say A, to update its beliefs about B. At the beginning of period 1, it enters A. Observing a
success, it subsequently invests in B in period 2. Otherwise, it just remains in A without
any further investments. Note that entry in B after a failure in A can not be optimal
since this would be dominated by simultaneous entry.
The (relative) protability of sequential entry depends on several aspects. As already
mentioned, the rm faces a tradeo when comparing sequential and simultaneous entry.
Under the former regime, it can reduce its risk and only has to bear investment costs
for relatively high beliefs. On the other hand, it looses potential prots from the second
country in period 1. Crucial for the aspect of risk reduction is the actual amount of
correlated learning, which determines the option value of waiting. This depends on the
distance between A and B, captured by the parameter rAB. Furthermore, observing
a success in A has to be a suciently strong signal. In case that rA is very close to
unity, a success in A does not contain much new information, as the rm already is quite
optimistic to face a high type there ex ante. This limits updating in B, rendering the
gains of sequential entry negligible. Therefore, a considerable amount of uncertainty in
A has to prevail for sequential entry to be optimal.
Beliefs and Correlated Learning
Considering correlated learning, the updating process is slightly dierent from above,
as the outcome in one country also aects beliefs in the other one.
Recall that ex-ante beliefs (or priors) about markets A and B equal ρA = rA +
(1 − rA)ρ0A and ρB = rB + (1 − rB)[rABρ0A + (1 − rAB)ρ0B], respectively, where rj is a
proxy for the (cultural or geographical) distance of country j ∈ {A,B} to the MNE's
home market, while rAB considers the proximity between the two foreign target countries.
With sequential entry, we can not analyze both countries' beliefs in isolation anymore
and have to consider four possible states for the set of types (θA, θB), namely (θ
h, θh),
(θh, 0), (0, θh), and (0, 0). Updating occurs conditional on observing the outcome (YA, YB),
which takes one of the realizations (RA, RB), (RA, 0), (0, RB), or (0, 0). As before, we use
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superscripts to denote updated beliefs. For instance, ρ+−j denotes the period-2 belief in
country j after a success in A and a failure in B were observed. Note that not entering
B in period 1 automatically implies that a failure was observed there. In Appendix I, we
derive general characterizations of the updated beliefs.9 Note that, after a success, the
belief in the respective country still jumps to unity. What we need for the analysis of
sequential entry  i.e., entry in the second country after a success in the rst one  is the
updated belief in B after a success was observed in A, and vice versa.
Under sequential entry starting in A and with YA = RA (which implies that the type
in A must be high), the belief in B becomes
ρ+−B =
(
rB + (1− rB)[rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
.
Obviously, ρ+−B > ρB. Starting out by investing in B and observing a success there yields
ρ−+A =
(
rB + (1− rB)[rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
ρA
ρB
= ρ+−B
ρA
ρB
.
Prots and Capacities
In this section we derive prots and capacities under sequential entry. For convenience,
we continue to assume that the MNE enters country A rst, and B subsequently.
Sequential entry yields total expected prots of
Πseq = XseqA ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)−kA
(XseqA )
2
2
−FA+δXseqA ρAθ
h
(
XseqB ρ
+−
B θ
hRB − kB
(XseqB )
2
2
− FB
)
.
(3.4)
XseqA ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ)− kA
(XseqA )
2
2
− FA collects prots generated in A. The term
XseqA ρAθ
h
(
XseqB ρ
+−
B θ
hRB − kB
(XseqB )
2
2
− FB
)
= XseqA ρAθ
hΠseqB describes expected prots
from entering country B valued in period 2. It is the product of the probability that this
actually happens, i.e., the probability of success in A, and the expected prots in B given
9We also show that under correlated learning beliefs follow a martingale  implying that they do
not change in expectation  just as before when we considered the updating process for one country in
isolation
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entry there. Then, the capacity in B equals
XseqB =
ρ+−B θ
hRB
kB
,
yielding ΠseqB =
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB.
When determining XseqA , the potential prots in B are taken into account, and we obtain
XseqA =
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
hΠseqB
kA
. (3.5)
Proposition 2 (Sequential Entry): The capacity chosen in the rst country under
sequential entry is larger than the capacity in this country under simultaneous entry.
Proof: See Appendix II for the proof.
Capacity in A is higher under sequential than under simultaneous entry because it
not only raises expected revenues there but also the probability for entry in B for a given
belief ρ+−B . As the expected prots in B are positive by construction (otherwise, isolated
entry would be better), a larger capacity in A increases the likelihood of a realization
of these prots. This implies that expected total prots (net of investment costs) in A
are lower than under simultaneous entry. Whether the capacity in B is lower or higher
depends on the size of the discount factor.
Dierent from the standard literature on investment under uncertainty (see McDonald
and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the degree of learning is not exogenously given
but implied by the capacity choice in country A. Thus, the rm balances costs of learning
(higher capacity in A than individually optimal) with its benets (higher probability of
realizing prots in B).
Proposition 2 is very important for empirical robustness tests as conducted in Section
3.5 below. If sequential entry were unobserved in reality, we would not not know whether
simultaneous or isolated entry were intended from the beginning or whether the rm had
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planned sequential entry originally but did not observe a success in the rst country.10 If
simultaneous or isolated entry were observed, we could use capacity dierences between
simultaneous or isolated entry and sequential entry as a proxy for the intended entry
pattern.
Finally, sequential entry upon entry in A gives expected prots
Πseq =
1
2kA
[
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
((
ρ+−B θ
hRB
)2
2kB
− FB
)]2
− FA. (3.6)
Similar to the cases of simultaneous and isolated entry, the probability of sequential
entry to be protable (which does not mean that it is actually optimal) increases with
expected prots, i.e., ρj, rj, θ
h, and Rj, and it decreases with costs, i.e., with kj and Fj.
The next proposition contains our rst main result.
Proposition 3: Sequential entry or simultaneous entry can be optimal, depending
on parameter values. Sequential entry is even possible if individual expected prots in
both countries are positive at the beginning.
Proof: See Appendix II for the proof.
This proposition links our results to the one proposed by optimal investment decisions
under uncertainty (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). If expected
prots in both countries are strictly positive ex ante, delaying entry for one of them might
still be optimal. Despite the positive net-present-value of an investment, the option value
of waiting may be higher.
However, sequential entry will only be optimal if sucient correlated learning occurs,
which requires two elements. The distance between countries A and B must not be
too high (rAB must be high enough). In addition, some uncertainty has to prevail, as
otherwise no substantial updating can occur. If a rm is already very optimistic about
its type in one country (ρj is close to unity), beliefs will only be updated marginally.
10A further option would be that sequential entry is still planned and only was not realized yet. We
will come back to that point later on.
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Let us use these results and attend to the tradeo the rm faces when considering
sequential entry. It can reduce the total risk of investment (investment costs in markets
with a low type) by using information gained in country A for activities in B.11 The
information gathered in A is only valuable for B, if the dierence between ρ+−B and ρB is
suciently large. To see this, consider the extreme case where ρB = ρ
+−
B (which will be the
case if either ρA = 1 or ρB = 1). Then, simultaneous or isolated entry always dominates
sequential entry (for a formal analysis see the proof with regard to Hypothesis 2 in
Appendix II). This remains the case as long as ∆ρseqB ≡ ρ
+−
B −ρB is relatively small. Since
this is an important aspect, let us take a closer look at ∆ρseqB = (1− rB)rAB
ρ0A
ρA
(1− ρA).
As ρA = rA + (1− rA)ρ0A, we arrive at the following comparative static results:
∂∆ρseqB
∂rAB
= (1− rB)
(
ρ0A
ρA
− ρ0A
)
> 0, (3.7)
∂∆ρseqB
∂rA
= −(1− rB)rAB
ρ0A(1− ρ0A)
ρ2A
< 0, (3.8)
and
∂∆ρseqB
∂rB
= −rAB
(
ρ0A
ρA
− ρ0A
)
< 0,
∂2∆ρseqB
∂rA∂rB
= rAB
ρ0A(1−ρ
0
A)
ρ2A
. Expression (3.7) implies
that if conditions in countries A and B are more similar to each other, the correlation
in learning is higher, and a positive outcome in A is a stronger signal concerning the
protability in B. Expression (3.8) states that if A is closer to home, entry there makes
the rm learn less about the conditions in B. In the extreme case, if rA = 1, the type
in A can not be distinguished from the type at home. Then, ∆ρseqB = 0, and it is not
possible to learn something from A about the conditions in B. Again, this part relates
to the question of optimal investment under uncertainty. A higher degree of uncertainty
increases the option value of waiting and thus raises the threshold of required prots to
make entry actually optimal. Here, a sucient degree of learning as characterized by
∆ρseqB is required to render sequential entry an optimal choice.
12
To sum up, for sequential entry to be optimal, a success must reveal sucient infor-
mation about the rst country that is entered as well as the second one.
11For example, a high level of FB will make the risk reduction through waiting and learning more
valuable.
12Note that we can not establish a simple monotone rule claiming that a higher level ∆ρseqB increases
the protability of sequential relative to simultaneous entry. The reason is that it is not possible to
analyze a change of ∆ρseqB in isolation, as all its components have an impact on other issues than just
the degree of learning or uncertainty.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Testable Hypotheses
In this section, we use the theoretical model to derive predictions and formulate them
in a way that allows us to test them empirically (all predictions are proven in Appendix
II). We will refer to these predictions as testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1:
Foreign market entry should be more likely for larger levels of Rj and θ
h, for lower costs
kj and Fj, and for a larger value of general proximity rj.
Rj or θ
h capture a rm's protability in a market provided that it is generally successful
there (its type is high). Protability may be aected by market size, which can be
measured by a country's GDP, and other aspects that have a direct impact on prots,
such as a country's prot tax rate. Concerning the costs of market entry, we consider
measures such as corruption, investment freedom, or the general costs of starting a
business in a country (see Chen and Moore, 2010). Finally, a high proximity to the
home country should render entry into a market more likely. Geographical distance is
obviously a good proxy for the parameter rj. But also cultural factors such as a common
language are expected to positively aect a rm's propensity to enter a foreign market.
Hypothesis 2:
Sequential entry can be the optimal entry mode. If it is chosen, the country with a
higher level of proximity rj should generally be entered rst. For levels of rj close to 1,
simultaneous entry would be optimal.
Hypothesis 2 states that the marginal eect of the proximity parameters should be larger
in absolute value for earlier compared to later entry. The reason is that the rst foreign
investment of a rm may relate to sequential or simultaneous entry and should thus be
close to home on average. In contrast, all subsequent investments must be part of a
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sequential entry strategy.
With sequential entry, the closer country should generally be entered rst as long as
two foreign markets do not dier too much in size (and, hence, protability). If rj is
close to unity, almost no correlated learning occurs; see equations (3.7) and (3.8) and
the related discussion. Then, simultaneous entry is optimal.
Hypothesis 3:
Provided that market A is entered in period 1 but B is not, a higher value of proximity
between A and B, rAB, should increase the probability that the MNE enters B in period
2.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that a greater (geographical) distance between countries of
dierent expansion phases will reduce the probability to enter a country at a later stage.
In this sense, later expansion phases depend on all previous investments.
The above hypotheses suggest that a rm should rather enter more promising markets
in terms of market size and costs than others. Furthermore, an expansion of a multina-
tional network should, on average, follow a certain pattern  starting in closer countries,
then gradually increasing in distance from home but remaining close to markets entered
previously. In the following, we show that such entry patterns are indeed observed in
our data. For this empirical analysis, we use a unique micro-level data-set provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central Bank) that allows us to track the universe
of German MNEs' sequential location decisions over time. We will see that the patterns
observed in the data are largely in line with those hypotheses.13
3.4.2 Empirical Model Specication
Let us index German MNEs by i = 1, ..., N and focus on the location choice of
their aliates among j = 0, 1, ..., J foreign host countries. In any phase p = 1, ..., P
13At this point, the patterns described by Hypotheses 1-3 and found in the data could still be generated
by other mechanisms than the proposed correlated learning channel. However, we analyze this issue
theoretically below and provide evidence supporting the proposed learning process for the genesis of
multinational networks.
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(corresponding to periods in our theoretical model), MNE i can choose among the J
host markets with regard to location of its foreign entities.14 Since we are interested in
the genesis of MNEs' networks, we associate expansion phases of the network with p.
While MNEs typically set up one foreign aiate per phase p, in some cases they locate in
several markets simultaneously in p. Each of these decisions will be treated individually
below.15 There is a number of options for modeling such a multinomial choice problem by
means of nonlinear multinomial probability models. Examples thereof are the classes of
multinomial probit-type models and multinomial logit-type models. A great advantage
of the latter is that they follow from utility maximization of households or, as in our
case, prot maximization of rms (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 500f.). The same would be
true for multinomial probit-type models, but with a huge number of N = 15, 171 rms
choosing among as many as J = 104 host countries as in our case,16 it is natural to resort
to multinomial logit-type models due to their tractability and numerical stability.17 In
the class of logit-type models, the conditional logit is a natural candidate for modeling
the problem at stake, since it allows for regressors which are indexed by alternative j
(and possibly also by rm i).18
We postulate that rm i would receive latent net prots Π∗ijp from locating an aliate
at market j in phase p consistent with our theoretical model according to the process
Π∗ijp = Zijpβp + αijp, i = 1, ..., N, j = 0, 1, ..., J, p = 1, ..., P (3.9)
14Notice that investment phases are unequally spaced in real time across rms. Hence, phases should
not be confused with years. For instance, the rst foreign investment of rm i may take place in any
year covered by our sample period. Hence, a phase is associated with a vintage of foreign investments
per rm.
Furthermore, note that the restrictions to two rms, two host countries, and two periods in our
theoretical model has no qualitative impact on the derived hypotheses.
15Accordingly, index i in fact denotes the choice of an MNE about a specic aliate. However, for
the ease of presentation, it is sucient to refer to i as a rm.
16In principle, MNEs may enter as many as 162 countries, but in 58 of them not a single investment
occurs so that those choices are dropped in the analysis.
17Multivariate probit-type models require integrating numerically a multivariate normal whose di-
mensions are determined by the number of choices taken. In spite of the ecient simulation algorithms
available nowadays, for a choice problem as large as ours and a data-set which is not accessible locally
so that computers can not be employed over extended time spans, it is virtually impossible to run
multinomial probit-type or nested logit-type models.
18What is referred to as the multinomial logit model in a narrow sense assumes that the regressors
only vary across rms i but not alternatives j in any phase p, while the parameters on those regressors
vary across alternatives. It is well known that this model can be represented by the conditional logit
model, where regressors rather than parameters are specic to the alternatives. Again, for as many
alternatives as in our case, it appears unnatural to estimate J parameter vectors.
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where the 1 × Lp vector Zijp contains determinants of the prots which depend on the
alternative and, eventually, on rm i in any phase p. The Lp × 1 vector of weights βp
on Zijp are unknown and will be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. αijp
represents unobservable variables aecting the choice. The actual choice Cip ∈ 0, 1, ..., J
is based on the maximum attainable prot, arg max(Π∗i0p, ...,Π
∗
iJp). Following McFadden
(1974) in assuming that the αijp are independently distributed across alternatives with a
type I extreme value distribution and using the notation Zijp = (Zi0p, ..., ZiJp),
Pijp ≡ Pr(Cip = j|Zijp) =
exp(Zijpβ)∑J
j=0 exp(Zijpβ)
, for all i, j, p (3.10)
for which the marginal eect of the kth variable Zijp is ∂Pijp/∂Zijpk = Pijp(1−Pijp)βpk for
all i, j, p, k and ∂Pijp/∂Zi`pk = −PijpPi`pβpk for all i, ` 6= j, p, k. A well-known assumption
taken by this approach is the one of independence from irrelevant alternatives (i.e., that
the choices taken with regard to alternatives j versus ` are not aected when adding
further alternatives).19
3.4.3 Data
We use data on the universe of German MNEs' foreign entities according to the
classication taken by Deutsche Bundesbank20 and as collected in and made available
through the Bank's MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment) database (see Lipponer,
2009, for details). Individual MNEs and their aliates can be tracked annually in MiDi
since 1996. Since the database contains the universe of German MNEs' foreign aliates,
it is particularly suited for an analysis of the genesis of multinational networks of foreign
aliates.
The vector of determinants of location decisions of rm i in phase p, Zijp in (3.9),
19Alternative modeling choices such as multivariate probit or nested logit models do not assume an
irrelevance of the relative odds between choices j and ` from irrelevant alternatives. However, as said
before, these models are computationally demanding and, with a choice and rm data-set as large as
ours and the conditions imposed on empirical analysis through computing at the site of the data source,
even infeasible to estimate.
20All German rms and households which hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights in a foreign
enterprise with a balance-sheet total of more than 3 million Euros are required by German law to report
balance-sheet information to Deutsche Bundesbank. Indirect participating interests have to be reported
whenever foreign aliates hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises.
These reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
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contains the following regressors. The statutory corporate tax rate of the host country,
Taxjp ∈ [0, 1], reduces a rm's protability ceteris paribus. The log of real GDP at
constant U.S. dollars of the year 2000, logGDPjp, is a measure of j's market size. A
number of variables are supposed to reect the xed investment costs F in terms of our
theoretical model, namely an investment freedom index, InvestFreejp ∈ [0, 100], and a
corruption perception index CPIjp ∈ [0, 10],21 as inverse measures of investment costs, as
well as InvestCostjp ∈ [0,∞) that reects cost of starting a business relative to income
per capita. The stock of German investments prior to rm i's investment in j and phase
p, StockInvjp ∈ [0,∞), is included as a general measure of market j's attractiveness for
German investors beyond the aforementioned measures thereof. Furthermore, a number
of variables determine the correlation between markets entered in p and 1 ≤ ` < p in
terms of economic, cultural, and geographical proximity: host market j's geographical
distance to Germany, logDistancejp to ` − th ∈ (−∞,∞), a common border indicator
between Germany and host market j, Borderjp to ` − th ∈ {0, 1}, a common language
indicator between Germany and host market j, Languagejp to ` − th ∈ {0, 1}, a former
colony indicator between Germany and host market j, Colonyjp to `− th ∈ {0, 1}, and a
preferential trade agreement indicator between Germany and host country j, GTAjp to `−
th ∈ {0, 1}.
When analyzing subsequent investment decisions (see below) for p ≥ 2, we will also
control for the indicator variable Samejp ∈ {0, 1}, which is unity if host country j and
the country of the previous investment i are the same. Since Samej1 = 0 for all host
countries j in the sample, Samejp is included only in the specications for the second
and subsequent investment phases. The sources for the data on the control variables
are the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2009 (logGDPjp, InvestCostjp),
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (Taxjp), Ernst&Young (Taxjp), Price Wa-
terhouse Coopers (Taxjp), Transparency International (CPIjp), Deutsche Bundesbank's
MiDi (StockInvjp), the Centre d'ï¿½tudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
(log Distancejp to `− th, Borderjp to `− th, Languagejp to `− th, Colonyjp to `− th,
Samejp to ` − th), and the World Trade Organization as well as individual preferential
trade agreement secretariates' webpages (GTAjp to `− th).
Since the purpose of our analysis is to shed light on the determinants of an establish-
21Higher values of that index measure lower levels of perceived corruption.
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ment of foreign aliates per phase of investment, we restrict our interest to those rms
for which we know that they did not operate any foreign aliates in the rst available
year of the data, 1996. Hence, phase p = 1 with the rst foreign investment of rm i
may correspond to 1997 or any later year. Our data-set covers all rst or subsequent
investments of rms that became MNEs in 1997 or thereafter until 2008. Moreover, there
are as many as P − 1 = 11 subsequent expansion phases possible in the data between
1998 and 2007. All of a rm's new aliates which are founded across dierent years are
associated with specic phases p and dubbed sequential investments, while a number of
new aliates founded within the same year are associated with the same expansion phase
p and dubbed simultaneous investments. The design is such that p = 1 refers to the rst
set-up of one or more aliates of rm i abroad, no matter in which year between 1997
and 2007 it occurred, and similarly for subsequent phases p ≥ 2.
First Foreign Investments (p=1):
For rst investments, Zij1 = Zj1 in (3.9) includes only determinants which pertain to
the host country the rst aliate may be or is located in. First foreign investments may
in principle occur in more than a single host market as investments in any phase p. We
will relate subsequent investments to the biggest investment in phase p − 1 in terms of
xed assets for any phase p ≥ 2. Using total assets as an alternative criterion does not
lead to alternative conclusions. See also Section 3.4.5 for further sensitivity checks on
this issue.
Second and Subsequent Foreign Investments (p>1):
According to our theoretical model, rm-specic decisions about rst investments
matter for subsequent foreign investments. Therefore, the determinants for subsequent
expansions of the MNE network will be collected in the matrix Zijp for p ≥ 2 in equation
(3.9), which is indexed by i as well as j apart from p. In phases p ≥ 2, Zijp includes
regressors which are specic to host market j for the p-th investment, but it also includes
ones that are rm-and-host-market specic in the sense that they relate to previous
investments for rm i in phases ` < p. By design, the number of regressors is Lp > L` > L1
for all phases ` < p with p ≥ 2.
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Covariates which relate foreign investments in phase p to previous ones are the follow-
ing: the log distance of an aliate set up in market j and phase p to the investments in
earlier phases, log Distancejp to `− th; a common border indicator between an aliate
set up in market j and phase p with the investments in earlier phases, Borderjp to `− th;
a common language indicator between country j entered in phase p and countries en-
tered in previous phases, Languagejp to `− th; and similarly with colonial relationships
(Colonyjp to `− th), same country relationships (Samejp to − th), and membership in a
common goods trade agreement (GTAjp to `− th). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
of all variables.
 Insert Table 1 about here 
3.4.4 Estimation Results
Table 2 summarizes results for sequential location decisions of MNEs. In every phase
p, rms choose among approximately 100 host countries.
 Insert Table 2 about here 
We observe 15,165 rst location decisions of MNEs in our sample analyzed in Column
1 of Table 2. As expected by Hypothesis 1, a bigger market size (logGDP ) raises the
probability of an investment. A higher tax burden measured by the statutory tax rate of
a country (Tax) implies a lower probability to choose a location. This is consistent with
the impact of Rj on the location choice in the theoretical model. Moreover, as stated by
Hypothesis 1, lower costs of entry as captured by more investment freedom (InvestFree),
lower xed costs (InvestCost), and less corruption perception (CPI) are associated with
a higher probability to locate in a country. This is consistent with the impact of Fj and
kj on the location choice in the theoretical model. Finally, the included measures of prox-
imity suggest that the probability of choosing a location increases with rj as stated in
Hypothesis 1. For instance, a larger distance between Germany and a potential host coun-
try (logDistance to parent) reduces the probability of a rst investment there. Similarly,
if a potential host country shares a border with Germany (logBorder to parent), the loca-
tion probability of a rst investment increases. The variables Language same as parent
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and Colony of parent measure proximity in terms of cultural similarity and historic ties,
respectively. In both cases, the impact on the location probability of a rst investment
is positive. Finally, if Germany has signed a goods trade agreement with a host country
(GTA with parent), this aects the rst foreign investment decision signicantly.
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 summarize the results for the second up to the fth location
decision (phase). The ndings with respect to the (unilateral) host-country variables are
qualitatively very similar and all coecient point estimates have the expected signs. Note
that a positive fth location decision is observed for only 958 aliates but the number of
(columns in Zij5 and) parameters to be estimated is largest among all models in Table
2. Hence, the coecients in the last column of Table 2 are estimated with less precision
than the ones pertaining to the rst to the fourth investments. All of that is also broadly
consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The results for the second, third, and fourth location decisions reveal an interesting
pattern, conrming our theoretical considerations as stated in Hypotheses 2 and 3. While
the distance eect between foreign investments in phase p to ones in phase p − 1 is
always negative (Hypothesis 3), it becomes less important in terms of magnitude over the
expansion path of a multinational network (Hypothesis 2). This pattern clearly conrms
some form of regional development of MNE networks, similar to the development of export
networks identied in the literature on sequential exporting (see Evenett and Venables,
2002; Albornoz et al., 2011). This feature does not accrue to the sample composition but
is also reected in the marginal eects (see Table 3).
 Insert Table 3 about here 
In addition to the proximity variables, Table 3 presents further marginal eects. Lines
1 and 2 imply that the marginal impact of parameters referring to potential protability
in a market declines over time, wheres lines 3-5 suggest that the marginal impact of
lower xed costs gets broadly less important for later stages. We use this result as a
robustness test below, addressed in Hypotheses R4 and R5.
Let us particularly emphasize two results in Table 2. First, whether or not a host
country was a former colony seems relatively important in expansion phases p ≥ 2. One
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reason for this result may be that the variable Colony captures many dierent aspects of
proximity. Second, while we nd that having a goods trade agreement (GTA = 1) with
the parent makes it less likely to locate in a country, trade agreements between countries
of subsequent location decisions increase the probability of establishing aliates there.
This stays in contrast to the literature on tari-jumping FDI which stipulates that trade
agreements may lead to a consolidation of foreign aliates in response to preferential
tari liberalization (see Ra, 2004).
3.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In contrast to the models estimated in Table 2, the ones in Table 4 include the total
stock of German investments in market j and phase p (StockInvjp) prior to a rm's
location decision there while otherwise including the same regressors as in Table 2. This
modication aims at checking whether or not the estimated coecients are mainly driven
by agglomeration eects  such as a general tendency of German rms to locate in just
a few countries. StockInv should be a good measure of a market's general attractiveness
for German investors beyond the dimensions captured by the covariates included in the
regressions of Tables 1 and 2. The results in Table 4 suggest that the earlier ndings
are robust against the inclusion of StockInv. In fact, most of the coecients are hardly
aected by the additional control variable and, hence, are not biased due to omitted
determinants of location choice.
 Insert Table 4 about here 
Recall that MNEs may establish more than one aliates in an expansion phase p. If
two or more investments are conducted in dierent countries in phase ` < p, the reference
of investments in p to ones in phase ` through Distance, Border, Language, Colony, etc.,
is no longer clear. We solved this problem in Table 2 by using the country of the bigger
previous investment in terms of xed assets as the reference country in phase p. In Table
5 we use the biggest previous investment in terms of total assets as alternative criterion
to determine the reference country in phase p. The results displayed in Table 5 show that
using an alternative criterion does not lead to alternative conclusions.
 Insert Table 5 about here 
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Table 6 presents results for a subsample of rms and aliates where all investments of
any previous phase p− 1 occurred in only one country (the rms might have established
several aliates in this country, though). Then, the bilateral variables Distance, Border,
Language, Colony, etc., refer to a unique reference country throughout. The ndings in
Table 6 conrm our previous results in broad terms. However, we should note that the
strategy applied in Table 6 leads to a signicant loss of degrees of freedom along the
expansion path of MNE networks. The reason is that many MNEs set up foreign entities
simultaneously in several countries at some point of the genesis of their multinational
network. Therefore, from the third location decision onwards, the coecients can not be
estimated precisely any more, due to the reduction in sample size as compared to the
ndings in Tables 2, 4, and 5.
 Insert Table 6 about here 
3.5 Further Hypothesis Tests and Robustness
Although our results concerning the genesis of a multinational network appear to
be robust regarding some general features, it is not per se obvious that learning under
uncertainty is the main factor driving the observed patterns of investments. In what
follows, we will derive further  more specic  hypotheses, referred to as R1-R5, arising
from our theoretical model.
Let us rst address the point that sequential entry is only observable ex post. More
precisely, when there is foreign market entry in one period but no subsequent expansion
of the network, we do not know whether this was intended from the beginning or not.
Instead, an MNE could have planned to enter markets sequentially, but it could have
turned out that it was not suciently successful in the rst-entered markets to undertake
subsequent investments. By this reasoning, rms that actually take the second step and
make a sequential investment should have been relatively more successful in their rst
market(s). On the other hand, rms that only remained in their initial markets will
include those that chose isolated or simultaneous foreign investments and were either
successful or not; it will also include those that had planned sequential entry but were
not successful in the rst markets. Furthermore, an investment in a country entered
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as second under sequential entry will on average be more successful than an otherwise
identical investment in a country entered under simultaneous or isolated entry. The
reason is that correlated learning together made its belief increase, implying higher
expected prots. Therefore, the pool of rms where sequential entry is observed should
on average be more successful than the pool of MNEs where only simultaneous or isolated
entry is observed. This gives
Hypothesis R1:
Firms where sequential entry is observed are on average more successful than rms where
isolated or simultaneous entry is observed in otherwise identical markets.
Proof : The proof associated with Hypothesis R1 follows from the discussion.
The following hypothesis uses the result that if a country is chosen as the rst market
of a planned sequential entry path, the MNE will have a larger capacity there than
otherwise. Although the pool of observed isolated or simultaneous entries also contains
planned but not realized sequential patterns, the capacity there should on average be
smaller. Thus, we state
Hypothesis R2:
Firms where sequential entry is observed have, on average, a larger capacity than rms
where only isolated or simultaneous entry is observed in otherwise identical markets.
Proof : Follows from the denition of sequential entry and Proposition 2. Furthermore,
note the belief in markets entered in later stages is ceteris paribus higher and that these
markets also serve as rst countries for later stages. Under sequential entry, capacities
should thus be higher along the whole investment path.
Hypotheses R1 and R2 relate to the size and protability of MNEs. In particular,
MNEs may dier in these dimensions depending on whether they enter markets simul-
taneously or sequentially. Table 7 presents regression results, where we use the indicator
variable Sequential entry to distinguish between sequential and simultaneous entries. To
be precise, the variable Sequential entry is unity if we identify an observation as a se-
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quential entry and zero else.
We analyze three dierent dependent variables in Table 7: the xed assets, the total
assets, and the sales-to-total-assets ratio of the average investment, respectively. The
dierent columns refer to the maximum number of entities a rm consists of. For example,
the column denoted by (3) includes rms that have established 2 or 3 entities. By
focusing on rms that are always 2-plant, 3-plant, etc., MNEs, we can distinguish between
simultaneous and sequential market entry.
All results support Hypotheses R1 and R2: if sequential entry is observed ex post,
the previously established aliates are on average more successful and larger than those
where only simultaneous or isolated entry is observed.
 Insert Table 7 about here 
Now, let us only consider investments where no sequential entry is observed (yet).
As pointed out above, such investments may include ones where sequential entry was
intended but not (yet) exercised.22 The corresponding rms should, on average, be less
successful than other MNEs. As their capacity is higher as well, we formulate
Hypothesis R3:
For rms where simultaneous or isolated entry is observed, the more successful ones
should, on average, exhibit a higher capacity.
Proof: The proof associated with Hypothesis R3 follows from the discussion.
Table 8 presents a test of Hypothesis R3, focusing on one-plant MNEs. The depen-
dent variable is xed assets of a foreign aliate. Consistent with Hypothesis R3, we
observe that for rms where only isolated entry is observed ex post, more protable ones
(measured by the sales-to-xed-assets ratio or the sales-to-total assets ratio) have lower
amounts of xed assets. We conduct the same test in column 2, but additionally include
all simultaneous-plant units in the estimation sample. The ndings are very similar.
22This also contains investments where sequential entry is still planned. However, by selecting on
rms that did not exercise sequential entry ex post within a given time span, there is an intended bias
towards rms which will not exercise sequential entry in the future. The latter should be sucient for
the proposed inference.
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 Insert Table 8 about here 
Furthermore, a crucial component of learning is that if a market is entered at a later
phase, the belief about that market is higher compared with an earlier entry. This can
have interesting implications on the (marginal) propensity to enter a market. Take a
country that can either be entered using simultaneous entry or, as second investment,
under sequential entry. To make entry optimal, the associated Rj must exceed (and
equivalently xed costs Fj must be lower than) a certain threshold, for a given belief.
Since the belief is higher if the market is entered under sequential entry (and if a success
in the rst country was observed), the relevant threshold making entry optimal for Rj
should be lower and the one for Fj higher than when this country is entered under
simultaneous entry. Although this result is less straightforward when the country is
entered rst under sequential entry, if countries are not too dierent, we can conrm the
above nding. Thus, we propose
Hypothesis R4:
If a country is entered at later expansion phases, the minimum market size necessary to
enter should be smaller. Moreover, the maximum xed costs making entry just protable
should be higher.
Proof: The proof associated with Hypothesis R4 can be found in Appendix II.
Lines 1-5 of Table 3 give marginal eects of variables characterizing market size (lines
1 and 2) and xed costs of market entry. Until the third investment, the marginal
eects have the predicted patterns. Marginal eects of Tax and log GDP decrease in
absolute terms, indicating that the correlated learning is important for entry decisions.
Furthermore, while the marginal eect of InvestCost does not seem to dier much for
dierent entry stages, the development of the marginal eects of InvestFree and CPI are
largely as predicted.
Finally, let us establish another hypothesis that makes use of correlated learning. For
higher xed entry costs, learning is more valuable, i.e., the option value of waiting is larger.
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Hypothesis R5:
If xed entry costs in one country are ceteris paribus higher, it is more likely that this
country is chosen as second under sequential entry. Furthermore, the relative protability
of sequential compared to simultaneous entry increases if the xed entry costs in the second
target country are larger. Thus, xed costs should, on average, be higher for countries
entered at later stages.
Proof: The proof associated with Hypothesis R5 can be found in Appendix II.
Hypothesis R5 is supported by Table 1, where lines 3-5 give average values for pa-
rameters capturing xed entry costs. There, especially InvestFree and InvestCost are as
predicted, where the former decreases and the later increases along expansion phases.
Furthermore, Hypothesis R5 can help to explain the seemingly counterintuitive impact
of trade agreements (GTA) with the parent with countries entered in the second and later
phases. Whereas the rst investment is positively aected by such an agreement, the
impact is negative for later ones. If GTAs are associated with xed cost, this contradicts
the (otherwise empirically supported) hypothesis that higher xed costs should generally
be associated with a lower probability of entry. However, if rms enter countries with
high xed cost, this will rather happen at later stages.
3.6 Alternative Explanations for the Genesis of Multi-
national Networks
In this section, we present alternative explanations for the dynamic pattern of for-
eign market entry of MNEs. These alternative explanations fail to predict one or more
substantial aspects of the observed investment pattern. In fact, we nd conclusive evi-
dence that supports the suggested correlated learning mechanism rather than any of the
considered alternatives.
Although the observed sequential entry and expansion patterns of MNE networks
can not be explained by static models of market entry, there is a number of alternative
dynamic models which could lead to predictions that are qualitatively similar to the ones
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derived from our model. Here, we briey analyze three prime candidates of alternative
models, namely stochastic shocks, diseconomies of scale, and learning by doing. The
main dierence between those models and ours is that, in each period, the MNE would
face uncertainty concerning its type in the respective market in the alternative modeling
environments. While we would agree that any one of the three models may be consistent
with some empirical ndings concerning the gradual expansion of MNE networks, we will
show that they fail to explain important features of the data. The reason is that the
learning model renders decisions in later periods contingent on the outcome in earlier
periods, while the three alternative explanations do not. In the absence of uncertainty
concerning success in a market, second-period actions are generally independent of success
in the rst period.
Alternative 1: Stochastic Shocks
One reason for why a rm might not want to enter all markets simultaneously is that
exogenous factors aect its protability there. Then, it will not invest unless market
conditions turn out to be suciently good.
The setup for such a model is identical to the one derived above, with two exceptions.
The rm's type in each country is not identical over time, but a new realization is drawn
at the beginning of each period. The probability that the type in country j is high in
a given period equals qj, j = A,B. We impose no further structure on qj, however it
could depend on the realization in the previous period as well as the distance to home
(rj) or to the other potential host country (rAB). Furthermore, the rm can observe the
realizations of θj, j = A,B, in each period, so that the only uncertainty it faces concerns
next period's value of θj.
The MNE's entry decision with respect to country A is now independent of its entry
decision for B (and vice versa). The reason is that past decisions have no impact on the
likelihood of having a high type in the future. Thus, we can focus on optimal actions for
just one market.
In the rst period, the rm will not enter country j if θj = 0, since this would yield
negative prots in period 1 (without a positive impact on future prots). If θj = θ
h in
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period 1, expected prots for a given capacity Xj are
Xjθ
hRj(1 + δqj).
Conditional on entry, it will choose a capacity level Xj =
θhRj(1+δqj)
kj
and nally enter
the market if Πj =
(θhRj)
2(1+δqj)
2
2kj
− Fj ≥ 0.
If θj = 0 in the rst period, the MNE will enter the market in period 2 if the type is
then high and if expected prots are positive, i.e., whenever Π = (θ
hR)2
2kj
− Fj ≥ 0.
If these conditions are satised, entry in periods 1 and 2 occurs with probability qj
and (1− qj)qj, respectively. The total likelihood of entry thus equals 2qj − q2j .
A bigger market size and lower entry costs are also associated with a higher likelihood
of entry. We might even construct a sequential entry pattern as observed in the data, with
closer countries entered rst, followed by a gradual expansion to markets farther away.
This would require the assumption
∂qj
∂rj
> 0. It would already be less straightforward to
construct assumptions  such that the role of rAB would be similar to our benchmark
model  however not impossible. But Hypotheses R1-R5 will denitely not hold. Take
Hypothesis R1, where we claim that rms that enter sequentially are on average more
successful. Assume A is entered in the rst period but B not. Then, the decision whether
to enter B in period 2 is independent of what happened in A. Thus, expected prots in A
are always the same, no matter whether B is entered in period 1, 2, or not at all. Similar
arguments can be used to reject Hypothesis R2 (sequential entry is associated with higher
capacity levels), and Hypothesis R3 (when countries are entered simultaneously, the ones
with a lower capacity should be less successful). Furthermore, Hypothesis R4 is not
supported, as the thresholds do depend on whether a country is entered earlier or later,
taking aside time horizon eects. Finally, the average xed costs will not be higher if a
country is entered in period 2, dismissing Hypothesis R4. Hence, we can reject the rst
alternative model as an explanation for the observed empirical patterns.
Alternative 2: Diseconomies of Scale
Here, we take into account that an MNE's resources in one period might be con-
strained. For simplicity, let us focus on nancial resources and assume that investment
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costs in one period may not exceed the value D. Also, let us assume that it is known
that the MNE's type is high in both markets. All else is identical to the original model
setup. Thus, without nancial constraint, the MNE would enter both countries at the
beginning of period 1. Then, the rm would choose capacities Xj =
(θhRj)(1+δ)
kj
and obtain
expected prots Πj =
(θhRj)
2(1+δ)2
2kj
−Fj. For D ≥ kA (XA)
2
2
+kB
(XB)
2
2
+FA+FB, the budget
constraint does not bind and simultaneous entry occurs. To simplify issues, we assume
that kj
(Xj)
2
2
+Fj ≤ D ≤ kj (Xj)
2
2
+FA+FB. Accordingly, it is feasible to enter one country
with the rst-best capacity, but not possible to enter the second one at all. Hence, higher
revenues or lower costs render rst entry more likely again, and Hypothesis 1 would hold.
If we further assume that Rj decreases with the distance to home, the geographically
closer country would more likely be entered rst, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. It
would be more dicult to justify why the distance between two host markets A and B
should matter for the sequential entry pattern, and Hypothesis R1 could only be obtained
for this model under the assumption that the budget constraint in the second period is
relaxed after the realization of a success in period 1. But Hypotheses R2 and R3 would
denitely not ow from the diseconomies of scale model, since chosen capacities are inde-
pendent of other entries. Note that Hypothesis R2 (rst country of sequential entry has
larger capacity) holds for otherwise identical markets and we can not use the argument
that aliates at initially entered markets are more successful. Finally, while Hypothesis
R5 is in line with a model of diseconomies of scale (countries with higher xed costs are
on average entered later), this is not true for Hypothesis R4, since the relative thresholds
above which entry is protable do not change along entry phases.
Although the diseconomies of scale model does a relatively better job in explaining
the pattern of MNE network formation observed in the data than the stochastic shocks
model, neither of them provides an explanation for the dierent capacity levels and their
correlation with observed success. Thus, the second alternative model can be rejected on
those grounds as an explanation for the observed empirical features as well.
Alternative 3: Learning by Doing
Finally, let us assume that second-period returns in both countries depend on rst-
period production, i.e., Rj(XA, XB). We use the explicit linear expression for the second-
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period returns, which equal RA(XA, XB) = rXA+αrXB+TA and RB(XA, XB) = αrXA+
rXB + TB, with α, r ≥ 0 and α ≤ 1. First-period returns thus equal Tj. Now, sequential
entry might also be used to save investment costs in the rst period and use learning
benets from A about B. It is easy to derive formal results, which we omit here; just
note that Hypothesis 1 is satised as in the benchmark learning model. If Tj is larger
for the closer country and α is larger if the two host countries are closer to each other,
Hypothesis 2 can be met if countries closer to home are more protable, while Hypothesis
3 is supported by learning by doing if the learning parameter α is larger for host countries
that are close to each other.
Since entry into the second country in period 2 occurs for sure, Hypotheses R1-R5 are
not generally true in the case of learning by doing. Hypotheses R2 (sequential entry is
associated with a larger capacity), R4 (entry thresholds dier across phases) and R5 (xed
costs are higher in later entry phases) may or may not be true, depending on parameter
values. But Hypotheses R1 (observed sequential entry associated with higher success)
and R3 (larger capacity correlated with lower success for simultaneous or isolated entry)
will not be satised here, because outcomes in the rst period have no impact on later
decisions. Hence, the third alternative model can also not explain all empirical results.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that multinational enterprises develop their networks of foreign
aliates gradually over time. Instead of exploring all protable opportunities immedi-
ately, they rst establish themselves in their home countries and then enter new markets
stepwise. We explain this gradual expansion pattern by proposing a model where MNEs
face uncertainty concerning their success in new markets and learn about that after en-
try. Conditions in dierent markets are not independent, and the information gathered
in one country can also be used to learn about conditions in other, in particular, similar
countries.
This so-called correlated learning mechanism serves us to derive a number of testable
hypotheses regarding market entry in general and simultaneous versus sequential market
entry in specic. These hypotheses are assessed in a data-set of the universe of German
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MNEs and their foreign aliates provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Using a con-
ditional logit model for the empirical analysis, we nd that rst foreign entry is more
likely for countries that are closer to the MNE's home base and where higher prots
may be expected in general terms. This nding is supported by variables measuring the
proximity of markets at large, e.g., whether the same language is spoken or if the target
country used to be a colony of the home country. Moreover, proximate countries tend
to be entered rst as a multinational network evolves. Third, subsequent entry in later
expansion phases is generally more likely in markets that are closer to the ones entered
previously.
Although other reasons like diseconomies of scale, stochastic shocks, or learning by
doing certainly also inuence a multinational rm's expansion, we show in a number of
additional tests that correlated learning plays a substantial role in explaining the genesis
of multinational networks.
The way how MNEs expand their network of foreign aliates over time and, in par-
ticular, correlated learning as identied in this paper may have important policy impli-
cations. Understanding whether, how, and where rms grow is crucial to anticipate for
policy makers  not only with respect to domestic policies (such as tax policy) but also
with regard to international policies (such as bilateral or multilateral preferential agree-
ments). This is especially important since dierent country variables do not only aect
location decisions of MNEs, it also aects entry patterns on an overall scale. Since dier-
ent entry patterns are associated with dierent investment levels, countries may pursue
policy strategies that take into account such eects.
In our future research, we aim at analyzing learning processes in more detail. For
example, the role of learning might be dierent contingent on whether a rm acquires an
existing aliate or establishes a new plant. Correlated learning can also have an impact
on market exit, which we have neglected so far. In the latter case, policies of neighboring
countries may be even more important. We also aim at quantifying the gains and costs
of learning in comparison to the impact of other fundamentals on rm behavior.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Appendix I  Correlated Learning
The ex-ante joint beliefs for being in one of the four potential states (θh, θh), (θh, 0),
(0, θh) or (0, 0) are characterized in the following Corollary.
Lemma A1: The ex-ante probabilities of being in state (θA, θB) equal
Prob(θh, θh) ≡ phh =
(
rB + (1− rB)[rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
ρA
Prob(θh, 0) ≡ phl = (1− rB)
(
1− [rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
ρA
Prob(0, θh) ≡ plh = (rB + (1− rB)(1− rAB)ρ0B) (1− ρA)
Prob(0, 0) ≡ pll = (1− rB) (1− (1− rAB)ρ0B) (1− ρA)
Proof:
As Prob(θh, θh) = Prob(θhB | θhA)Prob(θhA), we need Prob(θhB | θhA). Taking ρB =
rB + (1− rB)[rABρ0A + (1− rAB)ρ0B], we obtain
Prob(θhB | θhA) = rB + (1− rB)[rABE[ρ0A | θhA] + (1− rAB)ρ0B]. Bayes' rule can be used
to compute E[ρ0A | θhA], and we get
E[ρ0A | θhA] =
ρ0A(rA+(1−rA)·1)
ρ0A(rA+(1−rA)·1)+(1−ρ
0
A)(rA+(1−rA)·0)
=
ρ0A
ρA
. Equivalently,
E[ρ0A | θlA] =
ρ0A[1−(rA+(1−rA))]
ρ0A[1−(rA+(1−rA))]+(1−ρ
0
A)[1−(rA+(1−rA)·0)]
= 0, proving the Corollary.
Updating occurs for each of the potential outcome realizations
(YA, YB) ∈ {(RA, RB), (RA, 0), (0, RB), (0, 0)}:
1. (YA, YB) = (RA, RB):
ρ++A = ρ
++
B = 1
2. (YA, YB) = (RA, 0)
ρ+−A = 1
ρ+−B = (p
hh)+− + (plh)+− = p
hhXAθ
h(1−XBθh)
phhXAθh(1−XBθh)+phlXAθh
+ 0 = p
hh(1−XBθh)
(1−XBθhB)phh+phl
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3. (YA, YB) = (0, RB)
ρ−+A =
phh(1−XAθh)
(1−XAθh)phh+plh
ρ−+B = 1
4. (YA, YB) = (0, 0)
ρ−−A =
phh(1−XAθh)(1−XBθh)+phl(1−XAθh)
(1−XAθh)(phh(1−XBθh)+phl)+(plh(1−XBθh)+pll)
ρ−−B =
phh(1−XAθh)(1−XBθh)+plh(1−XBθh)
(1−XAθh)(phh(1−XBθh)+phl)+(plh(1−XBθh)+pll)
Observing (RA, RB), both beliefs jump to 1, i.e. ρ
++
A = ρ
++
B = 1. If a suc-
cess is only realized in country A but not in B, implying (RA, 0), ρ
+−
A = 1, while
ρ+−B = (p
hh)+−+ (plh)+− = p
hhXAθ
h(1−XBθh)
phhXAθh(1−XBθh)+phlXAθh
+0 = p
hh(1−XBθh)
(1−XBθhB)phh+phl
. Conversely, the
realization (0, RB) gives ρ
−+
A =
phh(1−XAθh)
(1−XAθh)phh+plh
and ρ−+B = 1.
Finally, after a double failure, beliefs fall to ρ−−A =
phh(1−XAθh)(1−XBθh)+phl(1−XAθh)
(1−XAθh)(phh(1−XBθh)+phl)+(plh(1−XBθh)+pll)
and ρ−−B =
phh(1−XAθh)(1−XBθh)+plh(1−XBθh)
(1−XAθh)(phh(1−XBθh)+phl)+(plh(1−XBθh)+pll)
.
The case we are interested in is where entry initially occurs only in one country, say
A. This is covered by setting XB = 0 and taking into account that a failure there
occurs with probability 1. If the MNE only enters A and observes a success, the belief in
B becomes
ρ+−B =
(
rB + (1− rB)[rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
> ρB. Recall that ρ
−+
B is not of interest
as B is never entered after a failure in A.
Starting out by investing in B and observing a success there yields
ρ−+A =
(
rB + (1− rB)[rAB
ρ0A
ρA
+ (1− rAB)ρ0B]
)
ρA
ρB
= ρ+−B
ρA
ρB
.
Finally, beliefs also follow a martingale here; to see this, take the expected belief
change in A for arbitrary investment levels XA and XB. Keeping in mind that ρA = p
hh+
phl, we have E[ρAt+1 | ρAt] = phhXAXBθhθhρ++A +
[
phhXAθ
h(1−XBθh) + phlXAθh
]
ρ+−A
+
[
phh(1−XAθh)XBθh + plhXBθh
]
ρ−+A
+
[
phh(1−XAθh)(1−XBθh) + phl(1−XAθh) + plh(1−XBθh) + pll
]
ρ−−A
= XAθ
hρA + (1−XAθh)(phh + phl) = ρA
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Appendix II  Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that beliefs follow a martingale, i.e., they do not change in expectation:
E[ρt+1 | ρt, Xt] = Xtρtθhρ+t + (1 −Xtρtθh)ρ−t (Xt) = ρt. Thus, (3.1) can be rewritten
as
Πiso = max
X≥0
[
{1}X=00 + {1}X>0
(
XρRθh(1 + δ)− [F + k (X)
2
2
]
)]
.
Since there is no market exit after a failure and beliefs assume the martingale fea-
ture, expected prots in period 1 and 2 are identical (from the perspective of period
1). The rst-order condition yields (3.2). The second-order condition is satised by the
assumption of convexity of the investment cost function. As entry will only occur for
non-negative prots, xed investment costs have to be covered as well in expectation,
i.e., X(ρθhR− c)(1 + δ)− [F + k (X)
2
2
] ≥ 0, yielding (3.3).
Proof of Proposition 2
This immediately follows from comparing XseqA =
ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)+δρAθ
h
(ρ+−B θhRB)2
2kB
−FB

kA
with XsimA =
ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)
kA
. The term
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB
)
has to be positive as otherwise
entry into B would not occur.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume ΠsimB =
(ρBθ
hRB)
2(1+δ)2
2kB
−F ∗B = 0, implying that isolated entry (only in A) and
simultaneous entry yield identical prots.
Πseq > Πsim, if
1
2kA
[
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− F ∗B
)]2
− FA > (ρAθ
hRA)
2(1+δ)2
2kA
− FA or
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− F ∗B > 0.
Thus, we need
ρ+−B > ρB(1 + δ).
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As ρ+−B > ρB, there is always a δ such that this is satised.
For the part that sequential entry can be optimal even if ex ante prots in country B
are strictly positive, assume that FB = F
∗
B −
(
ρAθ
h
)2
δε (2RA+δε)(1+δ)
2
2kA
, ε > 0, and entry
into B already in the rst period would yield a prot
(
ρAθ
h
)2
δε (2RA+δε)(1+δ)
2
2kA
.
For Πseq > Πsim, we need
1
2kA
[
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− F ∗B +
(
ρAθ
h
)2
δε (2RA+δε)(1+δ)
2
2kA
)]2
− FA
> (ρAθ
hRA)
2(1+δ)2
2kA
− FA +
(2δρAθ
hρAθ
hRAε+(δρAθhε)
2
)(1+δ)2
2kA
or
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− F ∗B > ε
(
(1 + δ)− δ
(
ρAθ
h
)2 (2RA+δε)(1+δ)2
2kA
)
.
This possibly for a ε suciently small.
Finally, we have to make sure that entry into B after a failure in A is not optimal,
which requires
(ρ−−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− F ∗B +
(
ρAθ
h
)2
δε (2RA+δε)(1+δ)
2
2kA
< 0.
We know that
(ρBθhRB)
2
(1+δ)2
2kB
− F ∗B = 0 and that ρ−−B < ρB for X
seq
A > 0. Thus, the
above condition is satised for ε suciently small.
For the potential optimality of simultaneous entry, see Lemma 3 below, which states
that there exists a value r∗A such that for rA ≥ r∗A, sequential entry is never chosen.
Then, there are always values for FA and FB making simultaneous (and not isolated)
entry optimal.
Proofs of Propositions underlying Hypotheses 1-3, R4 and R5
Hypothesis 1
We aim at showing that the marginal impact on respective prots of Ri, ri and θ
h
is positive, while it should be negative for ki and Fi. The claim is obvious for isolated
and simultaneous entry, where individual prots equal (ρiθ
hRi)
2(1+δ)2
2ki
−Fi and comparative
statics yield the predicted signs. Total prots under sequential entry are
Πseq = XSeqA ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)−kA
(XSeqA )
2
2
−FA+δXSeqA ρAθh
(
XSeqB ρ
+−
B θ
hRB − kB
(XSeqB )
2
2
− FB
)
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= 1
2kA
[
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB
)]2
− FA.
The Hypothesis is easily satised for entry into B, where prots, given a success in
A was observed, equal
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB, and
∂ρ+−B
∂rB
> 0. Concerning entry in period 1,
comparative statics with respect to RA, θ
h, kA and FA are unambiguous. This is dierent
for rA, as
∂ρ+−B
∂rA
< 0, and we can not exclude ∂Π
seq
∂rA
< 0. Still, to determine the likelihood
of entry, we focus on the margin, i.e., where Πseq = 0. But if ∂Π
Seq
∂rA
|Πseq=0< 0, the MNE
would choose isolated or simultaneous instead of sequential entry. As derived above, this
becomes more likely for a larger value of rA.
Hypothesis 2
For the part that sequential entry might be optimal, see Proposition 2.
When choosing sequential entry, we rst show that for two countries which are identi-
cal and only dier in their distance to home, the MNE will enter the closer country rst.
Afterwards, we compare the prots under sequential entry when A is entered rst with
those when B is entered rst. We look at the impact of rA on the dierence between
these two measures and show that  as long as the countries are not too dierent  this
impact works in favor of rst entering A.
Here, we are mainly interested on the impact of distance, i.e., if we expect to observe
entry into closer countries rst. Although a larger rA decreases the updating in B, it
generally makes it more likely that A is entered rst. Let us rst derive the result
for the most stylized case where both countries are identical except for their distance
to home. Then, it can be shown that entry rst occurs into the country with the higher ri.
Lemma A2: Assume RA = RB ≡ R, ρ0A = ρ0B ≡ ρ0, kA = kB ≡ k, FA = FB ≡ F , and
that sequential entry is chosen. Then, the MNE will rst enter A if (and only if) rA ≥ rB.
Proof:
Dene ∆Πseq ≡ Πseq(AB)− Πseq(BA). Then,
∆Πseq = 1
2k
[
ρAθ
hR(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
(
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2k
− F
)]2
− F
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− 1
2k
[
ρBθ
hR(1 + δ) + δρBθ
h
(
(ρ−+A θhR)
2
2k
− F
)]2
+ F ≥ 0 or(
ρAθ
h
[
R(1 + δ) + δ
(
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2k
− F
)]
+ ρBθ
h
[
R(1 + δ) + δ
(
(ρ−+A θhR)
2
2k
− F
)])
·(
ρAθ
h
[
R(1 + δ) + δ
(
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2k
− F
)]
− ρBθh
[
R(1 + δ) + δ
(
(ρ−+A θhR)
2
2k
− F
)])
≥
0.
As the rst term is always positive, the sign of ∆Πseq is determined by
(
θhR(1 + δ)(ρA − ρB) + δρAθh
((
ρ+−B θ
hR
)2
2k
− F
)
− δρBθh
((
ρ−+A θ
hR
)2
2k
− F
))
which  as ρ−+A =
ρA
ρB
ρ+−B  can be rewritten as
θh(ρA − ρB)
[
R + δ
(
R−
ρA
ρB
(
ρ+−B θ
hR
)2
2k
− F
)]
. (3.11)
If we can show that the squared bracket of 3.11 is always positive, then sgn∆Πseq =
sgn(ρA − ρB).
As we assume that k ≥ θhR(1 + δ) (X ≤ 1 even if a type is known to be high) and
(θhR)2(1+δ)2
2k
> F (entry is optimal for the high type),[
R + δ
(
R−
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2k
− F
)]
≥
[
R + δ
(
R−
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2k
− (θ
hR)2(1+δ)2
2k
)]
≥
[
R + δ
(
R−
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B θhR)
2
2θhR(1+δ)
− (θ
hR)2(1+δ)2
2θhR(1+δ)
)]
= R
[
1 + δ
(
1− θh
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B )
2
2(1+δ)
− θ
h(1+δ)
2
)]
≥ R
[
1− δ
1+δ
θh
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B )
2
2
]
, as 1− θ
h(1+δ)
2
≥ 0
(A) ρA − ρB ≥ 0
Now,
ρA
ρB
(
ρ+−B
)2
= ρA
ρB
(
ρB + (1− rB)rAB ρ
0
ρA
(1− ρA)
)2
= ρAρB + 2(1− rB)rABρ0 (1− ρA) + 1ρAρB ((1− rB)rABρ
0 (1− ρA))2
= ρAρB + 2(1− rB)rABρ0 (1− ρA) + 1ρBρA ((1− rB)rABρ
0 (1− ρA))2
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and note that, ρAρB ≤ 1, 2(1− rB)rABρ0 (1− ρA) ≤ 2 and
1
ρBρA
((1− rB)rABρ0 (1− ρA))2 = (ρ
0)2
(rB+(1−rB)ρ0)(rA+(1−rA)ρ0)
((1− rB)rAB (1− ρA))2
≤ (ρ
0)2
(1−rB)ρ0(1−rA)ρ0
((1− rB)rAB (1− ρA))2
= (1− rB)(1− ρ0)r2AB (1− ρA) ≤ 1
Thus, ρA
ρB
(
ρ+−B
)2 ≤ 4 and[
1− δ
1+δ
θh
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B )
2
2
]
≥
[
1− δ
1+δ
2θh
]
= 1
1+δ
[
1− δθh + δ − δθh
]
≥ 0.
(B)ρA − ρB < 0[
1− δ
1+δ
θh
ρA
ρB
(ρ+−B )
2
2
]
≥
[
1− δ
1+δ
θh
(ρ+−B )
2
2
]
≥
[
1− δ
1+δ
θh 1
2
]
≥ 0.
To get a better idea, we now allow for general parameter values and analyze d∆Π
seq
drA
(recall that ∆Πseq = Πseq(AB)− Πseq(BA)):
d∆Πseq
drA
= XABA
dρA
drA
θhRA(1 + δ) + δX
AB
A
dρA
drA
θh
(
(ρ+−B θ
hRB)
2
2kB
− FB
)
+δXABA ρAθ
hXABB
dρ+−B
drA
θhRB − δXBAB ρBθhXBAA
dρ−+A
drA
θhRA, where X
AB
A is the capacity
chosen in A under sequential entry starting in A. The rst term describes increased prots
in A, while the second term covers the increased likelihood of entry into B. The third
term is negative, as ρ+−B decreases with rA. Finally, the fourth term captures foregone
prots when A is entered as the second country.
The expression can be rewritten as
δθhRA(1− ρ0A)
[
XABA − δXBAB θhXBAA (rB + (1− rB)(1− rAB)ρ0B)
]
+θh(1− ρ0A)XABA
[
RA + δ
(
(ρ+−B θ
hRB)
2
2kB
− FB − (1− rB)rAB
ρ0A
ρA
ρ+−B θ
hRB
kB
θhRB
)]
.
Taking the term in squared brackets of the rst line gives(
XABA −XBAB δθhXBAA (rB + (1− rB)(1− rAB)ρ0B)
)
=
ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)+δρAθ
h
(ρ+−B θhRB)2
2kB
−FB

kA
−
ρBθ
hRB(1+δ)+δρBθ
h
(ρ+−A θhRA)2
2kA
−FA

kB
δθh
ρ+−A θ
hRA
kA
(rB + (1− rB)(1− rAB)ρ0B)
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≥ ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)
kA
−
ρBθ
hRB(1+δ)+δρBθ
h
(ρ+−A θhRA)2
2kA
−FA

kB
δθh
ρ+−A θ
hRA
kA
(rB+(1−rB)(1−rAB)ρ0B)
≥
(
ρAθ
hRA(1+δ)
kA
− δθh ρ
+−
A θ
hRA
kA
(rB + (1− rB)(1− rAB)ρ0B)
)
(since k ≥ θhR(1 + δ) and (θ
hR)2(1+δ)2
2k
> F )
= 1
kA
θhRAρA
(
(1 + δ)− δθh ρ
+−
B
ρB
(ρB − (1− rB)rABρ0A)
)
= 1
kA
θhRAρA
(
(1 + δ)− δθhρ+−B + δθh
ρ+−B
ρB
(1− rB)rABρ0A
)
≥ 0
The term in squared brackets of the second line equals[
RA + δ
(θhRB)
2
kB
ρ+−B
(
ρ+−B
2
− (1− rB)rAB
ρ0A
ρA
)
− δFB
]
≥
[
RA − δ(1− rB)rAB
ρ0A
ρA
ρ+−B θ
hRB
kB
θhRB
]
≥
[
RA − δ(1+δ)(1− rB)rAB
ρ0A
ρA
ρ+−B θ
hRB
]
.
As RB is multiplied with terms that are all smaller than 1, the last term can only be
negative if RB is much larger than RA.
Therefore, d∆Π
seq
drA
will generally be positive.
Considering simultaneous entry, we can establish the following Lemma.
Lemma A3: There exists a value r∗A such that for rA ≥ r∗A, sequential entry is never
chosen.
Proof :
Now, assume without loss of generality that if sequential entry is chosen, the MNE
starts in A and dene ∆Π = Πseq − Πsim.
Rewriting gives
∆Π = ΠseqA − ΠsimA + δX
seq
A ρAθ
hΠseqB − ΠsimB
Furthermore, ∆ΠA ≡ ΠseqA −ΠsimA = −
(
δρAθ
h
)2
(ρ+−B θhRB)2
2kB
−FB
2
2kA
≤ 0, as the capacity
in A under sequential entry is too high if just prots in A are considered.
Furthermore, lim
rA→1
ρ+−B = ρB. For rA → 1, Π
seq
B approaches a value smaller or equal
than ΠSimB .
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As δXseqA ρAθ
h < 1, δXseqA ρAθ
hΠseqB − ΠsimB is negative for rA = 1. By continuity, the
desired value r∗A exists.
Note that this Lemma does not imply that for rA < r
∗
A, sequential entry is always
optimal. This might or might not be the case, depending on parameter values.
Hypothesis 3
The prots in B given sequential entry is chosen equal
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB
)2
. They
are increasing in ρ+−B , which itself increases in rAB.
Hypothesis R4
Note that we leave aside the modeling restrictions imposed by having only two periods
here. The reason is that this restriction decreases expected prot streams for countries
entered later per se. Since the expected time horizon should not automatically dier
for dierent entry phases, eects induced by the reduced time horizon should not be
emphasized too much.
Concerning the minimum requirements for market size Rj, compare prots when a
country is entered under isolated or simultaneous and when it is entered, as second
investment, under sequential entry. Without loss of generality, assume that this country
is A.
In the rst case, the requirement for entry is
RA ≥
√
2kAFA
ρAθh(1 + δ)
. (3.12)
.
In the second case, entry occurs if and only if
RA ≥
√
2kAFA
ρ−+A θ
h
. (3.13)
Since ρ−+A ≥ ρA, the right hand side of (3.12) is larger than the right hand side of
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(3.13), abstracting from the longer time horizon in the rst case.
Equivalently, we show that the threshold with respect to Fj is larger in the second
than in the rst case.
If A is entered rst under sequential entry, the condition for entry equals
Πseq = 1
2kA
[
ρAθ
hRA(1 + δ) + δρAθ
h
(
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB
)]2
− FA ≥ 0.
Since the thresholds now also depend on characteristics in B, it is not possible to
make a general statement. However, let us assume that both countries are identical and
only dier in Rj, giving respective thresholds RA ≥
√
2kF
ρ−+θh
(if entered as second under
sequential entry) and RA ≥
√
2kF−δρθh
(ρ+−θhRB)2
2k
−F

ρθh(1+δ)
(if entered as rst under sequential
entry). RB still plays a role in determining the relevant thresholds. However, we can
claim that if both countries are identical except their values of Rj and sequential entry
is chosen, the one with a higher Rj is always entered rst, completing the argument. To
see this point take ∆Πseq dened as the dierence when A is entered rst and when B is
entered rst under sequential entry. It equals
∆Πseq = 1
2k
[
ρθhRA(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRB)
2
2k
− F
)]2
− 1
2k
[
ρθhRB(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRA)
2
2k
− F
)]2
= 1
2k
{[
ρθhRA(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRB)
2
2k
− F
)]
+
[
ρθhRB(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRA)
2
2k
− F
)]}
·
{[
ρθhRA(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRB)
2
2k
− F
)]
−
[
ρθhRB(1 + δ) + δρθ
h
(
(ρ+−θhRA)
2
2k
− F
)]}
.
As the rst line of the previous expression is always positive, it is sucient to look at
the last line. It equals
(RA−RB)ρθh
[
(1 + δ)− δ
(
(ρ+−θh)
2
2k
)
(RA +RB)
]
. Thus, it remains to show that the
term in squared brackets is always positive. Then, the sign of ∆Πseq is only determined
by the sign of (RA −RB).
Thus,[
(1 + δ)− δ
(
ρ+−θh
)2 (RA+RB)
2k
]
≥
[
(1 + δ)− δ
(
ρ+−θh
)2 2max{RA,RB}
2k
]
≥
[
(1 + δ)− δ
(
ρ+−θh
)2 2max{RA,RB}
2θhmax{RA,RB}(1+δ)
]
as kj ≥ θhRj(1 + δ)
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=
[
(1 + δ)− δ (ρ+−)2 θh 1
(1+δ)
]
≥ 0
Equivalently, we can show that if both countries are identical but only dier with
respect to their xed entry costs, the one with a higher level of Fj should be entered
later.
Hypothesis R5
First, we derive ∆ΠSeq, the dierence between prots under sequential entry when A
and when B is chosen rst.
Here, ∂∆Π
seq
dFB
= −δXABA ρAθh + 1 > 0 and ∂∆Π
seq
dFA
= −1 + δXBAB ρBθh < 0. Second,
we derive the dierence between prots under sequential and simultaneous entry and get
d∆Π
dFB
= −δXSeqA ρAθh + 1 > 0.
Finally, it helps to establish that if xed costs are very small, sequential entry can
never be optimal. Note that when sequential entry is chosen, entry into B after a failure
in A can not be optimal (otherwise, the rm could increase expected prots by choosing
simultaneous entry). Thus, the belief, ρ−−B , i.e., the belief in B after a failure in A must
satisfy
(ρ−−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB ≤ 0. As ρ−−B > 0, FB needs to be suciently large to make this
condition hold.
Appendix III  Adjustable Capacity
Assume that the capacity can be adjusted upwards in the second period. We assume
that the cost function is a function of the total capacity, i.e. the marginal investment cost
for the rst capacity unit in period 2 equals the marginal cost for the last capacity unit
in the rst period. Generally, the option to adjust the capacity later will allow the rms
to increase investments in period 2 if a success was observed in t = 1. After a failure,
nothing changes. Obviously, the capacity in the rst period will be smaller than without
the adjustment option. What we shoe here is that sequential entry is still associated with
a higher investment level in country A. All other main results will obviously hold as well.
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Isolated Entry
As the MNE only considers entry into one country, we can omit the country subscript.
Dene X1 as the rst period and X2 = X1 + ∆X as the total second-period-capacity
following a success. Furthermore, dene ∆K(X2) = K(X2)−K(X1) as the costs of the
capacity increase.
We rst have to determine the capacity adjustment in the second period after a
success has been observed. Generally, expected prots then equal X2Rθ
h − ∆K(X2) =
X2Rθ
h−
(
k
X22
2
− kX
2
1
2
)
. The gives an optimal capacity levelX2 =
Rθh
k
and implies second-
period prots Π+2 =
(Rθh)
2
2k
+ k
X21
2
. As ρ− < ρ, the capacity does not get adjusted after a
failure, yielding expected second-period prots Π−2 = ρ
−
2 X1θ
hR = ρ(1−X1θ
h)
ρ(1−X1θh)+(1−ρ)X1θ
hR.
This allows us to state
Lemma A4: Assume the capacity can be adjusted in the second pe-
riod. Then, the rst-period investment level under isolated entry equals X1 =
(k+2δρθhRθh)−
√
(k+2δρθhRθh)
2
−3δρθhρθhR
(
δR(θh)
2
+2k(1+δ)
)
3δρθhk
.
Proof :
Total expected prots are equal to
Πiso = X1ρRθ
h −K(X1) + δ
(
ρX1θ
hΠ+2 + (1− ρX1θh)Π−2
)
Substituting allows us to state the rst-order condition:
ρRθh − kX1 + δ
(
ρθh
(Rθh)
2
2k
+ 3ρθhk
X21
2
+ ρθhR− 2ρX1θhRθh
)
= 0, with
X1 =
(k+2δρθhRθh)±
√
(k+2δρθhRθh)
2
−3δρθhρθhR
(
δR(θh)
2
+2k(1+δ)
)
3δρθhk
The second order condition then guarantees that the stated level is a maximum, while
the other level constitutes a minimum.
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Sequential Entry
We rst proceed with sequential entry and show that the resulting capacity in A is
higher than under isolated entry. Under sequential entry, the situation in country B is
identical to the case without the option to adjust one's capacity; thus XSeqB =
ρ+−B θ
hRB
kB
,
yields expected prots in B, ΠseqB =
(ρ+−B θhRB)
2
2kB
− FB.
Furthermore, the considerations in A in the second period are equivalent to isolated
entry. A success yields a second-period capacity X2A =
RAθ
h
kA
associated with prots
Π+2A =
(RAθh)
2
2kA
+ kA
X21A
2
. A failure leaves the capacity unchanged and gives second-period
prots Π−2 = ρ
−
2AX1Aθ
hRA =
ρA(1−X1Aθh)
ρA(1−X1Aθh)+(1−ρA)
X1Aθ
hRA.
Now we can state
Lemma A5: Assume the capacity can be adjusted in the second period. Then, the
rst-period investment level in the rst country entered under sequential entry equals
XSeq1A =
2δρAθ
hθhRA+kA−
√
(2δρAθhθhRA+kA)
2
−4 3
2
δρAθhkAρAθh
(
RA(1+δ)+δ
(RAθh)
2
2kA
+δΠseqB
)
3δρAθhkA
.
Proof :
Total prots equal
ΠSeq = XSeq1A ρAθ
hRA − kA
(XSeq1A )
2
2
− FA + δXSeqA1 ρAθh
(
(RAθh)
2
2kA
+ kA
X21A
2
+ ΠseqB
)
+δρA(1−X1Aθh)X1AθhRA, which implies the rst order condition
(XSeqA1 )
2 3
2
δρAθ
hkA−XSeq1A
(
2δρAθ
hθhRA + kA
)
+ρAθ
h
(
RA(1 + δ) + δ
(RAθh)
2
2kA
+ δΠseqB
)
=
0 and potential capacity levels
XSeq1A =
2δρAθ
hθhRA+kA±
√
(2δρAθhθhRA+kA)
2
−4 3
2
δρAθhkAρAθh
(
RA(1+δ)+δ
(RAθh)
2
2kA
+δΠseqB
)
3δρAθhkA
.
The second order condition guarantees that the stated level is a maximum.
This allows us to constitute
Lemma A6: Assume the capacity can be adjusted in the second period. Then, the
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rst-period investment level in the rst country entered under sequential entry is higher
there than when this country was entered in isolation.
Proof :
Xseq1A ≥ X iso1A is satised as long as 2kAδΠ
seq
B > 0, which obviously is the case.
Simultaneous Entry
We can not always state that simultaneous and isolated entry lead to identical out-
comes. Now, a success in A could induce a capacity adjustment in B even after a failure
in B was observed. Thus, the capacity under simultaneous might be higher than under
isolated entry. Yet, it will never be as high as under sequential entry. The reason is
that sequential entry constitutes the most extreme case of the possibility stated above.
As X1B = 0, ρ
+−
B > ρB, and a success in A leads to an increase of the capacity in B
even though a failure occured there (which had to happen with probability 1). As the
higher capacity in A under sequential entry is induced by the extra prots expected in
B, it is obvious that sequential entry is always associated with a higher capacity than
simultaneous entry. The reason is that these expected extra prots are highest when no
previous investments in B occured (otherwise, the updated belief would be lower).
Appendix IV  Tables
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Dependent Variable:
Location Decision 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013
Host-country Variables:
Tax 0.301 0.292 0.291 0.282 0.276
log GDP 25.750 25.572 25.575 25.762 25.882
InvestFree 60.860 59.292 58.100 57.850 57.518
InvestCost 26.782 28.383 31.163 28.539 21.810
CPI 4.756 4.676 4.562 4.695 4.895
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent 8.103 8.131 8.158 8.106 8.025
log Distance to 1st 8.407 8.427 8.373 8.273
log Distance to 2nd 8.461 8.418 8.312
log Distance to 3rd 8.441 8.400
log Distance to 4th 8.498
Border to parent 0.104 0.093 0.090 0.097 0.102
Border to 1st 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.037
Border to 2nd 0.030 0.032 0.039
Border to 3rd 0.034 0.034
Border to 4th 0.041
Language same as parent 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.026
Language same as 1st 0.137 0.132 0.129 0.111
Language same as 2nd 0.137 0.129 0.095
Language same as 3rd 0.124 0.137
Language same as 4th 0.133
Colony of parent 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.026
Colony of 1st 0.052 0.048 0.048 0.223
Colony of 2nd 0.049 0.043 0.198
Colony of 3rd 0.048 0.194
Colony of 4th 0.210
Same country as 1st 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.017
Same country as 2nd 0.010 0.013 0.016
Same country as 3rd 0.011 0.007
Same country as 4th 0.013
GTA with parent 0.221 0.199 0.206 0.231 0.261
GTA with 1st 0.173 0.181 0.202 0.242
GTA with 2nd 0.192 0.201 0.262
GTA with 3rd 0.196 0.241
GTA with 4th 0.179
Observations 1,164,529 402,359 199,168 90,716 74,876
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Table 2: Sequential Location Decision (Basic Results)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Host-country Variables:
Tax -1.626*** -1.619*** -1.613*** -3.346*** 0.742
(0.191) (0.343) (0.468) (0.698) (0.704)
log GDP 0.836*** 0.757*** 0.664*** 0.749*** 0.524***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031)
InvestFree 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
InvestCost -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI 0.042*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.038 -0.021
(0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028)
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent -0.522*** -0.251*** -0.033 0.011 0.315***
(0.016) (0.030) (0.043) (0.069) (0.076)
log Distance to 1st -0.538*** -0.358*** -0.217*** -0.267***
(0.021) (0.030) (0.050) (0.063)
log Distance to 2nd -0.347*** -0.216*** -0.148***
(0.030) (0.047) (0.057)
log Distance to 3rd -0.367*** -0.455***
(0.048) (0.058)
log Distance to 4th -0.272***
(0.044)
Border to parent 0.535*** 0.371*** 0.318*** 0.474*** 0.272**
(0.028) (0.051) (0.074) (0.108) (0.114)
Border to 1st -0.156** 0.016 -0.130 -0.568***
(0.059) (0.084) (0.152) (0.180)
Border to 2nd 0.199** -0.064 0.352**
(0.083) (0.142) (0.146)
Border to 3rd -0.078 0.630***
(0.141) (0.148)
Border to 4th -0.258*
(0.150)
continued
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Table 2: Sequential Location Decision (Basic Results)
(continued)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Language same as parent 0.378*** 0.251*** 0.297*** 0.031 -0.486***
(0.033) (0.062) (0.092) (0.150) (0.167)
Language same as 1st 0.087 -0.321*** -0.129 0.424***
(0.057) (0.087) (0.132) (0.154)
Language same as 2nd -0.276*** -0.059 -0.438***
(0.087) (0.130) (0.166)
Language same as 3rd -0.188 -0.554***
(0.132) (0.149)
Language same as 4th 0.163
(0.127)
Colony of parent 0.361*** 0.339*** 0.624*** -0.208 0.565***
(0.047) (0.085) (0.118) (0.196) (0.204)
Colony of 1st 0.429*** 0.611*** 0.273* -0.113
(0.066) (0.096) (0.157) (0.198)
Colony of 2nd 0.653*** 0.247* 0.132
(0.095) (0.150) (0.205)
Colony of 3rd 0.525*** -0.076
(0.140) (0.193)
Colony of 4th 0.019
(0.146)
Same country as 1st -0.226** -0.282* 0.105 -0.415
(0.100) (0.162) (0.256) (0.340)
Same country as 2nd -0.551*** -0.006 -0.061
(0.170) (0.223) (0.251)
Same country as 3rd -0.107 -0.680*
(0.249) (0.370)
Same country as 4th -0.214
(0.273)
continued
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Table 2: Sequential Location Decision (Basic Results)
(concluded)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
GTA with parent 0.073** -0.221*** -0.188** -0.543*** -0.088
(0.029) (0.055) (0.081) (0.128) (0.149)
GTA with 1st 0.535*** 0.333*** 0.330*** 0.153
(0.051) (0.078) (0.119) (0.148)
GTA with 2nd 0.410*** 0.350*** 0.223*
(0.078) (0.121) (0.126)
GTA with 3rd 0.316*** -0.310**
(0.116) (0.136)
GTA with 4th 0.471***
(0.120)
Pseudo R2 0.2258 0.2819 0.2706 0.2553 0.2255
Observations 1,164,529 402,359 199,168 90,716 74,876
Location decisions 15,165 4,694 2,249 1,099 958
Years between decisions 1.999 1.611 1.478 1.326
Notes: Conditional logit model. If the MNE has chosen two (or more) locations in phase p − 1,
we use the greater investment (measured in xed assets) as reference for the investment in phase
p. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. Location decisions reports the actual number of location decisions made
(Location decision = 1). Years between decisions are the average years between the respective
(sequential) location decisions made by the multinationals in the sample. Control variables are
take from dierent sources. Tax is the statutory tax rate of a host country. The tax data is
collected from databases provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD)
and tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG. log GDP measures the real GDP
at constant U.S. dollars of the year 2000 and is taken from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators 2009. The investment freedom index InvestFree is taken from the Heritage Indicators
database. The index can take on values between 0 and 100; higher values are associated with more
investment freedom. InvestCost is from World Bank's Doing Business Database and measures the
cost of starting a business relative to income per capita. CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is
published annually by Transparency International. It ranks countries in terms of perceived levels
of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The scores range from 10
(country perceived as virtually corruption free) to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt).
log Distance is the log of the distance (in kilometer) between the most populated cities in the
host country and the country of the previous investment. As to the bilateral variables for the
rst investment, we use Germany as the reference country. Border is a common border indicator,
Language a common language indicator, Colony a former colony indicator, Same country a dummy
indicating whether the host country and the country of the previous investment are the same. GTA
is an indicator for the existence of a general trade agreement indicator between the host country
and the country of the previous investment. The bilateral variables are either taken from the Centre
d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (log Distance, Border, Language, Colony,
Same country), or from the World Trade Organization (GTA).
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of Continuous Variables
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Host-country Variables:
Tax -.0200 -.0173 -.0168 -.0372 .0088
log GDP .0103 .0081 .0069 .0083 .0062
InvestFree .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0002
InvestCost -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002
CPI .0005 .0000 -.0000 -.0004 -.0001
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent -.0064 -.0027 -.0003 .0001 .0037
log Distance to 1st -.0057 -.0037 -.0024 -.0032
log Distance to 2nd -.0036 -.0024 -.0017
log Distance to 3rd -.0041 -.0054
log Distance to 4th -.0032
Notes: Marginal eects correspond to Table 2 (Basic Results). The values shown are the
average marginal eects. The latter are obtained as pj(x)/∂xjk = pj(x)[1 − pj(x)]βk,
where pj is the response probability given by Equation 3.10.
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Table 4: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity I)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Host-country Variables:
Tax -1.279*** -1.599*** -1.637*** -3.331*** 0.909
(0.193) (0.343) (0.469) (0.698) (0.708)
log GDP 0.584*** 0.667*** 0.606*** 0.764*** 0.617***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.027) (0.042) (0.041)
InvestFree 0.016*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
InvestCost -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI 0.011* -0.009 -0.010 -0.035 -0.017
(0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent -0.469*** -0.232*** -0.021 0.008 0.299***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.043) (0.069) (0.075)
log Distance to 1st -0.530*** -0.354*** -0.219*** -0.283***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.050) (0.061)
log Distance to 2nd -0.345*** -0.217*** -0.151***
(0.029) (0.046) (0.056)
log Distance to 3rd -0.368*** -0.461***
(0.047) (0.057)
log Distance to 4th -0.271***
(0.043)
Border to parent 0.313*** 0.293*** 0.268*** 0.485*** 0.343***
(0.028) (0.052) (0.076) (0.109) (0.115)
Border to 1st -0.148** 0.031 -0.133 -0.564***
(0.059) (0.084) (0.151) (0.179)
Border to 2nd 0.194** -0.061 0.341**
(0.083) (0.142) (0.146)
Border to 3rd -0.078 0.628***
(0.141) (0.146)
Border to 4th -0.275*
(0.150)
continued
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Table 4: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity I)
(continued)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Language same as parent 0.326*** 0.254*** 0.304*** 0.027 -0.515***
(0.032) (0.061) (0.092) (0.150) (0.169)
Language same as 1st 0.092 -0.321*** -0.132 0.361**
(0.056) (0.087) (0.132) (0.157)
Language same as 2nd -0.281*** -0.059 -0.419**
(0.086) (0.130) (0.166)
Language same as 3rd -0.186 -0.557***
(0.132) (0.148)
Language same as 4th 0.157
(0.126)
Colony of parent 0.441*** 0.355*** 0.627*** -0.205 0.601***
(0.046) (0.084) (0.117) (0.196) (0.206)
Colony of 1st 0.378*** 0.587*** 0.282* 0.017
(0.067) (0.097) (0.157) (0.202)
Colony of 2nd 0.636*** 0.252* 0.192
(0.095) (0.150) (0.202)
Colony of 3rd 0.531*** -0.041
(0.139) (0.191)
Colony of 4th 0.055
(0.147)
Same country as 1st -0.213** -0.281* 0.105 -0.450
(0.101) (0.162) (0.255) (0.340)
Same country as 2nd -0.549*** -0.008 -0.063
(0.171) (0.222) (0.249)
Same country as 3rd -0.108 -0.693*
(0.248) (0.368)
Same country as 4th -0.218
(0.271)
continued
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Table 4: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity I)
(concluded)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
GTA with parent 0.063** -0.214*** -0.179** -0.546*** -0.135
(0.028) (0.054) (0.080) (0.128) (0.148)
GTA with 1st 0.519 0.325*** 0.332*** 0.183
(0.051) (0.078) (0.119) (0.146)
GTA with 2nd 0.401*** 0.351*** 0.222*
(0.078) (0.121) (0.124)
GTA with 3rd 0.317*** -0.284**
(0.115) (0.134)
GTA with 4th 0.472***
(0.118)
StockInv 0.428*** 0.173*** 0.117*** -0.034 -0.229***
(0.015) (0.028) (0.041) (0.060) (0.077)
Pseudo R2 0.2307 0.2827 0.2710 0.2553 0.2265
Observations 1,164,529 402,359 199,168 90,716 74,876
Location decisions 15,165 4,694 2,249 1,099 958
Years between decisions 1.999 1.611 1.478 1.326
Notes: Conditional logit model. Sensitivity I : All estimations additionally include the stock of all
German investments in country j prior to rm i's investment, StockInv. If the MNE has chosen two (or
more) locations in phase p − 1, we use the greater investment (measured in xed assets) as reference
for the investment in phase p. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Location decisions reports the actual number of location
decisions made (Location decision = 1). Years between decisions are the average years between the
respective (sequential) location decisions made by the multinationals in the sample. Control variables
are take from dierent sources. Tax is the statutory tax rate of a host country. The tax data is
collected from databases provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and
tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG. log GDP measures the real GDP at constant
U.S. dollars of the year 2000 and is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2009.
The investment freedom index InvestFree is taken from the Heritage Indicators database. The index
can take on values between 0 and 100; higher values are associated with more investment freedom.
InvestCost is from World Bank's Doing Business Database and measures the cost of starting a business
relative to income per capita. CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is published annually by Transparency
International. It ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert
assessments and opinion surveys. The scores range from 10 (country perceived as virtually corruption
free) to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt). log Distance is the log of the distance (in
kilometer) between the most populated cities in the host country and the country of the previous
investment. As to the bilateral variables for the rst investment, we use Germany as the reference
country. Border is a common border indicator, Language a common language indicator, Colony a
former colony indicator, Same country a dummy indicating whether the host country and the country
of the previous investment are the same. GTA is an indicator for the existence of a general trade
agreement indicator between the host country and the country of the previous investment. The bilateral
variables are either taken from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (log
Distance, Border, Language, Colony, Same country), or from the World Trade Organization (GTA).
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Table 5: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity II)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Host-country Variables:
Tax -1.626*** -1.622*** -1.498*** -3.418*** 0.688
(0.190) (0.343) (0.469) (0.689) (0.725)
log GDP 0.836*** 0.757*** 0.663*** 0.754*** 0.536***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031)
InvestFree 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
InvestCost -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI 0.042*** 0.003 -0.007 -0.042 -0.023
(0.006) (0.011) (0.016) (0.026) (0.028)
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent -0.521*** -0.251*** -0.042 0.047 0.352***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.044) (0.069) (0.078)
log Distance to 1st -0.538*** -0.375*** -0.228*** -0.249***
(0.020) (0.030) (0.051) (0.066)
log Distance to 2nd -0.296*** -0.219*** -0.246***
(0.032) (0.048) (0.057)
log Distance to 3rd -0.358*** -0.363***
(0.046) (0.058)
log Distance to 4th -0.297***
(0.048)
Border to parent 0.535*** 0.371*** 0.281*** 0.462*** 0.315***
(0.027) (0.051) (0.074) (0.108) (0.114)
Border to 1st -0.161*** 0.143* -0.139 -0.509***
(0.059) (0.086) (0.151) (0.176)
Border to 2nd -0.083 -0.025 0.208
(0.098) (0.142) (0.155)
Border to 3rd 0.006 0.641***
(0.137) (0.145)
Border to 4th -0.302**
(0.147)
continued
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Table 5: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity II)
(continued)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Language same as parent 0.377*** 0.251*** 0.339*** 0.052 -0.429***
(0.033) (0.062) (0.093) (0.148) (0.166)
Language same as 1st 0.092 -0.373*** -0.113 0.389***
(0.056) (0.089) (0.134) (0.149)
Language same as 2nd -0.202** -0.188 -0.605***
(0.084) (0.130) (0.164)
Language same as 3rd -0.191 -0.483***
(0.138) (0.146)
Language same as 4th 0.395***
(0.118)
Colony of parent 0.361*** 0.339*** 0.659*** -0.146 0.509**
(0.046) (0.085) (0.119) (0.195) (0.204)
Colony of 1st 0.427*** 0.716*** 0.346** -0.194
(0.066) (0.101) (0.160) (0.186)
Colony of 2nd 0.443*** 0.224 -0.007
(0.096) (0.150) (0.201)
Colony of 3rd 0.382 0.234
(0.146) (0.190)
Colony of 4th -0.248*
(0.149)
Same country as 1st -0.225** -0.452*** 0.046 -0.448
(0.100) (0.165) (0.252) (0.341)
Same country as 2nd -0.084 0.347 0.417
(0.162) (0.222) (0.255)
Same country as 3rd -0.220 -0.606**
(0.249) (0.315)
Same country as 4th -0.104
(0.275)
continued
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Table 5: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity II)
(concluded)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
GTA with parent 0.073*** -0.220*** -0.186** -0.574*** -0.072
(0.028) (0.054) (0.082) (0.130) (0.155)
GTA with 1st 0.534*** 0.309*** 0.333*** 0.206
(0.051) (0.078) (0.122) (0.151)
GTA with 2nd 0.418*** 0.299** 0.209
(0.081) (0.122) (0.133)
GTA with 3rd 0.364*** -0.107
(0.115) (0.137)
GTA with 4th 0.152
(0.132)
Pseudo R2 0.2258 0.2819 0.2646 0.2564 0.2271
Observations 1,164,529 402,240 198,531 91,212 75,348
Location decisions 15,165 4,693 2,242 1,105 964
Years between decisions 1.998 1.613 1.485 1.332
Notes: Conditional logit model. Sensitivity II : If the MNE has chosen two (or more) locations in
phase p − 1, we use the greater investment (measured in total assets rather than in xed assets)
as reference for the investment in phase p. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Location decisions reports the
actual number of location decisions made (Location decision = 1). Years between decisions are the
average years between the respective (sequential) location decisions made by the multinationals
in the sample. Control variables are take from dierent sources. Tax is the statutory tax rate of
a host country. The tax data is collected from databases provided by the International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG.
log GDP measures the real GDP at constant U.S. dollars of the year 2000 and is taken from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2009. The investment freedom index InvestFree is
taken from the Heritage Indicators database. The index can take on values between 0 and 100;
higher values are associated with more investment freedom. InvestCost is from World Bank's
Doing Business Database and measures the cost of starting a business relative to income per
capita. CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is published annually by Transparency International.
It ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments
and opinion surveys. The scores range from 10 (country perceived as virtually corruption free)
to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt). log Distance is the log of the distance (in
kilometer) between the most populated cities in the host country and the country of the previous
investment. As to the bilateral variables for the rst investment, we use Germany as the reference
country. Border is a common border indicator, Language a common language indicator, Colony
a former colony indicator, Same country a dummy indicating whether the host country and the
country of the previous investment are the same. GTA is an indicator for the existence of a general
trade agreement indicator between the host country and the country of the previous investment.
The bilateral variables are either taken from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales (log Distance, Border, Language, Colony, Same country), or from the World Trade
Organization (GTA).
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Table 6: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity III)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Host-country Variables:
Tax -1.626*** -1.623*** -2.346*** -3.411** 1.710
(0.191) (0.343) (0.795) (1.678) (2.936)
log GDP 0.836*** 0.758*** 0.760*** 0.794*** 0.525***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.036) (0.085) (0.112)
InvestFree 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009 0.027**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.013)
InvestCost -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -.012* -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.012)
CPI 0.042*** 0.003 -0.046* -0.067 -0.160
(0.006) (0.011) (0.027) (0.056) (0.117)
Bilateral Variables:
log Distance to parent -0.521*** -0.252*** -0.099 0.144 0.634*
(0.016) (0.030) (0.069) (0.167) (.337)
log Distance to 1st -0.538*** -0.429*** -0.280** -1.064***
(0.020) (0.045) (.114) (0.227)
log Distance to 2nd -0.348*** -0.368*** 0.243
(0.049) (0.112) (0.315)
log Distance to 3rd -0.248** -0.732***
(0.125) (0.150)
log Distance to 4th -0.271
(0.222)
Border to parent 0.535*** 0.372*** 0.345*** 0.240 0.739
(0.027) (0.051) (0.122) (0.284) (0.534)
Border to 1st -0.160*** -0.109 0.517 -0.645
(0.059) (0.145) (0.349) (0.846)
Border to 2nd -0.163 -0.749* 0.896
(0.156) (0.400) (0.637)
Border to 3rd 0.320 0.383
(0.316) (0.571)
Border to 4th 0.292
(0.638)
continued
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Table 6: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity III)
(continued)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Language same as parent 0.377*** 0.251*** 0.225 0.601 -0.974
(0.033) (0.061) (0.155) (0.380) (0.808)
Language same as 1st 0.091 -0.278** -1.018*** -0.215
(0.056) (0.137) (0.335) (0.673)
Language same as 2nd 0.163 -.023 0.122
(0.130) (0.340) (0.623)
Language same as 3rd -0.109 0.337
(0.340) (0.583)
Language same as 4th -1.121
(0.719)
Colony of parent 0.361*** 0.339*** 0.650*** 0.686* 0.434
(0.046) (0.085) (.181) (0.409) (0.947)
Colony of 1st 0.427*** 0.437*** 0.844** 0.851
(0.066) (0.162) (0.350) (0.670)
Colony of 2nd 0.320** 0.314 -1.620
(0.154) (0.389) (1.223)
Colony of 3rd -0.136 -1.049
(0.381) (1.187)
Colony of 4th -0.365
(0.773)
Same country as 1st -0.224** -0.296 -2.006** -0.292
(0.100) (0.267) (0.875) (0.930)
Same country as 2nd 0.033 -0.009 -1.211
(0.245) (0.578) (1.216)
Same country as 3rd 1.030** -1.531
(0.439) (1.360)
Same country as 4th 1.958*
(1.056)
continued
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Table 6: Sequential Location Decision (Sensitivity III)
(concluded)
Foreign Investment of the MNE:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
GTA with parent 0.073*** -0.220*** -0.278** -0.157 -0.004
(0.028) (0.054) (0.127) (0.296) (0.697)
GTA with 1st 0.534*** 0.256** -0.290 -0.821
(0.051) (0.125) (0.278) (0.551)
GTA with 2nd 0.305** 0.293 -0.055
(0.128) (0.308) (0.600)
GTA with 3rd 0.367 -0.396
(0.281) (0.565)
GTA with 4th 0.440
(0.606)
Pseudo R2 0.2258 0.2819 0.2845 0.2695 0.3331
Observations 1,164,529 402,256 79,677 15,999 4,688
Location decisions 15,165 4,693 885 190 60
Years between decisions 1.999 1.821 2.034 1.90
Notes: Conditional logit model. Sensitivity III : We only include sequential investments if the
MNE has chosen only one location in phase p − 1. In such cases, we have precise information
on the reference investments in phase p. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Location decisions reports the
actual number of location decisions made (Location decision = 1). Years between decisions are the
average years between the respective (sequential) location decisions made by the multinationals
in the sample. Control variables are take from dierent sources. Tax is the statutory tax rate of
a host country. The tax data is collected from databases provided by the International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, and KPMG.
log GDP measures the real GDP at constant U.S. dollars of the year 2000 and is taken from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2009. The investment freedom index InvestFree is
taken from the Heritage Indicators database. The index can take on values between 0 and 100;
higher values are associated with more investment freedom. InvestCost is from World Bank's
Doing Business Database and measures the cost of starting a business relative to income per
capita. CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is published annually by Transparency International.
It ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments
and opinion surveys. The scores range from 10 (country perceived as virtually corruption free)
to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt). log Distance is the log of the distance (in
kilometer) between the most populated cities in the host country and the country of the previous
investment. As to the bilateral variables for the rst investment, we use Germany as the reference
country. Border is a common border indicator, Language a common language indicator, Colony
a former colony indicator, Same country a dummy indicating whether the host country and the
country of the previous investment are the same. GTA is an indicator for the existence of a general
trade agreement indicator between the host country and the country of the previous investment.
The bilateral variables are either taken from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales (log Distance, Border, Language, Colony, Same country), or from the World Trade
Organization (GTA).
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Table 7: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Entry
Maximum # of investments: (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is mean investment size measured as xed assets
Sequential entry 2307.46*** 1843.77*** 948.83*
(827.86) (635.99) (586.86)
R-sq 0.9279 0.9167 0.8444
Observations 1,812 2,543 2,954
Dependent variable is mean investment size measured as total assets
Sequential entry 23596.19*** 18705.9** 14582.75*
(6560.25) (7739.50) (8228.59)
R-sq 0.9409 0.8581 0.7853
Observations 1,812 2,543 2,954
Dependent variable is mean sales-to-total-asset ratio
Sequential entry .253*** .216*** .208***
(.069) (.056) (.052)
R-sq 0.0425 0.0386 0.0392
Observations 1,812 2,543 2,954
Share of sequential entries .582 .629 .651
Notes: Maximum # of investments is the maximum number of foreign entities per rm which have been
established (one-plant rms are not considered). For example, the column denoted by (3) indicates that
rms have established 3 or 2 investments. The dummy variable Sequential entry indicates whether the
investments have been established simultaneously (Sequential entry = 0) or sequentially (Sequential entry
= 1). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively. For reasons of comparability of rms, the above coecients are obtained from cross-
section OLS regressions which also control for a rm's total sum of investments and averages of all country
controls used in the conditional logit regressions above.
Table 8: Signals for one-plant & simultaneous-plant units
Dependent variable is xed assets of an aliate
one-plant & all
one-plant simultaneous-plant
units units
Sales/Fixed Assets -2.510* -0.234*
(1.417) (0.127)
Observations 6,130 7,477
Sales/Total Assets -957.711** -686.600**
(494.686) (329.551)
Observations 6,765 8,357
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. For reasons of comparability, the above
coecients are obtained from cross-section OLS regressions which also control for averages of
all country controls used in the conditional logit regressions above.
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